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Abstract
The Influence of Language Upon
Supreme Court Voting In Civil Liberties Cases
Sean Wilson, Esq.
Scholars such as Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth contend that U.S. Supreme Court decisions
are based primarily upon the ideological beliefs of the justices. However, in this work I show that this
conclusion is exaggerated. The aggregation of votes into a summary statistic (the percent liberal
rating) and its use by Segal and Spaeth in a regression having only 21 cases creates misleading results.
The truth is that political ideology is a fluctuating influence upon the Court. In some areas of civil
liberties voting, ideology is a poor explanation of how cases are decided (e.g., core political speech).
But in other areas, ideology is a much stronger explanation (e.g., search and seizure).
In this work, I investigate whether the clarity of legal commands can explain why the influence
of ideology fluctuates so much. My hypothesis is that “value voting” is inversely related to how
clearly a right is designated by legal commands. That is, where statutes or constitutional language
clearly designates a claim to liberty, ideology is a weak predictor of votes, but where law is vague and
indeterminate in its nomenclature, value-voting rules.
This dissertation has both a qualitative and quantitative component. It also relies upon
literature that is multi-disciplinary. It accomplishes following:(1) constructs a criteria for rigidity in
legal language; (2) selects cases for content analysis that meet the criteria; (3) assesses the
relationship between values and votes within the selection using logistic regression analysis; (4)
assesses the influence of textual rigidity upon votes cast by each individual justice for all selected
cases using logistic regression analysis and (6) re-assess the attitudinal model’s goodness of fit for
all civil liberties cases in a way that avoids ecological problems and micronumerous cases. The results
of this work will show that the influence of political ideology upon judging in the Supreme Court has
been overstated in the literature, and that command rigidity is a statistical predictor of judicial votes.
In short, “law” matters.
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Chapter 1:
The Influence of Political Ideology
on the U.S. Supreme Court

INTRODUCTION
After the United States Supreme Court decided Bush v. Gore,1 the case that ended the 2000
presidential election, the decision was said by many to epitomize the politics of law.2 Specifically, it
was said to show that the Rehnquist Court is group of ideologues primarily motivated by a hidden
conservative political agenda rather than “neutrally interpreting” law. Or as leading empirical scholars
of the Court, Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, said:
If [Bush v. Gore] tells us anything, it’s that the Supreme Court is more secure and more
comfortable than it has ever been in pushing an agenda that is not only activist and
conservative, but also blatantly partisan.3

These researches also told us that the election case was not a mere aberration; it was a
difference only in size rather than kind. They write, “While Bush v. Gore may appear to be the most
egregious example of judicial policy making, we suggest that it is only because of its recency.”4 Other
examples include: voting to weaken the Americans with Disabilities Act ;5 using the commerce clause
to strike down the Violence Against Women Act;6 declaring provisions of the “Brady Bill”
unconstitutional;7 voting against age discrimination claims8 and workers seeking overtime;9 and using
the Tenth Amendment’s “sovereign immunity” doctrine to frustrate the pursuit of legal claims against
state governments.10 The authors then characterize the voting bloc that defines and empowers the
Court’s hidden conservative agenda as “The Rehnquist Five,”11 which are: Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence
Thomas.
1
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Three years later, however, the fashion of the commentary changed. In June of 2003 when
the Court decided Lawrence v. Texas,12 the decision protecting sodomy – and as well Grutter v.
Bollinger,13 the decision upholding affirmative action – newspaper stories now declared that the
Court had turned to the left.14 Or as two leading commentators remarked on the program A
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer:
I think anyone who thinks this is a conservative court is smoking something ... because this
court has done things which the Warren Court never dreamed of doing ... so I really don't
think this is a conservative court at all, despite the fact that seven of the Justices had been
appointed by Republicans, it's not the kind of court conservatives would want.15
-- John Yoo of the University of California-Berkeley
I would suggest that the court is really quite a moderate court or a centrist court, that in fact
expresses a great deal of the values expressed elsewhere in society, rather than seeking to
change those values. ... I would say that the big theme of the court is that it's a centrist,
moderate court that expresses the values of most Americans.16
– Kathleen Sullivan, Dean of Stanford University Law School

Obviously, these characterizations are contradictory. The simple fact of the matter is that,
sometimes, voting on the Court appears to fit a political stereotype, but other times it does not. Other
recent examples where voting patterns seem less ideologically driven include the Court’s decision not
to influence the partisan control the U.S. Senate in the 1992 midterm elections;17 the decision granting
due process rights to suspected terrorists captured in battle and held by the military outside United
States borders;18 the decision outlawing the death penalty for mentally-retarded murderers;19 and the
decisions declaring unconstitutional many sentencing-enhancement laws that were originally enacted
to be “tough on crime.”20 I should probably mention the Rehnquist Court’s infamous decisions
protecting flag burning21 and abortion, 22 even though they are now too old to be considered “recent.”
Why does this happen? What factors might cause conservative and liberal justices to vote as
one “expects” for some cases but not others? Is it strategy? Is it fear of the other branches of
government? Is it a larger concern for the integrity of legal text or doctrine? Legal philosopher and
law professor Ronald Dworkin suggests that the reason why justices behave the way they do has
something to do with the “gravitational force” of law.23 Essentially, Dworkin’s point is that justices
are influenced by important legal principles and moral standards – things that give weight or structure
to decision making, but are not themselves determinative.24 But Segal and Spaeth (and others)
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suggest that “principles” do not structure justices away from their biases; they only fortify them.25
Interestingly, what hides beneath this debate is a dispute not so much about politics, but
epistemology. One view sees the concept of legal justification as a force external to, and in
competition with, the judicial will, while the other sees it as a toy or instrument of such a will. In this
work, I help explain why voting on the Court appears politically stereotypical in some cases but not
others. In doing this, I also show that the Dworkin view of legal justification seems to be a more
accurate description of how justices tend to behave than Segal and Spaeth’s view.26 Because this
revelation occurs in an empirical model of judging rather than just philosophically, I expect it to shift
the paradigm of scholarship in judicial politics.
What I show in this work is a simple, yet profound, notion: law matters. More specifically,
I show that the legal words of the Constitution do, indeed, effect how justices decide cases. The way
that legal language is shown to structure decision making is through a concept I refer to as “language
rigidity.” Rigidity is simply the idea of how clear the words of a sentence are. Some sentences are
more precise in meaning than others. My work develops a criteria for placing the meaning of certain
sentences in the Constitution in an ordinal level of rank according to their clarity. I then use a logistic
regression analysis to show that language rigidity effects voting on the Court.
My central theory is that “value voting” – voting one’s political ideology – is much harder
for justices to do when the words of the Constitution or statute being interpreted do not seem to
allow it. But when the words of a legal command are vague and indeterminate, I expect value voting
to be more widespread. I refer to this theory as the “rigidity hypothesis.” By validating it, I
demonstrate that law is a force that structures and even tempers the political bias of justices. Quite
simply, when the words of law are stern and clear, political stereotypes fail to describe judicial
behavior very well. But when law is “absent” – when its words are poetic and vague – the critique
of a political court seems much more accurate.
Although the validation of the rigidity hypothesis is itself important, its corollary may be an
equally remarkable contribution to the judicial-politics literature. That is, in proving that law matters,
I also prove something that is necessarily related: the force of political ideology on the Court is
fluctuating rather than defining. This finding is important because the current empirical research in
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political science seems to misunderstand it. My work shows, for example, that political ideology
seems to be a force that dominates some areas of Court voting – search-and-seizure and obscenity
cases – but not other areas (e.g, core political speech). I like to describe this revelation with the
metaphor of ocean tides. For some controversies, the Court experiences high political tide; for others,
the political tide is low.
Having just described what I prove, let me now describe how I present it. My work consists
of six chapters. Chapter 1 examines the role that ideology is said to play in Supreme Court judging
according to both American legal culture and the scholarship of empirical researchers. Chapter 2
explains the concept of language rigidity and provides an empirical design for its use as a variable in
a logistic regression analysis. Chapters 3 through 5 review both the content of Supreme Court
opinions as well as voting patterns in the cases selected for this work. Chapter 6 concludes by
demonstrating the validity of my hypotheses and discussing the relevance of these findings.
Before beginning, I must make one additional comment about a style convention that I use
throughout this work. The word “law” can be a troublesome concept at times, because what it refers
to can change from one paragraph to the next. When people say, for example, that “law” is a
“science,” what they are really saying is that judging is a science. When I mean “law” to refer in a
grandiose way to “judging,” I will place the word in quotation marks. When I mean it in to refer
simply to a command from a sovereign – i.e., the words written down in code books or the rules
extracted from case decisions (often called “positive law”) – I will not use the quotation marks.27 Of
course, where quotations are required because of ordinary style rules, they are used as well. I hope
this convention helps make my assertions more clear.
The Controversy Over Legal Justification
Legal scholars have had great debates about what constitutes the basis of legal decision
making. It is important to understand this dispute before one can properly understand the claims that
empirical researchers make about Supreme Court judging. In this section, I describe the different
views that American legal culture has generated about the concept of legal justification. I present
these views historically at first, but develop them categorically as the story progresses. What I show
is that all of the views fit into three basic schools of thought: determinism, structuralism and
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skepticism. I define and explain these terms below. I begin my discussion with the classical
approaches.
A. Determinism
In the mid to late 1800s it was common to hear the view that "law" was an autonomous
branch of reasoning – that rules of law were discovered sort of in the manner that are rules of physics
or geometry.28 The scholar who is most associated with the comparison of law to mathematics is
probably Christopher Columbus Langdell, the professor and dean of the Harvard Law School who
invented the "case method" of legal instruction. Although Langdell began teaching at Harvard in
1870, the views that he became associated with had apparently already become popular in legal
culture since at least the time of the Civil War.29
Langdell taught that the specific common-law rules that had developed in England and were
continuing to develop in America were capable of being derived logically (or necessarily) from the
more general category of right to which they belonged. 30 So, for example, once one analyzed the
concept of a "contract" and discovered its core properties – an autonomous exchange of detriment
– one would be forced to arrive at the rules for offer, acceptance and consideration. 31 These rules,
Langdellians claimed, followed necessarily from their mother concept. Just as importantly, the process
of their discovery was "self contained," meaning you did not have to analyze anything other than legal
ideas to find them. It was said, therefore, that you could resolve all future disputes about broken
promises among citizens – be it between merchant-and-consumer or prom dates – by simply looking
inward at "law" and applying necessary rules.
Langdell's orthodoxy – often labeled "formalism" – is different from the other legal classicists
that preceded him. First, formalism is more specific in describing “law's” method than the other
philosophies that tried to objectify legal decision making. It not only declares that judging is objective;
it tries to show how its process makes it so. In doing this, however, Langdell unfortunately placed
all of “law's” hope into a jurisprudence founded upon Platonic conceptualism and Aristotelian logic.
That is, at its epicenter, Langdellian formalism appeals to nothing but the necessary essences of
concepts, reasoning by analogy and syllogisms.
This is clearly different from the way that other classical theorists had described the judicial
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witchcraft. The famous English jurist and scholar William Blackstone, for example, had stressed the
judge's special wisdom in matters of tradition and nature as the source of “law's science.” Blackstone
argued that the common law which had developed in England was really nothing more than the
recognition of those sacred customs which made up the culture and tradition of the society and as
well the natural order of things.32 Hence, tradition and natural law made up the Blackstone wing of
classicism, while analytic conceptualism drove the Langdellian view of "law."
But although the two brands of classicism have different justificatory rhetoric, they share the
same fundamental approach to legal epistemology. Stated another way, they both assert something
critically important about the concept of justification: it is "out there" to be found. All forms of legal
classicism, it seems, assert four general premises about legal justification: (1) that it is more important
to justices than public policy; (2) that it is something separate from a justice's "private" views about
politics; (3) that it can be objectively accessed; and (4) that doing so produces correct answers to
legal questions. Those who tend to believe these premises ultimately adopt the view that judges do
not make law, they find it. I refer to this view as legal determinism.
Determinism was clearly the dominant view in American legal thought from the founding of
the country throughout most, if not all, of the 1800s. It was one of the reasons that Alexander
Hamilton argued in the Federalist Papers that Americans should not fear the federal judiciary.
Hamilton argued not only that the judiciary lacked basic political power – the power over the "purse"
and "sword" – but that it was fundamentally different from the other branches of government. It was
different, he claimed, because judges reach their decisions "neither [by] force nor will, but merely
judgment,"33 meaning that legal justification governs choices, not visa versa. This view is also
captured in the famous quotation of Chief Justice John Marshall, who in 1824 wrote, "Judicial power,
as contradistinguished from the power of the laws, has no existence. Courts are the mere instruments
of the law and can will nothing."34 Interestingly, determinism seems at times to motivate current
Supreme Court justice Antonin Scalia, who wrote in a 1990 opinion:
The very framing of the issue that we purport to decide today – whether our decision ... shall
“apply” retroactively – presupposes a view of our decisions as creating the law, as opposed
to declaring what the law already is. Such a view is contrary to that understanding of “the
judicial power,” US Const, Art III, Sec. I, cl I, which is not only the common and traditional
one, but which is the only one that can justify courts in denying force and effect to the
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unconstitutional enactments of duly elected legislatures ... To hold a governmental act to be
unconstitutional is not to announce that we forbid it, but that the Constitution forbids it ...
(Emphasis in original).35

Legal determinism, of course, is no longer popular in legal culture. The date that it officially
died is hard to assess. Some scholars place its demise as late as 1937, when the Court finally
succumbed to the Roosevelt administration's New Deal programs.36 If, indeed, this is the date when
the legal Humpty fell from the wall, it is safe to say that the process of demise began with Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes' writings in the late 1800s. Holmes was the first prominent legally-trained
American to reject at least the classical versions of determinism. His famous two-volume treatise, The
Common Law, was written in 1881, more than 21 years before he was appointed to the Supreme
Court. Its opening paragraph contains a passage that 20th century legal scholars have now made
famous:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time,
the prevalent moral and political theories, institutions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men, have had a good
deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.
The law ... cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book
of mathematics.37

Holmes' basic point is that judicial decision making is not a function of logic or any other kind
of a priori judgment; it is, simply, an endorsement of desired public policy. One must be careful,
however, not to lump Holmes with the more radical post-modern movement that I will describe in
a moment. As legal historian G. Edward White shows, Holmes was only rejecting classicism, not
determinism as I have defined it.38 Stated another way, he was rejecting only the idea that law's
justification was found in an a priori format. He still believed that "correct" answers existed to legal
problems,39 but being "correct" simply meant choosing the best public policy as dictated by the
empirical needs of the time. For Holmes, therefore, legal epistemology is still objective – the truth is
still outside of the mind and in need of being "found." But finding it takes the form of factual
positivism rather than premises, "logic," nature's order or any other deductive rhetoric.
Holmes' effect on legal culture occurs at two distinct levels: epistemically and
jurisprudentially. I discuss each of these unique contributions separately. Holmes' effect upon legal
epistemology is discussed first. White characterizes Holmes' approach as an appeal to "policy
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science."40 Although this is no doubt accurate, a broader term is needed so that one can classify all
of the various claims that academics will make in the aftermath of Holmes when they marry law with
various forms of social science. Therefore, I refer to the view that "law" is an empirically-driven,
result-oriented science as progressive determinism and the view that “law” is an autonomous, a priori
science as classical determinism. The term "progressive determinism" can be used to describe any
combination of law with social science, so long as the latter is committed to scientific methodology. 41
A good example is the movement in law and economics, which basically says that classical
determinism should be shunned in favor of creating economically efficient rules.
The central feature of progressive determinism is the claim that empirical indices and the
knowledge produced by studies of social phenomena provide the best basis for legal decision making.
This turns “law” into a "growth science" – i.e., a psychology or an anthropology rather than a physics
or a calculous – that allows it to find different "truths" as knowledge progresses. It makes no
difference that the paradigmatic answers are inductive or probabilistic; such is the nature with the
substitution of what philosophers call synthetic truths for analytic ones. The most important point is
that progressive determinism purports to be objective; it selects its truth through the use of
empiricism.
Progressive determinism had quite an impact on legal culture. In the 1920s and 1930s, it was
especially popular with a group of legal scholars who became known as "the realists" and who created
a body of work that is remarkably similar to Holmes' views.42 It also influenced the filing of famous
legal briefs. In 1908, for example, future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis authored a brief in
Muller v. Oregon containing 113 pages of sociological data and only two 2 pages of legal authority.43
The crowning achievement of progressive determinism is probably the Court's unanimous decision
in Brown v. Board of Education, which relied upon social science data about the status of African
American school children as the basis for declaring segregation illegal.
Although progressive determinism remains somewhat of a force in legal culture today, it, like
all movements in legal epistemology, eventually fell out of fashion.44 One of the reasons why its
popularity diminished is probably because of the inability of social science to produce many universal
empirical truths. Economists, for example, generally do not see the same reality as sociologists or
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political scientists (who themselves are not so agreeable about the phenomena they study). Other
reasons for progressive determinism's decline might be placed on the legal system itself, which does
not train judges to understand statistical methodology and which relies upon an organizational culture
that produces two "experts" paid by adversaries to say opposite things. Science simply doesn't look
like "science" very well in the courtroom. Whatever the reasons, progressive determinism is now
largely dormant in American jurisprudence, although it not completely dead.
Having just looked at the new epistemology that Holmes was central to creating in legal
culture, I now consider his impact upon 20th century jurisprudence. There are two developments that
are critical to understanding the consequences of Holmes' "progressive" views: state building and the
role of legislatures. It is no coincidence that classical determinism fell into disfavor precisely at the
time that the federal government began to create its modern administrative state. One of the reasons
that legal culture described its judicial orthodoxy as self-justifying, I contend, is largely because
agrarian society had not produced a significant body of positive law (statutes and administrative
regulations) that judges could use to resolve cases. Lacking large codes that tried to comprehensively
prescribe the conduct of discrete activities – e.g., the Uniform Commercial Code, the Internal
Revenue Code, etc. – classical judges were left to their own judgments about how to structure certain
segments of social order. It is no wonder, therefore, that legal culture invented a rationalization for
why its contribution to policy was special. What else could classical judges rely upon to govern?
But as the modern administrative state was created, federal and state governments started
producing more and more positive law. Scholars have described this phenomenon in such terms as
the growth of "legalism," "statutification" and even "hyperlexis."45 The issue that the growth of
positive law presented for jurisprudence in general, and for the role of the judge in American
government in particular, was indeed a defining one. What do judges do when they are told more and
more by other organs of government how they should rule? Progressive determinism really could not
answer this question very well. If, as the new epistemology said, “law” was ultimately a kind of
empirical policy science, what should judges do with all of these new regulations and statutes? Should
they second guess positive law by obtaining empirical data and conducting policy analysis? Should
they read and cite journal articles instead of precedent? As I indicated above, it is true that on some
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occasions justices did declare acts of Congress unconstitutional by appealing to social science
statistics, but, on the whole, this was only an episodic happenstance and was fundamentally
impractical.
These problems led mainstream legal culture into its only workable premise of retreat: that
the "wisdom" of policy should be judged by the other organs of government.46 I call this the
"deference principle." It says, simply, that judges should substantially defer to the wishes of political
assemblies because they are structured better for making policy choices. The only area where large
deference might not be given is if individuals are being denied important civil liberties or if political
minorities who cannot protect themselves from mob rule are being abused.47 But in the more
"general" matters of economic regulation, the common law, the powers of the federal sovereign, etc.,
the new jurisprudence held that justices should allow political assemblies considerable latitude to
govern.
What is interesting about the "new jurisprudence" is what it does to the form of legal
justification. When you combine the two great consequences of Holmes' thought – that “law” is only
policy, and that courts should defer significantly to assemblies – the inevitable result is the rise to
domination of legal positivism in American legal culture. “Law,” according to positivists, is only what
the legal text says it is, and nothing more. Judges are not logicians, and nor should they be acting as
legislators. What they should be, basically, are readers. Some in the present day might even call them
bureaucrats of a sort. Hence, in the modern 20th century, legal justification begins to rely heavily
upon appeals to word analysis – deploying, e.g., the "plain meaning" rule and statutory canons of
construction. Once again, it is no coincidence that the use of this kind of rationalization accompanies
the construction of the administrative state and its resulting explosion of legalism.
But this is not the end of the dispute about legal justification; it is only the middle. Many legal
scholars did not agree with either the new jurisprudence or the progressive determinism that
ultimately helped to create it. The dissenters basically fall into two opposing groups: those who want
to reestablish some role for analytic conceptualism in judging, and those who want to abolish the idea
of justification completely. I discuss the former first.
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B. Structuralism
There are two things that some scholars did not like about progressive determinism. The first
is that it did not seem to describe very well the phenomenon of judging. Quite simply, those who
actually participate in juristic activities seem to be genuinely influenced by a contemplative force in
"law" that is at least equally important as the urge for a particular result. Much of what judging seems
to be, in fact, is an attempt to broker the one to the other. The second objection that scholars had to
progressive determinism is its suggestion that conceptualism had absolutely no legitimate role in the
judicial mind.48 This seems like an odd suggestion because it is not the ethic that dominates non-legal
reasoning. You would not say to someone involved in any intellectual endeavor, be it empirical or
otherwise, that the goal is to be non-analytical. To some scholars, then, progressive determinism
seemed to be as much of an exaggeration of the data side of the judging equation as classical
determinism was on the theory side.
But it was not only the new epistemology that drew objection, it was legal positivism as well.
Specifically, scholars did not like how positivism defined the concept of “law.” They did not like the
idea that “law” consisted of nothing but the articulated commands of a sovereign. It is undeniable,
of course, that “law” consists primarily of legal rules. But, these scholars said, there should be some
other kind of amorphous property to a legal system that makes sure its commands are rationally
defined, meaningfully applied and given a sense of purpose.49
This realization led to the creation of a new school thought, which I call structuralism. The
basic goals of structuralism are twofold: (1) to re-establish the idea that judging is "special" or distinct
from other kinds of policy choice; and (2) to define its special quality ultimately in epistemic or
justificatory terms. To accomplish this, structuralists basically emphasize two related points: that the
judging process is significantly different from the legislative one, and that, as a result, justices are
influenced by something called legal "principles" or "standards" – things that give weight, but not a
single conclusion, to decision making.
The legal philosopher who is best associated with structuralism is Ronald Dworkin. One can
understand Dworkin's views best by considering his contribution to the concept of "discretion."
Dworkin says that discretion exists in two forms: as naked power and as an exercise of "judgment."50
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The former needs little, if any, decisional basis, but the latter requires something to structure how
decisions are reached.51 A football coach may have power to select a play, for example, but a referee
uses "judgment" to decide whether pass interference occurs. Both use “discretion,” but one relies
upon the license of authority, the other upon the application of an external standard to what he or she
sees. Based on this distinction, Dworkin argues that legal systems are composed not only of rules,
but upon "principles" that give a moral structure to choice.52
The use of a football game is an interesting metaphor. It not only says that the policy process
in majoritarian institutions can be thought of as a competition of sorts, but it suggests that the
participants of the policy game are under two distinct kinds of constraints. The coaches and players
are constrained by their interdependent choices – e.g., if one falls behind, one must select more
passing plays – but the referees (i.e., judges) are constrained by something that is cognitive and
justificatory: the meaning of rules and standards, and how to apply them.
Other scholars besides Dworkin have offered a similar description of judging. However,
because they are less philosophical in method, their emphasis is more upon the process of judicial
methodology rather than about how abstract conceptualism structures choice. Although the most
famous of these scholars in legal culture is probably Henry M. Hart Jr. and Albert Sacks, who are best
known for creating a view of judging in the 1950s called "reasoned elaboration,"53 I think that
political scientist C. Herman Pritchett offers the best account of process-centered structuralism.
Pritchett, unlike the philosophers, studied Supreme Court judging empirically. He is best known for
creating the first major work in judicial behavioralism with his 1948 analysis of voting on the the
Roosevelt Court from 1937 to 1947.54 He once said of that which he studied:
[P]olitical scientists who have done so much to put the “political” in “political jurisprudence”
need to emphasize that it is still “jurisprudence.” It is judging in a political context, but it is
still judging; and judging is something different from legislating or administering. Judges make
choices, but they are not the “free” choices of Congressmen. ... There is room for much
interpretation in the texts of constitutions, statutes and ordinances, but the judicial function
is still interpretation and not independent policy making. It is just as false to argue that judges
freely exercise their discretion as to contend they have no policy functions at all. Any accurate
analysis of judicial behavior must have as a major purpose a full clarification of the unique
limiting conditions under which judicial policy making proceeds.55

Perhaps the best description of what structuralism says about legal epistemology can be
analogized to the contribution that Karl Popper made to the philosophy of science. Popper was a
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philosopher who is best known for contributing a profound piece of wisdom to the search for
certainty in empirical science. He said, in essence, that what is known with certainty is not truth, but
falsity.56 Thus, one gains support for hypotheses only by getting verification that their null is false.
Stated another way, rationality often tells one more clearly about what is wrong than what is right.
Structuralism says something similar about jurisprudence. It says that there is a pre-existing
legal superstructure that judges work within and that determines not what is the one correct answer
for every case, but, rather, which set of answers are "incorrect." It, in essence, takes choices off the
table. Legal orthodoxy, therefore, does not tell justices how to vote on matters of policy; it tells them
which legally-correct choices are available to choose from. "Law," according to this view, is a
decision structure or filter. Dworkin uses helpful metaphors to describe this phenomenon. One says
that judges are like authors of a "chain novel," being asked to write a the current chapter in a book
that has already begun.57 The choices of what to write are bound and chained to what has already
been authored. He also at times refers to the force of law as "gravitational," an obvious reference to
the force that structures motion in the universe.
Importantly, however, structuralism concedes that, at least in "hard" cases, "law" can do no
more than create an array of limited choice for justices. How jurists choose among the remaining
options that “law” has pre-selected is nothing but an endorsement of favorite policy. Nothing can
avoid this. What structuralism seems to do, therefore, is say to all of the views of legal epistemology
– including the one I have yet to discuss – that each is correct in describing only a portion of the
judicial mind. Stated another way, what judging consists of is pre-existing conceptualism applied to
the empirical reality of current society through the lens or medium of political ideology. This is a
rather large view that I more fully develop in Chapter 6. For now, the only point that I am stressing
is that structuralism attempts to harmonize all of the approaches to legal epistemology into one
unifying explanation.
C. Skepticism
Having just described structuralism, I now describe the second and final group of scholars
who rebelled against legal positivism and progressive determinism. These scholars are known by
various names: "post realist," "post modern," "critical legal theorists," etc. Their central desire is to
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go in the opposite direction of structuralism. Instead of trying to repair the role that conceptualism
plays in law, they want to rid law completely of the idea of justification, so that neither empiricism,
logic, contemplative structures or anything outside of politics remains. Although some refer to their
work as legal "deconstruction," I use the philosophic term skepticism to describe their approach to
legal epistemology. The reason is simple. "Skepticism" is the term that philosophy uses to describe
the view that nothing can constitute knowledge, no matter how well it is thought to be known.
Because legal skepticism merely borrows philosophy’s doubting techniques when creating legal
criticism, I use the philosophical term.
Legal skepticism came to power in American legal culture after the 1960s generation came
to power in academia, starting in the 1970s and reaching its peak in the 1980s. The most notorious
movement in legal skepticism is known in law schools as Critical Legal Studies (Crits), although other
kinds of “critical” perspectives are found in all corners of academia. The Crits are leftist in orientation
and use law schools as a platform to promote various radical views, such as: justification is a myth;
“principles” are imaginary and inherently contradictory; and at the epicenter of our language exists
nothing except dichotomous pairs of opposite concepts, the prevailing one always being culturally
and institutionally-constructed. 58 Meaning, therefore, is inherently subjective and determined by
powerful structures and entities. There is no such thing as "objectivity" or "judging" – there is only
the political choices of the powerful and the ideology they espouse.
At the heart of legal skepticism lies two basic assaults against the justificatory edifice of "law."
The first is the attack against legal text. It is by far the most central to my concerns, because I claim
in Chapters 2 and 6 of this work to have refuted it both philosophically and empirically. The attack
simply declares, a priori, that language is of such a nature that it cannot ever "tell" its reader what it
"says." The confusion that supports this premise is the claim that words do not have "real" references
in empirical reality and that linguistic meaning is ultimately chosen by the mind of the reader.59
Hence, judges cannot objectively base their rulings upon the "plain meaning" of text, because there
is no such thing as a "plain meaning." I call this the indeterminacy principle. As I show in Chapter
2, however, it is founded upon a misunderstanding of the dominant works in language philosophy as
well as a refusal to even consider what the empirical science of cognitive linguists contributes to the
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discussion.
Nonetheless, the indeterminacy principle is very popular among skeptics. It is, unfortunately,
the view adopted by leading empirical scholars of the Court, Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, who
are famous for creating a body of research in political science that claims to prove skepticism's
critique of the Court. In their latest work, they take the position that there is no such thing as "plain
meaning" in language because, “English as a language lacks precision. Virtually all words have a
multiplicity of meanings ... [that] may directly conflict.”60 (They give the example of the word
“sanction,” which means to punish or to reward.)61 But a better rendition of the indeterminacy
principle is provided by law professor Elizabeth Mensch, who writes:
[The] dilemma [of justification] does not vanish when the "law" to be applied comes not from
cases but from the language of statutory or constitutional provisions, or the language of a
private contract. There was a time when words were thought to have a fixed, determinant
content, a meaning partaking of objective Platonic forms. ... no interpretation or application
of language can be logically required by the language itself. Words are created by people in
history, and their definition inevitably varies with particular context and with the meaning
brought to them by the judges who are asked to interpret them. That act of interpretation is,
in every instance, an act of social choice. 62

The second attack against legal justification is waged against Dworkin's "legal principles."
This attack asserts, a priori, that principles cannot truly structure outcomes because they amount to
nothing but self deception. Segal and Spaeth refer to this as "motivated reasoning," a term they
borrow from a perspective on rationalization in psychology. The authors write:
Those who wish to argue that the Court merely follows established legal principles in decided
cases (yes, such views exist, as we have documented in Chapters 2 and 7) certainly have their
work cut out for them. ... [Such a view] fails to appreciate the fundamental influence of
motivated reasoning in human decision making. As classic social psychological findings
demonstrate, the ability to convince oneself of the propriety of what one prefers to believe
psychologically approximates the human reflex. This is particularly true when plausible
arguments support one’s position, as is invariably the case for the types of issues the Supreme
Court decides.63

Skepticism's ultimate goal is twofold. It first desires to eliminate completely the idea that
justification has any real role in legal decision making, and, secondly, it transforms rationality into
a tool or instrument of underlying desires. In essence, it subordinates epistemology to psychology.
It is common, for example, to hear Segal and Spaeth and other proponents of skepticism assert, often
a priori, that all legal issues before the Court have equal justification on either side,64 that justices
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merely choose the case result that favors their political ideology;65 and that they simply manufacture
an appearance of coherency in case opinions that cloaks this underlying fiction. 66 "Law," therefore,
is nothing but a weapon or tool used as a means to satiate underlying ruling desires. From this point
forward, I refer to this view as instrumentalism.
Instrumentalism can be understood as applied skepticism. What is key about instrumentalism
is its claim that behind the logic of each judicial decision, there is a hidden ulterior motive. By
definition, the motive cannot be a desire for objectivity or integrity in “law” itself, because skepticism
holds these values to be pre-textual. It also cannot be a desire for empirically "correct" rulings –
skepticism abhors all knowledge claims, be they grounded in logic or fact. Segal and Spaeth, for
example, specifically dismiss the idea that justices are motivated to find "correct" answers. They
write:
Of course, humans are also motivated to find correct answers. Baumeister and Newman refer
to this as the “intuitive scientist” model. They refer to the search for preferred answers as the
“intuitive lawyer” model. We have little doubt that Supreme Court justices are better
represented as lawyers than as scientists.67

By definition, then, instrumentalism says that the ulterior motive of a justice is always the
ideological desirability of public policy, plain and simple. "Law," therefore, is nothing but the
ideological expression of political values. Stated another way, there is no "law" in the grandiose sense
that legal theorists use the word; there is only power. Instrumentalism is, in essence, progressive
determinism stripped of its empiricist foundation and objective epistemology. And according to Segal
and Spaeth, anyone who clings to the view that legal justification is a genuine decision structure is
presenting a hope that should be regarded as “the fatuousness characteristic of Pollyanna;” a “fairy
tale,” “myth,” and “mythology.”68
I have now finished with my discussion of the problem of justification in "law." Table 1.1
appears below that summarizes the various approaches I have described. Having developed a proper
understanding of the philosophic controversy, it is now time to consider these claims empirically.
Does ideology hide behind judicial governance? Can that be proved empirically? What does the
scientific research say about which approach to justification best describes Supreme Court decision
making? These matters are considered in the next section and throughout the remainder of this
chapter.
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Table 1.1: Schools of Legal Justification
Justificatory
Effect
Classical
Determinism

What
"Law" is

Autonomous, aCorrect,
certain answers priori science

Progressive
Determinism

Correct,
probable
answers

Empirical
growth
science

Structuralism

Incorrect
answers certain;
choices
narrowed.

Decision
structure;
mixture of
other 3
systems

No correct
or incorrect
answers

Politics,
ideology

Skepticism

Versions

Operative
Concept

Langdellian
formalism

logic,
conceptualism

Blackstone’s
natural law

sacred customs,
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The Birth of the Attitudinal Model
Behavioralism is a movement in social science that believes it is possible to empirically predict
the determinants of human behavior. In the late 1940s through the 1960s, the behavioralist movement
began exploring whether or not judicial behavior could be empirically explained. The first major work
came from C. Herman Pritchett’s 1948 analysis of voting on the the Roosevelt Court from 1937 to
1947.69 Glendon Schubert was the first to provide a detailed attitudinal model of Supreme Court
decision making.70
The early research in political science seemed to support structuralism’s approach to legal
epistemology. Pritchett, I have already shown, advocated structuralism. Other views echoed the
sentiment that, although public-policy values were important in determining how a justice voted, legal
justification and institutional orthodoxy mattered equally. As political scientist J. Woodford Howard,
Jr. wrote in one of his studies:
Clearly, judges of all ideological persuasions pondered, bargained, and argued in the course
of reaching their decisions, and they compromised their ideologies, too. No one can plow
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through the papers of a Stone or a Murphy without coming out with renewed respect for the
give-and-take or without appreciation for the multiplicity of variables and constraints,
including that old whipping-post, Law, that went into the decision-making of the era.71

In truth, legal skepticism never really had any strong empirical support until the early 1990s
when two political scientists began to seriously entertain the idea that they had “proved” the
instrumental view of judicial decision making. The empirical work that claims to validate
instrumentalism is the research of leading scholars Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal. Their work is
referred to in political science literature as the “attitudinal model.” Because the term “attitudinal” is
vague in this context – one could have structuralist or determinist attitudes about justification – I
refer to what their creation really is: the ideological model.
The birth of the modern ideological model became possible when Harold
Spaeth and other researchers created the Original Supreme Court Data Base. This resource contains
voting and case data for every justice who served on the Court since 1953, for all cases up to and
including the 1997 term. Recently, it was expanded to include the 1943 through 1999 terms. A “phase
II” data set that adds new variables was also created.
Before the data base was formed, research in judicial politics was quite laborious. Scholars
had to assemble their data one case at a time by rummaging through U.S. Reporters, coding the votes
of justices. Early studies that used these techniques tended to use party affiliation and appointingpresident as surrogates for political ideology. Interestingly, some studies found correlations between
these measures of ideology and the votes cast by justices.72 Once the data base was constructed,
however, not only was research made easier, but the number of votes one could analyze became much
more comprehensive. Today, for example, the total number of votes cast by justices in the data base
is 29,443.
The source of data that researchers now rely upon to estimate justice ideology are a set of
binary variables in the data base called "directional variables." They purport to keep track of the
ideological direction of every justices' vote by coding each with a "1" if it is liberal and a “2” if it is
not. A “0” is entered in cases involving interstate relations and in “miscellaneous” cases because
Spaeth says that voting in these matters is too politically uninteresting to assign an ideological
direction. 73 (The definition of what is a "liberal" or "conservative" vote is explained in Chapter 2,
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pages 62-65). Based upon this data, a percent-liberal index is created which is not unlike the
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores that are used to measure the ideology of members
of Congress.
When you look at the percent liberal index, it is easy to see how an ideological model is
formed. First, examine the data across time. Figure 1.1. shows the ideology of all of the Court's
decisions from the early 1960s to the present. As each of the Warren-Court justices retire and are
replaced with more conservative members, the Court’s liberal rating plummets. It reaches its lowest
point following the retirement of Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall in 1991. Clearly,
when liberal justices rule, the Court seems to vote for liberal social policy, but when conservatives
rule, the situation seems reversed.
One of the reasons why researchers like the percent-liberal ratings is that they seem to align
justices meaningfully along a spatial continuum. In other words, the placement of justices relative to
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one another seems to fit the anecdotal stereotype that one has about their belief systems. Justices
Byron White and John M. Harlan II (Harlan), for example, are somewhat conservative – their ratings
are 42.4% and 43.6% respectively – while justices Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day O’Connor are
significantly more conservative, having a score of 36.6% and 35.7%. And no one is as conservative
as Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas or William Rehnquist, who have liberal ratings in the 20s. The
linear proximity holds for liberals as well: William O. Douglas is extremely high (88.8 %), Brennan
and Marshall are almost as high (79.5% and 81.4%), John Paul Stevens and Ruth Ginsberg are next
(64.5% and 64.6%) and Justices Stephen Breyer and David Souter are the least liberal (61.2% and
60.8%). The only justices who do not have a significant directional alignment are Harry Blackmun,
Potter Stewart and Felix Frankfurter, who have ratings right at the fifty percent mark. A listing of
each justice’s score is found on Table 1.2.
For convenience, I have scaled the scores. The scale runs from 1.0 being absolutely liberal (a
100% liberal rating) to -1.0 being absolutely conservative (a 0% rating), with 0 being neutral (a 50%
rating). The scaled scores are also listed in Table 1.2. They show that although the percent-liberal
ratings seem to fit the justices well, they may not fit exactly the way that one thinks about justice
ideology. The ratings suggest, for example, that Justices Rehnquist, Thomas and Scalia have belief
systems that are less biased than Justices Warren, Brennan, Marshall, Douglas and Goldberg.
One thing needs clarified about the percent-liberal index. It is only derived from "civil liberties
cases," which are defined as cases involving “criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due
process, privacy, and attorneys” (cases involving attorney fees, lawyer advertising, and disciplinary
matters).74 There are, of course, percent-liberal ratings for other cases, such as federal taxation,
federalism, judicial power, commercial business activity and zoning. But the voting in these areas of
law are not as supportive of an ideological model. This is because the justices are not so polarized
and strange alliances exist – e.g., Rehnquist and Brennan vote liberally on tax matters approximately
70% of the time.75 Even Segal and Spaeth concede that this part of the Court’s docket – let us call
it Tower number 2 – is not yet beholden to an empirical form of political deconstruction. 76
Although one would have to admit that the voting scores in civil liberties cases seem telling,
there is a tautological problem with using them to explain the cause of judicial decision making. If the
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voting index is the explanatory variable and the votes are the dependent variable, all that is proven
is that justices vote the way they vote. One could, of course, use past votes to predict future votes,
but not explain them.77
To deal with this problem, political scientists Jeffrey Segal and Albert Cover created an
independent, "surrogate" measure of ideology, which are known today as the "Segal-Cover scores."78
To create the scores, the scholars examined newspaper editorials about Supreme Court nominees that
appeared at or during the time of their confirmation. They coded the content of the editorials when
the nominee was said to be liberal or conservative in civil liberties issues. They scaled the scores and
created what in essence was a measure of the justices reputation for bias at the time of confirmation.
The scores were updated through the 1999 term.79 They appear in Table 1.2.
To bring the attitudinal model to life, Segal and Spaeth regressed the Segal-Cover scores
against the justices' percent-liberal rating. The independent variable was the justice's reputation for
bias (Segal-Cover scores) and the dependent variable was the justices' career-liberal percentage. The
results of the regression, Segal and Spaeth say, show that there is a strong correlation between the
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surrogate measure of ideology and the actual votes cast. They write:
The correlation between ideological values of the justices and their votes is 0.76 (r2= .57,
adjusted to .55). Regressing votes on our measure of values yields a constant of 53.4 and a
slope of 23.5 (t = 5.06). The largest residuals belong to Goldberg, who is 23 percentage points
more liberal than expected, and Harlan, who is 27 points more conservative than expected.
Alternatively, Scalia and Powell are less than one point from their expected scores.80

It is critical to understand that the purpose of this correlation is not to establish the SegalCover scores as a true, independent measure of justice ideology. Those scores are only a rough
approximation of a justice's reputation for bias. What the correlation is said to do, therefore, is to
"independently operationalize" the percent-liberal voting record so that appealing to it is no longer
tautological. Stated another way, all that the Segal-Cover scores do is bring to life the claim that how
a justice votes throughout his or her career is an accurate indication of his or her political ideology.
Segal and Spaeth realize that the Segal-Cover scores themselves do not perform especially
well in the regression. They only purport to explain about half of the Court's voting activity. Stated
another way, increasing the Segal-Cover scores by a given increment only corresponds with an
increase in liberal votes that is about half the proportion of the increment. The reason why the
correlation between the measure of values and votes is not absolutely perfect, Segal and Spaeth, is
simply because the Segal-Cover scores are themselves imperfect.81 If you had better independent
measures of bias, you would have better correlation. They write:
Harlan and Stewart come out [with] liberal [reputations] because the debate about them
centered around their support for the overriding issue of the day, segregation. Goldberg is not
perceived to be as liberal as Fortas or Marshall because of an evenhandedness at the
Department of Labor that even the conservative Chicago Tribune could support. O’Connor
comes out as a moderate, given her previous support for women’s rights and abortion. Indeed,
the only hint of opposition to her nomination came from right-wing interest groups and the
arch-conservative senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.).”82

This, by the way, is also the reason why the ideological model is said to be less effective for
justices appointed by Harry Truman and Franklin Roosevelt. Harold Spaeth and others tried in 1995
to model the voting of Truman and Roosevelt Court appointees, but they found only a 0.40
correlation between political reputation and the actual votes cast.83 This result is much weaker than
the results that "independently operationalized" the voting pattern of the modern Court. Spaeth says
that this problem resulted because the political reputations of the justices could not be measured
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properly – simply put, there were not many newspaper editorials about Court nominees in the 1940s
and 1950s.
Segal and Spaeth's case for instrumentalism is not predicated entirely on career liberal ratings.
They have two other works that promote instrumentalism from a different vantage point. The first
is their study of precedent. The data base that researchers use to keep track of ideological ratings also
keeps track of whether justices vote to uphold precedent. Using this data, Segal and Spaeth show that
over the last 40 or so years the force of precedent has not significantly constrained judicial
preferences on the Court. 84 This is so because liberal justices do not tend to support conservative
precedents even after the Court establishes them, and that conservatives behave the same way toward
liberal precedents.85
The second work that Segal and Spaeth use to bolster their ideological model focuses on the
role that "case facts" play in judicial decision making. Studying search and seizure cases, the scholars
take the position that justices are influenced to some extent by the “facts” of cases that appear before
them (e.g., the location of the search).86 But the key, they say, is that the influence of facts is not as
significant empirically as ideological values,87 and, in any event, facts are assessed through ideology
rather than “law”88 – sort of in the way, I suppose, that Senators Edward Kennedy or Orrin Hatch
view particulars when voting on public policy. Truthfully, their argument here is not as convincing.89
The ideological model, therefore, is predicated upon the following basis: (1) career liberal
ratings that have been "independently operationalized;" (2) the failure of precedent to empirically
constrain Supreme Court justices; and (3) a tendency by justices in at least one area of voting (search
and seizure) to vote slightly in favor of case facts, but, even so, stronger in favor of their career liberal
percentage. Based upon this data, Segal and Spaeth declare that they have proven that political
ideology is what governs the Supreme Court. They write, “Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he
does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he was extremely
liberal.”90
When Segal and Spaeth's research burst on the scene in the 1990s, political scientists generally
reacted favorably. The consensus among most judicial politics scholars, in fact, was that the
ideological model accurately described civil liberties voting on the modern Court.91 This was
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apparently so because the model was thought to have the best empirical support.92 Indeed, one
scholar even suggested that further study of the issue should cease93 and gave to an empirical journal
what may become one of the most legendary quotations in all of judicial politics:
If the fiction of a Court of law and not politics, like the tale of a fire breathing dragon, is now
dead, why belabor it through further study? Perhaps it is because the dragon is dead, but like
most dead reptiles, he is still twitching. So, for good measure, it is necessary to drive lances
into him again and again and then draw and quarter him so that the heresy of a legal model
of Supreme Court decision making cannot be regenerated. 94

Although judicial politics scholars were understandably excited by the ideological model, there
is great reason to believe their enthusiasm is misplaced. As I show in Chapter 6, Segal and Spaeth's
work suffers from two glaring flaws. The first is that they aggregate their voting data into percentages
in a way that exaggerates how well their model works. The truth is that even if you use career liberal
percentages as an independent variable in a logistic regression analysis, movements in these measures
do not explain very well the non-aggregated twenty-some thousand votes that exist in the data base.
The aggregation of the voting data is, I contend, an ecological fallacy. As I show in Chapter 6,
political ideology is hardly a superb explanation of how the modern Court votes in civil liberties cases.
The second flaw in Segal and Spaeth's research is that it frequently deploys a poor
understanding of what legal justification consists of in a supreme tribunal. The scholars assume, for
example, that because the Court does not follow precedent that it is somehow violating its "mythical"
role as an institution in American government. This, of course, is a straw man. Supreme tribunals are
not precedent-following judicial organizations – the trial courts are. Supreme courts are largely law
defining courts. The duty to follow precedent in supreme tribunals is merely a institutional policy, not
a mandate. Indeed, the Court’s own doctrine states that stare decisis is a policy that justices do not
follow when they have strong convictions that the Court’s decision is wrong. One could take the
position, in fact, that the judicial oath requires this.
Recent Works in Rational-Choice Theory
There is another empirical model of judicial decision making in political science that
challenges a portion of the ideological model’s claims. It is a model based upon rational-choice theory
(or “strategic decision-making”). The rational choice approach begins with the same assumption as
the ideological model – that justices are goal-directed, single minded seekers of their favorite policy
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– but assumes that goals are pursued as strategy in an interdependent decision-making context. The
idea is that the expression of a justice's choice occurs in and around the expression of choice by others
to whom the justice depends. But who, in theory, is a policy-maximizing, life-tenured justice forced
to depend upon? Rational-choice scholars offer two answers: justices are constrained by the choices
of the other branches of government (external constraints) and by the choices of their fellow
colleagues (internal constraints). The former is called the "separation of powers model" and the latter
is called the "collegial game." I discuss the government-interdependency theory first.
The separation-of-powers theory says that justices have to be careful about voting only for
the policies they truly desire. The reason why caution must be exercised is that, if a justice's desires
go too far to the left or right of the views currently prevailing in government, he or she runs the risk
of setting off slack resources in the political system. This may result in the justice being sanctioned
– i.e., being overturned by legislation in statutory cases or with amendments in Constitutional ones,
or perhaps even with the reduction of the Court’s budget or some of its jurisdiction.95
Although scholars such as Terri Jennings Paretti argue that ideological and strategic-decisionmaking models go hand in hand – they both represent the triumph of politics over law – Segal and
Spaeth resist the idea that justices shun ideology for strategic reasons. They specifically do not like
the proposition that conservative justices might vote more liberally, for example, when the Congress
and the President are more liberal, and more conservatively when the situation is reversed. To counter
this theory, Segal and Spaeth demonstrate that the separation-of-powers model simply lacks sufficient
empirical support. Although some early studies found evidence that justices did shirk ideology out
of a fear for other branches of government, the studies were apparently mis-modeled.96 Segal and
Spaeth write:
Beyond our own previously published articles and the works discussed above, recent years
have witnessed an explosion in quantitative analyses of the separation-of-powers model. The
findings are overwhelming in their lack of support for the model.97

But although the separation-of-powers model lacks sufficient support, the same cannot be said
of the "collegial game" theory of judging. The scholars who developed this very interesting work are
James Spriggs II, Forrest Maltzman and Paul Wahlbeck ("SMW"). Their view says that justices
sometimes do take non-attitudinal factors into consideration, but only because the game of judging
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requires this when it is played within a collegial workgroup.98 To understand their view, SMW ask
that one conceptualize judging as being an array of policy options rather than a simple liberalconservative dichotomy. Figure 1.2 explains how such an array might conceivably work. The idea is
that if justices have many policy options to choose from, they may decide that it is rational to
cooperate with others’ choices instead of perpetually asserting the one they want the best. A good
example is Justice Brennan’s vote in Pennsylvania v. Muniz,99 where he chose to vote for a
conservative outcome – creating yet another exception to the Miranda rule – because voting any
other way would have resulted in an even more conservative outcome. In essence, he voted for the
“lesser of two evils.”
SMA argue, therefore, that justices care more about the underlying legal principle in an
opinion rather than which side wins the case.100 They show that justices bargain during the opinionwriting process about the language the opinion will adopt.101 They also show that a justice’s decision
to specially concur rather than join a majority opinion depends on strategic considerations such as the
size of the majority-conference coalition. 102
One of the interesting aspects of the game-theory research is determining where it fits within
the different approaches to legal epistemology. Clearly, all that game theory seems to do is change
instrumentalism’s conception of judging from being as a set of finite games into one large game that
plays indefinitely. As game theory demonstrates with its example of the prisoner's dilemma, how one
maximizes utility in a mutually-interdependent game varies if the play occurs only once or repeats
infinitely. Continuous play encourages behavior that benefits both players in the long run. This is so
because, in order to make long-term gains, players must learn to shun their most selfish short-term
decisions. That is, they must cooperate. The duration of play therefore determine the rules for
selfishness. Judging, under this view, is not isolated acts of selfishness; it is a continuous act of
selfishness that, paradoxically, requires a few acts of non-selfishness along the way.
But how does this differ from the view of judging provided by Herman Prichett and other
structuralists? They key difference is that structuralism recognizes that the Court is constrained by
intellectual as well as institutional things. The idea that judging is tied to a pre-existing cognitive
framework that itself helps to develop policy choice is not written out of Pritchett's critique. Political
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values are half of the story, but the other half is still the reconciling of those values with legal
principles undeniably designated by text and further enforced by the use of a professional orthodoxy.
Strategic decision-making models, like the ideological model, throw all of this out of the judicial
window. The only kind of partial constraint that the Court faces when voting on the merits, strategic
modelers say, is the policy competition of other players. Ideology, therefore, is still very much the
intellectual king.
I suppose that game theorists do have one large difference from those who, like Harold
Spaeth, see justices as possessing free, autonomous power over their policy expression. The
difference is not about selfishness, however – it is about legitimacy. It seems as if the game-theory
movement – especially its separation-of-powers model – is an attempt to take judicial legitimacy out
of its ivory tower and into the shade of modern pluralism. The idea is that if scholars can characterize
the policy process of majoritarian institutions as being directly pluralistic, perhaps they can
characterize the Court's policy process as being indirectly pluralistic. If the governmentinterdependency theory is ever proved, the scholars could, in essence, write "law" out of the judicial
story altogether but retain some conception of legitimacy for judicial governance. The idea would be
that the American political system is a highly penetrable policy structure where groups, in competition
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with one another, form a policy equilibria that indirectly influences the choices of the Court. Justices
would not need to be constrained by "law" in such a world because pluralism would come to the
rescue once again – just as it did for Congress when democratic theory was said to be an empirical
fairy tale.103
Research Supporting Structuralism
Having just reviewed two different bodies of work that support instrumentalism in different
ways, I now review the empirical research that supports structuralism. Most standard textbooks in
political science describe Supreme Court judging the same way that Herman Pritchett did: as a
combination of ideology and things that act to mitigate its free expression – law being one of them.104
Some scholars suggest that justices have a sincere concern for their institutional mission. 105 Others
have argued that it is simply foolish to think that judging is not constrained by professional and
societal norms.106 Still others have urged the formulation of a model that would integrate legal and
ideological criteria.107
With respect to empirical studies, there are a few that try to demonstrate that justice ideology
is mitigated by the force of legal doctrine. Larry Baum and Lori Hausegger’s work on “invited
overrides,” for example, suggests that justices want to achieve “good law” as much as they do good
policy. 108 In that study, the authors looked at 42 statutory interpretation cases between 1986 and
1990 where justices ruled a particular way and, in the opinion, suggested Congress override their
decision. The authors thought it was odd that justices would vote to interpret a statute in a way that
created a result that they disagreed with, especially if they were single-minded seekers of policy.
There is also some evidence that legal argument and the collegial pontificating that occurs
between justices about the merit of legal issues is effective in shaping the votes of a justice. At least
two case studies suggest this.109 But more recent research tries to demonstrate this quantitatively.
Andrea McAtee and Kevin McGuire, for example, argue that strategic legal argumentation induced
some members of the Burger Court to vote slightly more liberally or conservatively than they
otherwise would have.110 The effect is higher with the less biased justices. Similarly, Timothy Johnson
and Matthew Roberts suggest that oral arguments play some role in how the Court makes substantive
decisions.111
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But by far the most important support for structuralism comes from the recent work of
Herbert Kritzer and Mark Richards. These researchers show that the Court uses the device of
“landmark precedent” to create a “decision structure” that guides, but does not determine, its own
future decision making.112 A landmark precedent is simply a precedent that is regarded as
groundbreaking or very important. They show that the Court reacts differently to certain case facts
when comparing the era before the groundbreaking precedent to the era following it.113
For example, in the area of search and seizure, the authors argue that the case of Illinois v.
Gates114 is a structuring precedent. They argue that, before Gates, the Court was more mechanistic
in its orientation toward search-and-seizure claims. To see this, assume for the moment that an
anonymous informer calls the police station with a "tip" about someone committing a crime. Prior to
Gates, officers could not have “probable cause” to act on the tip until they first obtained information
about how the informant obtained the knowledge and whether the proffered story contained facts that
were, in fact, accurate. In other words, police had to do more ground work before they could arrest.
Gates began to erode this “two-pronged” test and eventually led to its complete abandonment in
favor of a more discretionary “totality of the circumstance” test.115 Other cases followed Gates that
likewise freed police officers from the constraints of various other Fourth Amendment categorical
mechanisms. Hence, the 1980's saw the ushering out of "legalisms" in search-and-seizure law and the
ushering in of a new standard of “general reasonableness.”
This is important for Kritzer and Richards because their work shows that each “regime” had
an impact upon what a justice considered when voting to uphold a search. That is, under the old,
mechanistic regime, the justices were more concerned with whether a warrant was needed for the
police activity and less concerned with whether the search was supported by probable cause. Stated
another way, a lower-court finding of probable cause was statistically irrelevant in predicting how a
justice would vote. However, in the new regime, a lower court finding of probable cause significantly
increases the likelihood of a justice voting to uphold a search. Similarly, the location of a search is
a statistical predictor of its acceptability in period one, but not in period two.
Hence, Kritzer and Richard conclude that jurisprudential regimes create decision-structures
that influence judicial behavior. Justices react to different facts depending on what regime is in place.
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Under the mechanistic regime, justices focus more on search locations and warrants, but, under the
circumstantial regime, they focus more upon whether the trial court believed that police officers in
fact had enough actual suspicion to act. The researchers also conduct a similar analysis in
establishment-clause cases where Lemon v. Kurtzman116 is the structuring precedent.117
What is most interesting about Kritzer and Richard’s work is how it differs from Segal and
Spaeth’s treatment of precedent. Recall that Segal and Spaeth showed that liberal justices tend not
vote for conservative precedents even after the Court establishes them, and that conservatives behave
the same way toward liberal precedents.118 The suggestion from Kritzer’s work is that not all
precedents are created equal. Some appear to be more influential at structuring judicial attitudes than
others. The suggestion, therefore, is that landmark precedents may structure decision making more
than the institution of stare decisis generally.
I view Kritzer and Richard’s work as being an important companion to mine because it
attempts to explain something I neglect. My work shows that justices defect from political ideology
when the right being asserted is more precisely articulated in the statute or constitutional provision
being interpreted. But where the right being asserted is vaguely and indeterminately articulated, I
show that ideology dominates judicial choice – but not always. There are occasions, however rare,
when a decision structure controls judicial voting even though the law being interpreted is vague and
flowery (e.g., “substantive due process” cases involving large punitive damage awards, or the view
that indecent nudity is "speech."). Kritzer's work may help explain how legal doctrine sometimes
governs judicial choice even when it is not expressly sanctioned by the textual requirements of
positive law.
Summary and Conclusion
There are three basic views about legal justification that legal culture has produced: (1) it
provides correct answers to issues before the Court (determinism); (2) it provides a decision-making
structure that independently influences, but does not determine, the policy choices of the justices
(structuralism); and (3) it is a mythical concept that does not exist (skepticism). The behavioralist
movement in social science attempts to look at these claims empirically. The early research in political
science suggested that structuralism was the best explanation. The trend in the 1990s, however,
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supported skepticism. Current research seems to be returning to the favor of structuralism.
The judicial behavior research in political science is basically divided into three distinct
approaches. The first theory, referred to as the “attitudinal model,” says that justices simply vote their
political ideology when deciding cases. The case of Bush v. Gore is said to epitomize this kind of
behavior. Although the influence of political ideology is no doubt significant on the Court, the
empirical work offered by proponents of this view tends to over estimate its explanatory power. Quite
simply, measures of justice ideology alone do not constitute an especially strong explanation of how
the Court votes in civil liberty cases. At best, the research shows that ideology is only a variable in
a more complicated judging equation.
Another theory is called “rational choice.” It agrees with the proponents of the attitudinal
model that justices are "single-minded seekers of policy," but offers one caveat: justices are not free
to choose the policies they most desire. Instead, they are forced to be responsive to the policy desires
of elites within the other branches of government (external forces) as well as the desires of their
fellow membership (internal forces). The former view is called the "separation of powers" model. It
is currently regarded as having little, if any, empirical support. The latter view is called "the collegial
game" and does enjoy some interesting empirical support. Still, it in no way approaches a
comprehensive explanation of judicial behavior.
Still another theory puts forth the view that justices want outcomes that are obedient to legal
text and principle. This view sees "law" as providing a structure that helps to facilitate policy choice.
Justices, this view says, shun their best policy desires when strong legal justification requires it.
Although this view is traditionally espoused by philosophers in qualitative works and by behavioralists
of the prior generation, it is beginning to gain contemporary empirical support. Recent works by
Herbert Kritzer and Mark Richards, for example, have shown that important or landmark precedents
can structure the way that justices approach decision making.
My work builds upon this research. If, indeed, landmark precedents do structure the way that
facts are judged before the Court, there is no reason why more hierarchical legal authority, such as
the language of the Constitution or statutes, cannot act in a similar capacity. In Chapter 2, I outline
why one should think that justices are influenced by legal text, and I construct a design for proving
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Chapter 2:
The Battle Plan: How and Why
Language Should Effect Judging

INTRODUCTION
In the last chapter, I reviewed the empirical literature that attempted to explain what causes
U.S. Supreme Court justices to vote they way they do when deciding cases on the merits. I also
briefly mentioned my hypothesis that the legal language of “positive law” acts as a decision structure
for the Court. The way that language is thought to do this is through its “rigidity” – a concept that
refers to how clear the words of a sentence are. In essence, I hypothesize that there is an inverse
relationship between the linguistic clarity of a constitutional or statutory command and the expression
of judicial bias. Where the language of a command is most determinate (“rigid”), justices are less
likely to vote their political ideology, but, where the opposite is true, political values are more likely
to dominate voting. I call this the rigidity hypothesis. Closely related to it is another theory: that
political ideology is a fluctuating force upon the Court. Sometimes it is a powerful explanation of
judicial choice; other times, it is not. Because this claim follows from the rigidity hypothesis, I refer
to it as my corollary hypothesis.
Before I demonstrate how I prove my hypotheses, it is necessary to consider more carefully
the concept of rigidity and what it entails. In the first segment of this chapter, I explain in detail what
language rigidity is and how it is theorized to fit within an empirical model of judging. This endeavor
is primarily a philosophical task, although I make some use of an empirical scholar in the field of
cognitive linguistics. In the second segment of the chapter, I describe my empirical research design.
This segment, of course, consists primarily of statistical methodology. I suppose it is strange to have
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a chapter that is part philosophy and part empirical methodology, but most works do not both invent
a novel idea and test it all at once – so I guess I have no choice. I begin with the philosophy section
first.
A Criteria for Rigidity in Legal Sentences
In this section of the chapter, I explain and construct a criteria for when language can be said
to be “rigid.” There is much happening lately in the field of cognitive linguistics.1 Although my work
draws upon some of this scholarship and as well upon works in philosophy of language, it is possible
that the approach I am about to present is somewhat novel. I leave others to decide whether or not
my offering constitutes a breakthrough of some kind for language philosophy. Of course, whether my
views break new ground or not, it is clear that my primary influences are two analytic philosophers,
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Saul Kripke, and one linguist, Steven Pinker. Drawing upon their works,
I construct a criteria of rigidity for legal language that can be used not only as a variable in an
empirical model, but also as a general guideline for analyzing any use of language whatsoever. The
criteria consists of three basic factors: referents, gradiency, and parameters. Each is explained
separately.
A. Referents
I want to begin with a basic premise about how legal sentences tend to describe various
guarantees of liberty. As a general rule, sentences that guarantee liberty tend to have three
components: (1) a command (which is usually a verb); (2) its object (some noun); and (3) what I call
a “liberty parameter,” which is usually a gerund phrase that poetically refers to some abstract
delimitation of the available use of the object. For example, in the sentence “Congress shall make no
law abridging the freedom of speech,” the command, “shall make no law abridging,” essentially
reduces to: “don’t censor.”2 The object is the word “speech.” The parameter is poetically referred to
as “the freedom of" speech. More is said about liberty parameters in a moment, but for now, all that
must be seen is the inherent difference in the statements, “don’t censor speech” versus “don’t censor
the freedom of speech.” The difference is that, in the latter, an activity must belong to both
“freedom” and “speech” to be protected (as opposed to just speech alone).
I begin my discussion about referents by focusing on the object (noun). What does the word
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“speech” refer to? More importantly, is there a way for us to delineate which of the possible referents
of the term are better than others? In answering this question, I avoid making a bombastic assertion
about language – that, for example, it must refer to nothing (by definition) – as is so often done by
“post-modern” scholars. Instead, I consult the views of the most dominate language philosophers and
linguists in the last century. From this structured discussion I reach an answer to the question of how
one might place an “order” or structure to references of words.
Early on in his life, Ludwig Wittgenstein thought that words played the same role in
communication as pictures. He was originally inspired by a newspaper article reporting about a trial
involving an automobile accident. The lawyers had used miniature replicas of automobiles to
reconstruct the accident scene. Ludwig was struck by the fact that the model cars were acting as
depictions of an actual reality and began to think that this is precisely what words do. This led him
to the idea that if words did not contain sensory content, they had to be meaningless, just as a picture
would be if its content did not “show” something that could be verified with eyesight. This view
ultimately led him to his first philosophical creation, the Tractatus Logico Philosophicas, published
in 1922, which was not only his dissertation, but the work that ultimately inspired the movement in
logical positivism.
By the 1930s and 40s, however, the older Wittgenstein abandoned his view that words
functioned as pictures. Instead, he invented a brand new view – equally radical, but in the opposite
direction – that once again became the new paradigm. 3 Wittgenstein’s new view asserted two critical
premises: (1) that what words referred to was simply a function of how they were used; and (2) that
words, themselves, had no real essence or “ultimate meaning.” The first premise is the one that took
significant jurisdiction from philosophers over matters of linguistics. That is, where other philosophers
such as Bertrand Russell had tried to sort out the problems of language using logic, Wittgenstein was
now saying that cultural anthropology was a superior device.
But Wittgenstein’s second premise is the more radical. What it ultimately says is that words
which stand as objects in sentences are no different at how they designate things than are surnames
that designate people. For example, the way that the word “game” refers to something is no different
than, say, how the word “Soprano” or “Huxtable” designates its membership. Just as there is no one
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essential “Soprano” or “Huxtable,” so too is there no one perfect referent for the word “game.”
Instead, what terms like “game” and “Soprano” refer to are a family of things – i.e., a collection
having similar attributes, but still themselves different. This view became known in philosophy as the
“family resemblance” or “cluster” concept.
Language philosophy stayed with this view until the early 1970s, when Saul Kripke came
along.4 Kripke’s main contribution was that he reimposed order on a small portion of the clutter
Ludwig created. Kripke showed that some terms – the ones used by scientists – could, in fact, be
“reduced” to the point where they had unquestionable referents. Kripke called these terms “rigid
designators.” An example is the term “water,” which refers indisputably to H20. Similarly, the term
“gold” refers unquestionably to a substance composed of atomic number 79. One should note that
what is happening here is called a reduction. The idea is that if you can take a term and reduce it to
its atomistic parts, it can then unquestionably designate something. What is a “Soprano?” It is
probably a DNA profile of some sort.
What is important about Kripke’s view is that it gives science the final say over “what is.” But
there are two potential problems with this. First, many terms are not scientific, so it becomes harder
to make use of Kripke for those terms. It is not impossible, however. A Kripkean view of the word
“speech” might say that it ultimately refers to a “verbalization.” Something that is not a verbalization
– e.g., nudity – cannot be “speech.” This maneuver is Kripkean in the sense that it takes a larger
generality and reduces it into a more concrete, precise form.5 What something is, therefore, is what
it literally is. One can read Kripke in a larger context as promoting a kind of philosophy of literalism.
But another concern is that Kripke’s view may not work as perfectly as he thinks even for
terms that utilize science. For example, if the term “Soprano” ultimately refers to some kind of DNA
sequence – when is it created? At conception? Is it not possible that the term “person” or “Soprano”
designates not only base genetic or biological material of a particular kind, but also something more?
It would be odd, after all, to say to someone, “Hello DNA profile such and such.” And it would be
odd not because of a learned convention, but rather because it seems as though the labels that
instantiate people tend to “mark” much more than their genetic atomism. These labels seem to
become associated, over time, with a certain set of traits or behaviors that come to identify the person

A Criteria for Rigidity in Legal Sentences (Referents)

46

as much as his or her biological markings.
And so it might be that Kripke only has half of the picture. Let me show this in a much better
way. Suppose that, one day, gold deposits become so abundant on earth that they are no longer
regarded as a precious commodity. Everyone can have as much gold as they want. Is what the term
“gold” now refers to a little different? The answer is that, literally, gold has not changed at all – it
is still atomic number 79. But in terms of the function that the concept of “gold” plays in our
language, things indeed are different. Striking gold is no longer special. And therefore, the suggestion
that is implicit in the label “gold” – that it is valuable and precious – is now lost.
And so what I am saying is this: what any term most indisputably stands for is both what it
reduces to as well as what function it serves. Let me call this the term’s form and function.6 When
both of these things are present, one has what I call an “archetype.” When a referent of a term loses
either its form or function, language controversies emerge. In fact, all of the linguistic problems that
Wittgenstein and (later) Steven Pinker invent are nothing more than language games where a referent
has either the form of function of its term, but not both. Pinker’s examples include: Is a penguin a
bird? Is a scorpion a bug? Is an SUV a truck? Is the Pope a bachelor? These are all language puzzles
which ask the same question: namely, what is more important in the classification scheme, the
membership’s form or its function?
The Pope has the form of a bachelor – that is, he is an unmarried male, so he fits the definition
– but his inclusion in this category seems funny. And it seems funny because the purpose of using the
term “bachelor” is to denote one’s dating eligibility. Applying the term “bachelor” to the Pope,
therefore, applies the term’s form without applying its function. In other words, it makes “gold” no
longer precious. The same game is played in an opposite direction with the question: is a bar stool
a “chair?” Or, is a large living-room bean bag a “chair?” Although they do not look like the archetype,
they are nonetheless used for sitting. Hence, they are obedient to the function of the term, but violate
its expected form.
Pinker, of course, makes a unique contribution to this discussion because he is a cognitive
linguist, not a philosopher. He argues, in essence, that what determines whether one places disputable
referents into a given category is a governed by one of two cognitive pathways that are available to
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determine meaning.7 Humans, he says, have two pathways to meaning: one involves a combinatorial
system of computation – the part of the brain that wants to do 1+1=2 – and the other involves
associative memory. Associative memory is where the mind creates “family resemblance” categories
like the ones described by Wittgenstein. The reason why the Pope is a bachelor, Pinker says, is
because we are relying upon the brain’s capacity for symbol combination to say that he fits the rule,
whereas, with chairs, we are relying upon the brain’s use of associative memory. It is my own
contention that what Pinker is doing is providing an empirical social-science explanation for concepts
that analytic philosophers once described using the terms a priori and a posteriori.
In any event, I am now ready to unveil my new creation. Relying upon all of the foregoing,
I have devised a criteria for placing in an ordinal-level of rank the clarity of all possible referents to
a given noun. 8 It is conceptualized in Figure 2.1. It says three things. First, where a referent of a word
has both its usual form and function, it is most indisputable and called an archetype. Second, where
form and function become separate and the referent retains one but not the other, this is called a
linguistic diffusion. Diffused referents are not as rigid as archetypes, but they are still more rigid than
the final category, called referent extensions. Extensions occur where referents lack both the form
and the function of the prototype. They, in essence, turn their words into a kind of poetry. They are
the least rigid of the three.
Let me apply my criteria to a legal word by considering the meaning of the word “speech” in
the U.S. Constitution. First, “speech” is not a scientific term, so its reduction may be somewhat less
precise than one might like. Nonetheless, its form seems to entail a “verbalization”of some kind – one
cannot be literally speaking without doing something that can be said to be verbalizing. The term
“verbalization,” of course, is itself tricky. Its basic idea seems to entail using intermediary symbols
of some kind – be they alphabetic (words) or non-alphabetic (e.g, the peace sign) – to convey
sentential content. The atomistic things that one is shooting for are simply “words” and “sentences”
of some kind. Hence, any utterance that qualifies as words and sentences is “verbal” and constitutes
the form of “speech.”
What about the function of “speech?” The term’s function – what it does as a legal entitlement
– seems to have something to do with the ability to advocate ideas or exchange information for the
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primary purposes of changing minds, criticizing or gaining knowledge. Hence, any verbalization that
has the primary function of advocacy, teaching or criticism is archetypical speech. Even if this
delineation of form and function is not perfect, it suits my purposes for now.
So what about commercial advertising – is that “speech?” And what about campaign
contributions – is giving money to politicians “speech?” The answer is that these are diffused referents
of the term. Commercial advertising has the form of speech – it involves an exchange of verbal
messages – but not its usual function. It lacks the usual function because its primary purpose is to
profit from the selling of things, not to advocate or teach apart from that. Contributing money to
campaigns is just the opposite: it has the function of speech (political advocacy, support of ideas) but
not its expected form. The two, therefore, represent opposite linguistic diffusions. Asking whether
advertising is “speech” presents a language puzzle not unlike asking whether the Pope is a bachelor.
Asking whether spending money on campaigns is “speaking” is similar linguistically to asking whether
or a bar stool or a large beanbag is a “chair.”
A good example of a referent extension of the word “speech” is obscenity or pornography.
They are extensions because the act of exchanging depictions of nudity lacks both the form and
function of the archetype. What these referents do is turn the word “speech” into a kind of poetry.
Consider one who encounters an image of a scantily-clad female and says, “Oh gosh is she speaking
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to me.” Or how about a chocolate-lover who upon tasting a fine confectionary says, “Mmm, this
speaks to my soul.” In both examples, the declarant is not receiving words or a sentential
transmission, let alone advocacy, criticism or instruction. In such a situation, the word "speech"
becomes a kind of poetry. Obscenity and pornography, therefore, are the least-rigid references of the
word “speech.”
B. Gradiency
Having just constructed a framework for ranking the clarity of references for nouns, I now
consider another problem that is far too common in legal interpretation: vague adjectives. I begin with
a simple distinction about the way that guarantees of liberty are described in legal sentences: they are
either gradient or simple. Simple rights are those that are not qualified by adjectives or clauses. For
example, the right to speech is not limited by words such as important, reasonable, due, equal, fair,
etc. Other examples of rights in the Constitution that translate into a simple articulation include:
• Provide defendants with counsel.
• Provide defendants with witness confrontation.
• Provide defendants with trials where the crime occurred.
• Do not impose “double-jeopardy” for the same offense.
• Provide defendants with subpoena power.
Now, compare these sentences to the command: “No unreasonable searches.” Here, the noun
“searches” is preceded by a qualifier (“unreasonable”) which forces its reader to value-judge the
activity in question before one can say whether rule-conformity occurrs. The same is true for, “No
excessive fines.” Because some of the activities described by the noun, fines, are acceptable under the
sentence’s own terms while others are not – and because this determination requires “judgment” –
the right is said to be “gradient.” Other examples of gradient rights in the Constitution include:
• Provide just compensation for takings.
• Provide due (meaning fair) process when taking life/liberty/property.
• Provide speedy criminal trials.
• Do not impose cruel punishment.
• Use indictments for infamous crimes.
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I refer to these rights as gradient because their articulation is ultimately conceptualized as
being a matter of degree. That is, words like “substantial,” “significant,” “excessive,” “cruel,”
“unfair” or “undue” are simply more sophisticated ways of saying “too much.” They are words,
therefore, that purport to draw gradients not too unlike the measuring lines one might find on rulers,
test tubes or cooking cups. The difference is that instead of measuring liquid or solids, you are asked
to “measure” an activity across some moral criteria. Hence, the word “gradient” is used.
What is important about gradient versus simple rights is not what you might expect. It is not
that simple rights grant more liberty or are more stern than gradient rights. The command, “provide
defendants with counsel,” for example, is not more generous than the command, “provide defendants
with good counsel.” What is relevant is that one is easier to affix meaning. The former command is
more rigid because it designates more clearly what is required for rule conformity, whereas the latter
requires more effort to see if the rule is violated.9
One of the things that makes gradient rights even more tricky is when their gradient fluctuates
or changes. Consider the word “unreasonable.” What is interesting about this word is that it refers
linguistically to two different things at the same time. It can refer to something that is verb-possible
and something that is adjective-opposite. This is because the prefix and suffix specify what in essence
are mathematical operations, yet the English language does not indicate in its syntax the order that
such operations are to be performed. Let me demonstrate how this works. Consider the meaning of
the prefix and suffix:
1. “un” means opposite (To be unlocked is to be open)
2. “able” means possible. (One can lock that which is “lockable”)
Any word that starts with “un” and ends with “able” will have a different gradient depending
on what order the mind performs the opposite and possibility functions. One way to interpret
unreasonable, e.g., – let us call it X – is:
1. un = opposite
2. unreason = opposite of reason
3. (unreason)+ able = possible to opposite reason.
4. Therefore, X = something which can be opposite reasoned.
Hence, if it is possible to counter-reason something – if there are two equally cogent justifications –
the thing in question must be unreasonable. Literally speaking, one is able to “unreason” the result.
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Imagine how this would work if it was the law of search and seizure. Assume for the moment
that a police officer sees, e.g., gun ammunition on the floor board of a car late at night as a motorist
exited his vehicle to pump gas in an area that had just reported a murder one hour earlier. And assume
that the ammunition looks like the kind of slugs used at the crime scene, and the person is wearing
ragged clothing. Would acting upon this information be unreasonable? Well, it would be if one found
an equally valid counter-theory: that, e.g., many people in the area were avid hunters, the ammunition
was common for hunting deer, it was open season, and hunters wear dingy clothing under their
orange vests. So perhaps the person was hunting.
The point is that one has two propositions, P and Q, each of which has a certain degree of
speculative force. One says that the person may be linked to a murder; the other says he is linked to
hunting. If one reads the word “unreasonable” to mean that which cannot be opposite reasoned, one
would have to find any seizure on this basis to violate the text of the Fourth Amendment.
But not so fast. Consider now a different order of operations. Another way to calculate the
meaning of the word “unreasonable” – let us call it Y – is as follows:
1. able = possible
2. reasonable = possible to reason
3. un = opposite
4. un+(reasonable) = not possible to reason
5. Therefore, Y = something which cannot be reasoned
( i.e., that which is arbitrary).
This interpretation says something completely different: that “unreasonable” means that which
cannot be reasoned. Decisions for which no reason can be offered are said to be arbitrary. If the
Fourth Amendment protected only against arbitrary searches, then the government could search
whenever it had some simple basis capable of articulation. It would not matter whether a counterbasis existed – any minimal chain of inference would do. This standard seems to allow a search of the
car and seizure of any evidence.
Note how fascinating this transformation is. In both instances there is indisputable logic. Both
syllogisms, X and Y, are deductive and are a priori. Yet one says that “unreasonable” means that
which can be opposite reasoned, while the other says it means that which is not possible to reason
at all (and hence is arbitrary). This paradox exists because the English language does not indicate
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what order one is to perform logical operations in linguistics. If it had told one not to engage in
(unreason) + able searches, one could distinguish it from un + (reasonable) searches. Stated another
way, one could tell from symbol combination alone whether the word means verb-possible or
adjective-opposite.10
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment is a gradient command that is a little different than other
gradient commands. It is different because it is ambiguous as well as vague. It is also unique in that
it specifies a logical ambiguity rather than an empirical one. Most ambiguities are empirical in nature,
such as the statement, “The banks are falling” – which could mean river banks or financial
institutions depending upon the state of affairs being reported. One needs further information to see
which it is. But with “unreasonable,” there is guesswork not about what can be seen but rather about
how to conduct linguistic math. The result is that two anthropological meanings for the word exist
in our culture. And I want to categorically suggest that what Fourth Amendment litigation has been
all about in the past forty or so years has been a battle over which meaning of “unreasonable” should
prevail. As Chapter 5 shows us, the version that best suits the police state seems to have prevailed.
One can also see the politics of gradiency when comparing the meaning of “unreasonable” in
tort law versus its meaning in Fourth Amendment criminal procedural law. In torts it means a risky
violation of the relevant custom (a stronger standard), but for police officers it largely means arbitrary
conduct (a weak standard). Indeed, if doctors were allowed the same latitude in medical treatment
that police officers are allowed in searching and seizing, it would quite difficult to find rule violations
in medical malpractice cases. But the point here is not to argue for a uniform standard – that would
be idiotic. The point is simply that some semantic qualifiers actually signal to their readers two
different grades at the same time.
Note that this is not limited to words with difficulties in symbol combination. It is also true
of words like “objective,” “rational,” “legitimate” and “reasonable.”11 One can interpret these words
to mean satisfying certain minimal standards of acceptability or to mean the better of two alternatives.
The reason for this seems once again to involve the game of transposing form and function. If
something has a rational form, it passes a basic test for acceptability. But if it is not the best of its
kind, can one really say that its acceptance is “rational?” Not if “rational” is meant to include the
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function of rationality, which is to select the best possible alternative.12
Hence, gradiency poses special problems for clarity in language. What gradient rights “say”
is vague and often fluctuating. And how justices choose their meaning, therefore, seems more to do
with which choice provides satisfying social policy than with what legal words actually “tell” them
to do. To see an interesting example of this, compare the meaning of an “unreasonable” seizure in
Browner v. County of Inyo13 to what is normally regarded as “unreasonable” police conduct. Browner
is a tort case. It involves the police trying to stop a criminal who was fleeing in a stolen car. The
officers set a road block that ultimately killed the driver. Evidently, the defendant could not see the
road block because it was constructed at a bend in the road. As the driver made the turn, he
encountered the traffic obstructions too late to safely stop and died in a crash. His heirs sued for
intentionally violating the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.
The issue in the case is simply whether the “seizure” of the defendant – i.e., forcefully
stopping his car on the road – was “reasonable.” If so, no possible violation of the Fourth Amendment
occurred and recovery is barred. But if not, the heirs have the right to go to trial and recover damages
(so long as they prove that the violation was intentional). The question, then, is simply whether
“wrongful roadblocks” constitute a valid theory for lawsuits claiming a tortious violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The plaintiff’s counsel argued, obviously, that a reasonable police department
would not have set up the road block that way – they would have been more cautious of the harm
involved (not placing it around a bend).
The decision in the case is interesting. The Court held that the tort theory was valid and that
the case could not be dismissed as a frivolous lawsuit.14 Hence, the Court apparently held that what
can be an “unreasonable” seizure under the Fourth Amendment can be a more restrictive idea in tort
than what it is for criminal cases, even though it involves the same exact conduct and the same exact
provision of law! Does anyone really think that if the victim lived he could have suppressed his
evidence in a prosecution for fleeing because the road block was risky? What about highway chases
where police knock the car off the road? Defendants who survive such “seizures” cannot show a
violation of the Fourth Amendment when they are prosecuted for their crimes. But if they die – who
knows? – maybe it violates.
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The point of all of this is only to show that gradiency presents special problems for those who
want to find determinate references in words. Because of this, gradient rights are less rigid than
simple ones.
C. Parameters
Having just completed my discussion of the problems inherent in reading vague adjectives,
I now discuss my final concept. Parameters are the easiest of my criteria to understand. Recall that
at the beginning of Part-A, I suggested that the sentence “don’t censor speech” was different from
the sentence “don’t censor the freedom of speech.” The difference is that the former requires an
activity to belong to both the category of “freedom” and “speech” before it is protected, whereas the
latter requires the approval of only one category. The idea that speech is itself a subset of a larger
concept of liberty is what I call liberty’s parameter.
The fact that such a ceiling exists is self evident. If people had the right to speak without the
benefit of a parameter, students could talk over professors, people could scribble on others’ mail,
graffiti could not be outlawed on public or private structures, someone could perpetually yell and
disrupt church or libraries and so forth. American society often describes this concept with a popular
metaphor: “the right to swing your fist ends where my nose begins.” This suggests that the idea of
a liberty parameter is inherent in the whole grammar of the language of rights, and that there is some
kind of natural order to the utilization of rights.
I must make a sharp distinction, however, about what a liberty parameter is not. I am not
saying that a parametric limitation has the same impact on the meaning of rights as do words like
“reasonable,” “excessive,” or “offensive.” There is a huge difference between a simple command
having only a parametric limitation versus one having gradiency imposed upon its noun. If the First
Amendment said, for example, “Don’t censor reasonable speech,” one would expect categories of
legal thought to emerge that proscribe the speakable from the unspeakable. Perhaps the categories
would be epistemic in nature – only those with sufficient justification can speak (let us call it the
“adequate basis” rule). Perhaps they would be economic in origin – those thoughts that are optimally
understood get priority (“the rule against confusion”). Of course, one would probably not see the
kind of freedom that allows the speech of the KKK, Malcolm-X, the Black Panthers, flag burning,
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Larry Flynt, rock-and-roll music in the 60s and who knows what else. And so, therefore, a parametric
limitation cannot be equated with gradiency.
Actually, this can be demonstrated by simply comparing the subject categories of legal
doctrine for each kind of right. For example, if one examines how the Court has actually interpreted
the speech clause of the First Amendment – a simple right with only a parametric limitation – one
finds a clear distinction between parametric concerns and concerns about referents. The division is
as follows:
Parametric Concerns:

Referent Problems:

• Time & Place
• Protected environments
• Some tortious conduct (very limited)
• Fighting words (very limited)
• Inciting immediate danger (very limited)15

• Symbolic speech
• Advertising
• Campaign finance
• Obscenity/Pornography

When looking at the these doctrinal categories, it is clear that they are distinct. The parametric
doctrines try to regulate the use of speech in the larger marketplace of liberty, whereas the referent
doctrines try to say what “speech” is. So it is not considered “free speech” to block traffic, injure the
reputation of your private colleague with damaging falsehoods, or get face-to-face with someone and
provoke a fist fight. It is not “free speech” because these activities do not belong to the category of
“freedom,” though they may fit the category of “speech.”
Note also how the doctrine of “protected environment” fits into this logic. Examples of
protected environments in First Amendment law include schools, prisons and the military. Because
each member of these environments – children, convicts, and conscripts – have lost (or not yet
attained) basic freedom, their rights to speak are now analytically a parametric concern. Freedom is
given to those who are emancipated. When one substantially compromises the emancipation status,
one’s right to speech becomes compromised as well. Hence, how liberty is systemically constructed
effects whether or not a given right exceeds its parameter.
To see how this sort of “rights structure” differs from the kind of doctrine produced by
gradiency, all one has to do is examine the subject categories of search-and-seizure law listed below:
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• Plain view
• Good-faith reliance
• Inventory search
• Consent
• Hot pursuit
• Stop & frisk
• Inevitable discovery
• Evanescent evidence
• Independent source or justification

If one examine these categories closely, it is clear that they all purport to proscribe the definition of
a lawful search. That is, they look at the universe of possible searches and then delineate a criteria for
which searches are good and which are bad. In essence, then, they proscribe the behavior’s content.
With the First Amendment, there really is no legal criteria that tells us what is the acceptable content
of speech. In fact, it is illegal in this country for the government to tell citizens what is good or bad
speech. The point, then, is that rights having parametric delimiters only seem to result in doctrine that
is far different from ones having gradient delimiters. The former’s doctrine is more structured around
fixed concepts, while the latter is more circumstantially oriented.
D. Conclusion
Having just discussed the concepts of referents, gradients and parameters, I now conclude
my discussion about rigidity. Based upon what I have shown, it is now possible to rank the following
legal commands according to how rigid they are: (1) the free speech clause of the First Amendment
in cases where the right asserted is an archetypical referent of the word "speech" and does not involve
the liberty's parameter (referred to as "core political speech"); (2) the free speech clause where the
right asserted is a diffused referent of the word "speech" and does not involve the liberty's parameter
(advertising cases and campaign finance); (3) the free speech clause where the right asserted is an
extension of the word "speech" and does not involve the liberty's parameter (obscenity and
pornography); and (4) the Fourth Amendment's protection against "unreasonable" searches and
seizures. These commands appear in Table 2.1 below with their rigidity designation (most,
intermediate or least) listed on the left and an explanation of why in the far right column:
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Table 2.1: Rigidity Assignment

Most Rigid:

Intermediate:

Least Rigid:

Law

Explanation

First Amendment core political
speech.

No gradiency; Ref erent is
archetypical and not outside the
parameter.

First Amendment advertising and
campaign finance cases.

No gradiency; Referent is diffused
and not outside the parameter.

First Amendment obscenity and
pornography.
-------------Fourth Amendment search and
seizures.

No gradiency; Referent is extended
and not outside the parameter.
--------------Gradiency – vague and fluctuating.

Based on what I have shown, it is now possible to assign a numerical value to these liberty
claims. In my work I place the above claims in an ordinal level of rank, assigning a 1, 2 or 3 to each
claim depending upon its rigidity classification. Although this is a useful way to measure rigidity, I
am aware that I may not have provided an adequate basis for saying that legal sentences with
fluctuating gradiency are equally imprecise as those with referent extensions and no gradiency. Stated
another way, I may not have shown that the activities proscribed by the phrase "unreasonable search"
are equally uncertain as the claim that marketing nudity is "speech." One is vague and ambiguous; the
other figurative. Can it really be said that the two should be equated in an ordinal measure? My
answer is pragmatic: my criteria is still somewhat "rough." But I stand by the assertion that, in both
search-and-seizure cases and pornography/obscenity cases, law seems to be more absent than in the
other two categories of cases. The words simply provide the least amount of literal verification for
what claimants assert to be their content. So perhaps it is not all that wrong to lump vagueness and
ambiguity with poetry in an indeterminacy rating. In both instances, word references are quite unclear.
In the next section, I present my empirical research design. As I show below, a few more areas
of law are added to the ones I discussed above. This discussion was meant only to describe how
rigidity could be translated into an empirical model, not to comprehensively list all of the legal
provisions that are included in my study. That kind of information is provided next.

Empirical Research Design

58

Empirical Research Design
Having just explained the concept of rigidity and how it can be used in an empirical model of
judging, I now describe the methods I use to prove my hypotheses. I state my hypotheses in
paragraph form at the beginning of this section and then break the organization of its proof into two
separate discussions. The utility of this is evident below.
My hypothesis is very simple: the rigidity of a legal command effects how justices vote. In
particular, there is an inverse relationship between command rigidity and political ideology. Where
the liberty claim being asserted is most clearly designated by law, justices shun their political values,
and measures of ideology poorly explain Court voting. But where the liberty claim being asserted
is least clearly designated by law, "value-voting" tends to dominate, and the Court appears most
politicized. Where law is intermediately rigid, measures of political ideology explain Court voting only
"somewhat" and are generally unimpressive. I refer to all of these claims as the rigidity hypothesis.16
I also theorize something that is related to the rigidity hypothesis: that the influence of ideology upon
the Court is a fluctuating one, sometimes strong and sometimes not. I refer to this claim as my
corollary hypothesis.
A. The Rigidity Hypothesis
To test the rigidity hypothesis, I analyze votes cast by justices in selected civil liberties cases
from 1963-2004. The exact period that governs case selection is January 1, 1963 to June 30, 2004.
No cases before or after that date are eligible for analysis.17 The cases selected from this time period
were chosen according to three criteria: (1) the liberty claim being asserted had to be capable of being
differentiated according to my criteria of rigidity; (2) the number of cases for each rigidity
classification had to be sufficiently numerous to facilitate voting comparisons; and (3) the cases,
overall, had to involve the kind of important and salient rights controversies that Court historically
decides. In short, I wanted a decent crop of rights cases that were sufficiently numerous and salient,
and that varied in how rigidly their claims were founded in law.
To implement this criteria, I selected the following cases for analysis:
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Table 2.2: Selection of Cases
Rigidity
Assignment

1

2

3

Totals

Case Topic

First Amendment core political
speech.

First Amendment advertising,
campaign finance, vulgarity and
verbal obscenity cases; and
Sixth Amendment right to jurytrial cases involving a highly
selective area: judge-controlled
sentencing enhancements that
go beyond statutory maximums
in cases involving “jury trials.”20
Fi rst Amendment pictorial
obscenity cases; substantive
due process cases involving gay
rights, punitive-damage relief
and landmark abortion cases; 21
and Fourth Amendment searchand-seizure cases involving the
warrant requirement and the
ability of officers to act upon a
standard of proof lower than
probable cause.22

Cases

44

37

Votes

Cases Excluded

419

Time, Place and Manner
restrictions,18 certain defamation
cases19 and cases involv ing
protected environments.

355

70

678

151*

1,452

First Amendment time, place
and manner restrictions, and
protected environments; all
Sixth Amendment cases that do
not involve language diffusion
(i.e., all cases except sentencing
enhancements that go beyond
statutory maximums).
First Amendment time, place
and manner restrictions and
p r o t ec t e d e n v i r o n m e n t s
(including child pornography);
substantive due process cases
not involving gay rights, punitive
damages or landmark abortion
decisions; search-and-seizure
cases inv olv ing protected
environments (schools, prisons),
non-criminal searches (e.g.,
regulatory agencies), and nonwarrant, non-Terry issues.23

* Note: Some cases contain more than one issue. A search and seizure case, for example, might contain a vote on both a warrant
issue and a Terry issue. Hence, the number of issues is a more important statistic than the number of cases. The number of issues
in the study is165. For more information about what constitutes an “issue” and a “vote.” see the Appendix.

The votes from these cases are organized into a pooled, cross-sectional design where the
organizing principle is language rigidity rather than time. Cases are therefore organized into three
groups: (1) those where the right asserted is most rigidly designated by the primary command; (2)
those where the right is intermediately designated; and (3) those where the right is least rigidly
designated. The voting data for the justices is collected through content analysis of each case. I read
and code every opinion in this study. The Appendix provides a list of my coding rules.
The rigidity hypothesis is proved using two very simple variables:
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Command Rigidity:

This is an ordinal-level variable: a “1" is assigned when
the claimed right is most rigidly designated by a
primary command; a “2" when it is intermediately
designated; and a “3" when it is least rigidly
designated.

Liberty Granted:

This variable assigns a 0 if a justice votes against the
liberty claim asserted in the case and 1 if the justice
votes for the claim. It does not matter if the claim is
“conservative” or “liberal.” Voting in favor of
donating money to campaigns because it is “speech”
receives a “1" just as would voting for flag burning.
There are 23 of these variables, one for each justice.

To prove the hypothesis, I use a logistic regression analysis estimated with maximum
likelihood. The independent variable is "command rigidity," the dependent variable is "liberty
granted." There are 23 justices covered in my study and each has his or her own voting record. I
therefore conduct separate logistic regressions on each justice to determine the effect that command
rigidity has on his or her decision to grant or deny a claim to liberty. I also use qualitative methods
that consist of reviewing cases selected for analysis to determine whether their content supports or
opposes my hypothesis. In particular, I determine from reading each opinion whether or not justices
show a concern for legal text when deciding the case.
The layout of my data set is important for reasons that become evident in the next section.
In proving the rigidity hypothesis, the data set is organized conventionally. That is, the independent
and dependant variables appear in columns, and the data entries – the legal issues – appear in rows.
There is a column for each justice. The layout of the data is conceptualized in Table 2.3 below:
Table 2.3: Hypothetical Organization of Rigidity Data
Legal Issue
rigid case 1
rigid case 2
etc.,
intermediate case 1
intermediate case 2
etc.,
least-rigid case 1
least-rigid case 2
etc.,

Rigidity

J1

J2

J3

J4

1
1

1
0

0
1

1
1

1
1

2
2

1
0

0
1

1
0

0
1

3
3

0
0

0
1

0
0

1
0

... etc.
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B. The Corollary Hypothesis
Having just described how I prove the rigidity hypothesis, I now describe how I prove the
corollary hypothesis. Recall that the corollary hypothesis says that political ideology is a fluctuating
force upon the Court, sometimes high, sometimes low. To prove this hypothesis, I conduct a separate
logistic regression analysis using different variables. The variables for this analysis are as follows:
Career-Liberal Rating:

The career-liberal rating for each justice as
reported in the most recent edition of the
United States Supreme Court Compendium,
Third Edition (December, 2002) (continuous
level data).

Segal-Cover Scores:

The updated Segal-Cover scores for each
justice as reported in political science literature
(continuous-level data).

Ideological Direction:

This variable assigns 0 if a justice’s vote is
conservative and a 1 if it is liberal. The criteria
for the assignment of direction is obedient to
the rules of the attitudinal model (binary
variable).

For this model, the independent variable is justice ideology and the dependent variable is the
ideological direction of the vote. I estimate justice ideology using career percentages in one
regression and Segal-Cover scores in another, so that readers can see the difference between the two.
This analysis is used simply to assess how well an ideological model fits the voting data encountered
in each chapter of my work. To assess goodness of fit, I use the likelihood ratio R-squared statistic
because it is both a reliable and superior measure of a logit model’s overall fit.24 To perform this
analysis, however, I have to invert the structure of my data set: that is, each justice’s vote appears
as data in rows rather than columns. An example of how this might look is as follows:
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Table 2.4: Hypothetical Organization of Corollary Data
Justices’
Votes

Vote
Direction

Career
Rating

Segal/
Cover

White’s vote in case 1
Rehnquist vote in case 1
Powell’s vote in case 1
O’Connor’s vote in case 1
Burger’s vote in case 1
Brennan’s vote in case 1
Marshall vote in case 1
Stevens vote in case 1
Blackmun’s vote in case 1

1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1

42.4
21.8
37.4
35.7
29.6
79.5
81.4
64.5
52.8

.00
-.91
-.67
-.17
-.77
1.00
1.00
-.50
-.77

White’s vote in case 2
Rehnquist vote in cast 2
Powell’s vote in case 2
O’Connor’s vote in case 2
Scalia’s vote in case 2
Brennan’s vote in case 2
Marshall vote in case 2
Stevens vote in case 2

1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1

42.4
21.8
37.4
35.7
28.4
79.5
81.4
64.5

.00
-.91
-.67
-.17
-1.00
1.00
1.00
-.50

... and so forth for all of the selected cases.

Using this layout, I can easily estimate how well measures of ideology fit the actual voting
behavior of justices on the Court for discreet areas of interest. I estimate, for example, how well
ideology explains votes cast in core political speech cases, advertising cases, obscenity cases and
search-and-seizure cases that appear in my study. In Chapter 6, I also use this procedure to estimate
the relationship between ideology and voting for all civil liberties votes that appear in the United
States Supreme Court Data Base. This, in essence, re-estimates the goodness of fit of attitudinal
model as a whole. This is useful not only for showing that ideology is fluctuating influence upon the
Court, but also for showing that Segal and Spaeth's work greatly overestimates the role that political
ideology plays in the judging of civil liberties claims. The utility of this procedure is that justices votes
remain non-aggregated – I do not place them into percentages before I run them in a regression – so
that claims of an ecological fallacy can be avoided.
One of the things that should be noted about my design is that its interpretation requires one
to examine two separate analyses. The two should be thought of as providing companion information.
One, for example, shows that ideology is a poor explanation of votes in legal areas that are said to
be most rigid, and a much better explanation of votes in legal areas that are least rigid. The other
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analysis shows that particular justices are more likely to grant liberty claims as command rigidity
increases. Combining the two together, therefore, is what ultimately proves my case. I wish there was
some way to incorporate my theories into one model, but this is simply impossible given the need to
invert the data set.
The Concept of Political Cue
There is one final concept that must be understood before I commence my study. It concerns
how the attitudinal model classifies votes as being “liberal” or “conservative.” The coding criteria is
very important to understand because I use it to invent a new analytical concept: political cue. Quite
simply, a case is said to have "political cue" if its outcome suggests an ideological direction.
According to the attitudinal model, for example, a vote against flag burning is “conservative.”
Therefore, when I discuss the flag burning cases, I simply say that conservative justices are “politically
cued” to vote against flag mutilation. “Cue,” therefore, is the application of the rules for direction.
But why is voting against flag burning considered “conservative?” To answer this, one must
look more closely at how attitudinal model assigns direction. First, the most basic coding rule – the
one that probably codes at least 80% of the civil liberties cases – is what I call the model’s “abstract
criterion.” It says that liberalism as a political philosophy tends to favor the granting of rights to
individuals over the will of their political communities, while conservatism is opposite: it tends to
want social order structured by political assemblies rather than courts. Hence, a “liberal” vote in civil
liberties cases is one that is pro-claimant; a “conservative”vote is one that is anti-claimant.25 One
might think of this as being a variant of the old distinction between judicial activism or restraint .
But clearly, this criterion by itself is an inadequate way to code votes. It is inadequate because
one can consider specific examples – such as rights for gun owners – where conservatism is desiring
rights and liberalism is not.26 And so what the attitudinal model does, therefore, is create another
criterion for vote coding that I refer to as “policy cue.” It says that when the disputants in a case
promote a public policy agenda that liberals and conservatives have become meaningfully aligned with
in the larger political culture, it is "liberal" to vote with the liberal agenda, and "conservative" to vote
for the conservative agenda. So for example, if the claimant is pursuing an issue that conservatives
favor – e.g., reverse discrimination – a vote for the claimant is considered “conservative.”27 Other
examples of where pro-claimant votes are “conservative” include: voting in favor of anti-abortion
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protestors, voting for Christians who want First Amendment rights in public schools, and voting to
protect corporations and insurance companies from large punitive-damage awards.
There is one critical feature to understand about policy cue: it trumps the abstract criterion.
This goes to the heart of what an ideological model says about political reality: it is more important
to win salient power (policy) struggles than to be consistent with one's abstract rhetoric about
“rights.” This is so because politics is always more important than principle. Hence, whenever policy
cue is present, it alone determines the coding of votes. But where it is not present, the abstract
criterion is used as a back up.
One can visualize these criteria better in a matrix. Table 2.45, below, lists policy-cue in
columns and abstract-cue in rows. When both the policy issue and the abstract rhetoric are pointing
in the same direction, I call this an unambiguous cue. But where the two conflict, I like to use the
term reverse cue because it warns us that conservatives are now said to be the legal activists, while
liberals are said to be the deniers of rights. Examine the following:
Table 2.45: Assignment of Political Cue
Favor Policy

Oppose Policy

Favor Individual Rights

Unambiguous cue
(liberals)

Reverse cue
(liberals)

Oppose Individual Rights

Reverse-cue
(conservatives)

Unambiguous cue
(conservatives)

Based upon these general rules of vote coding, the attitudinal model generated its now famous
percent-liberal ratings. I have replicated these scores in Table 2.5. It is important for readers who are
less familiar with the Court’s voting membership to know of these values when following my analysis.
I frequently refer to justices using terms like “liberal members” or “conservative wing,” and
sometimes I refer to a justice by name, assuming that the reader is familiar with the member’s rating.
Committing the scores to memory is indeed a helpful suggestion.
I have also reproduced my scaled versions of the ratings. This allows for better precision
regarding not only who is “conservative” but to what degree. As I indicated in Chapter 1, the scale
runs from “-1” (always conservative) to “+1” (always liberal). A “0” represents the absence of
directional bias. The only justices who seem to lack virtually any directional bias in their career voting
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tendencies are Blackmun and Stewart.28 Their values are simply too close to “0” to be concerned
with. Therefore, when I refer in the next chapters to the voting patterns of “liberals” and
“conservatives,” I am not including these two justices as members of either category. These labels
refer only to justices who have a scaled score above the absolute value of 0.1.
One last thing needs mentioned before I begin. Throughout the next three chapters I have
provided tables that summarize court cases and voting behavior. The tables specifically list the justices
who vote in a direction opposite of the political label I have assigned to them. Although I call these
votes “defections,” they of course cannot be thought of as actual defections from ideology (yet). The
reason is elementary: No conservative or liberal justice always votes conservatively or liberally.
Justice White, for example, voted liberal on average every 4 in 10 cases. He therefore only possessed
a slight conservative bias. When listing justices in the tables, I have made sure that the scaled scores
are present so that one can see the extent of any “defecting” justice’s directional bias. Once again,
the tables are illustrative only; they are not meant to establish true ideological defection. I will let the
regression analysis at the end of the chapters make that conclusion for me.
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Summary and Conclusion
This chapter constructed a criteria for determining the clarity of legal sentences. It was shown
that clarity is related to three analytic components often found in legal sentences: referents, gradiency,
and liberty parameters. It was shown that referents of most legal nouns can be thought of as being
one of three types: archetypical, diffused and extended. Archetypical referents have the expected form
and function of their term. Diffused referents have either form or function, but not both. Extended
referents have neither the form or function of the archetype. Based upon the above, therefore, it is
possible to rank the clarity of the referents of legal nouns by placing them in a hierarchical order –
archetype being most clear, diffused types being intermediate, and extensions being most disputable.
This chapter also considered the problems posed by the existence of vague adjectives in legal
sentences. These problems were referred to as "gradiency." It was shown, quite simply, that a
sentence imposing gradiency upon its noun is less rigid than otherwise. This is especially true of
grades that are both vague and ambiguous at the same time, such as the word "unreasonable." It was
theorized that sentences using grades of this sort are about as equally imprecise as sentences that have
no gradiency, but rely upon a referent extension. This was admitted to be somewhat controversial
because, in fact, the two may not be equally indeterminate. However, it did seem to be the case that
they both are less exacting when compared to diffused and archetypical referents that have no
gradiency imposed upon their noun. Hence, it seemed possible to take at least some sentence
structures and place them into a "rough" hierarchical order according to their clarity. Once this
hierarchy was established, it was translated into an ordinal-level variable for purposes of empirical
modeling. The chapter concluded with an empirical research design. The design relies primarily upon
logistic regression estimated with maximum likelihood. The variables and details are more fully
described above.
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Notes:
1. See, e.g., Marc C. Baker, The Atoms of Language: The Mind’s Hidden Rules of Grammar (New York:
Basic Books, 2001); Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997); Steven
Pinker, Words and Rules (New Tork: Perennial, 2000); and Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct (New Tork:
Perennial, 1994).
2. It might be more literally stated as “don’t shorten” or “don’t truncate,” but the essential point is still the
same.
3. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, (New York: Macmillan 1953).
4. See Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, (Harvard University Press, 1971).
5. Of course, there are some who will say this is not Kripkean at all, because Kripke only proposed his view
for words that science had explained. I agree with this, but I maintain that reducing something to a more precise
form certainly resembles Kripke. It is applying Kripke where he himself did not.
6. I suppose I should mention something important about Socrates here. Socrates, through Plato, appealed to
this idea that the essence of something could be found in its great and undeniable “form.” I say this for one
reason: it appears that what he really means is the word “function,” not form. Properly translated, what I have
said is that one will find parallels with my use of the word “function” with Socrates’ desire to seek essences
and, for that matter, with Kant’s concern with “the relation of ideas.” What I am ultimately doing here is
propping up the idea of abstraction or conceptualism, and placing it on a parallel footing with literalism. What
I am asserting is that neither literalism nor conceptualism is more important in ascertaining the meaning of
something, but that both go hand in hand. It is when one lacks the other that problems arise.
7. See Steven Pinker, Words and Rules, (New York: Perennial, 1999), 269-287
8. If this criteria fails certain kinds of words, like scientific ones, it may have to be limited to terms that
describe legal rights. I am hopeful that it is applicable to all uses of language.
9. However, one can imagine a situation where gradiency is sufficiently clear. Compare the command “No
excessive bail,” with the command, “Do not bail at a rate greater than five times the maximum fine allowed
for each crime charged.” Both examples involves a right whose articulation is conceptualized as being a
matter of degree. But the difference is that the latter has an agreed upon metric (dollars) as well as a
demonstrable point at which a rule violation occurs. If you do not have a universal metric and precise indication
of when a line is crossed, then “gradiency” becomes a problem for those wanting clarity. In this work,
“gradiency” is used to refer to spectrums that are metaphorical. Perhaps I should have said “abstract
gradiency.”
10. See Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct, 119-123.
11. See Richard Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 7.
12. This is the linguistic difference in the Court’s weak scrutiny test, which uses words such as “legitimate
governmental interest” and “rationally-related means” to refer to something that is rational only in form. An
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example of using words like these to mean something that is rational in function can be found, politics aside,
in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13. 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
14. In legal jargon, it is called "failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted," or a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. The lower court had considered the matter frivolous and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court's
reinstatement of the matter means that these kinds of theories are now legally cognizable.
15. This doctrine was known as the “clear and present danger rule.” I’m hesitant to actually list it as a bona
fide doctrine today because it is now so limited. After the Court’s decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969), you can only be punished for speech that incites “lawlessness” if the incitement encourages an
immediate danger and if the it is likely to be successful. Clearly, this is now a very limited doctrine that has
as its main concern threats to others’ liberty rather than stopping the communication of dangerous ideas.
16. It should be clear from the above discussion that my hypothesis about rigidity is limited to “primary
commands” – the constitutional or statutory provision being interpreted – and not court precedent.
17. This time period was selected for several reasons. Resources did not permit me to enlarge it further, and
I was content with testing my theories only in the “modern court.” It is not because the theories would
necessarily fail in another time period, but rather because the measures of justice ideology for Truman and
Roosevelt appointees are not sufficiently correlated with Segal-Cover scores to use them in an analysis of this
sort. Most of the attitudinal model’s research, for example, is focused upon the modern court. I therefore used
the date that Justice Frankfurter left the Court as my starting point, and I used the date that I labored to finalize
this project – the end of June, 2004 – as my ending point.
18. “Symbolic speech” is not considered a time, place and manner restriction for reasons indicated in Chapter
3. Therefore, United States v. O’Brien is included as core speech.
19. Private-figure defamation cases are excluded, but some public-figure cases are not. Chapter 3 explains this
rationale.
20. This section concerns the right of citizens to have a “jury trial” when judges are given more power than
juries over the defendant’s ultimate fate. Usually, judges can only punish defendants for the crimes that juries
find them guilty of. The punishment generally takes the form of a minimum and a maximum sentence. In some
rare but growing situations, judges have been given the power to punishment people more severely than the
maximum punishment allowed by the crime the jury found was committed. These laws are referred to as
“sentencing enhancements.” They are included because they meet the definition of a claim of right that is
intermediately rigid. To see why, see Chapter 4.
21. All of the substantive due process cases involving gay rights and punitive damage relief are included. For
the abortion cases, only landmark cases have been used. The reason for not including more abortion cases or
even a complete treatment of substantive due process was simply a matter of resources. Had all substantive
due process cases been included, it is believed that the conclusions of this study would be strengthened.
22. The Fourth Amendment cases involve: (1) votes about whether warrants are required for particular
searches; and (2) votes about when police can detain, search or seize with a standard lower than probable
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cause. Although I had originally planned for a search-and-seizure chapter, I had to place the tables and data
for this analysis in the appendix. Although the cases I selected are indeed central to the ideological conflict that
the Court has experienced in search-and-seizure law over the last forty or so years, regrettably, resources
prevented me from undertaking a more comprehensive treatment of this topic. I would have liked to have
included cases involving the definition of probable cause, neutral and detached magistrates, the particularity
requirement, highway checkpoints, the definition of what is a “search” or “seizure” and so forth. I am confident
that a more expansive treatment of this area of decision making will only bolster the conclusion of this study.
23. Fourth Amendment cased excluded include school searches, drug testing, cases where there is no state
action and so forth.
24. Scott Menard, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis, (Sage, 2002), 20-27.
25. See Segal and Spaeth, The Attiudinal Model Revisited, 323.
26. It is actually inadequate because the definition of the term “liberal” and “conservative” is being switched
from one paragraph to the next. In the former the term refers to an abstract philosophy about the place of rights
in government, but in the latter it refers to what might be called “political pathology” – that is, a shared
rhetoric used by groups or interests to dominate one another in politics and society. In the first case, the
centerpiece of the belief system is philosophy, but in this case it is psychology and desire.
27. Segal and Spaeth, The Attiudinal Model Revisited, 323. See also, ICPSR 9422 Code Book, 69-72 & 92.
28. For convenience, I do not show the scores of justices not included in my study. Those are Roosevelt and
Truman appointees: justices Frankfurter, Minton, Reed, Rutledge, Whittaker, Jackson and Burton.

Chapter 3:
Core Political Speech:
The Triumph of Law over Politics

INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I analyze voting behavior for an area of civil liberties cases where law seems
to be most clear: the speech clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applied to cases
involving “core political speech.” In Chapter 2, I showed that the concept of “core speech” consisted
basically of two things: (1) an archetypical referent; and (2) a claim not involving the liberty’s
parameter. The cases selected in this chapter are obedient to this criteria. I briefly describe the
selection before I begin my analysis.
Selection of Cases
In each case in this chapter, the referent of the word “speech” has the term's expected form
and function. The form appears either as a verbalization, public demonstration or protest.1 The
function appears as an attempt to communicate messages about political or cultural change, criticism
of authority or philosophy, or the revelation of a public scandal. A list of the selected topics are as
follows:
• Anti-police speech
• Anti-war speech
• Flag mutilation
• Civil rights speech

• Hate speech
• Speech by murderers
• Socialist campaigns
• Christian speech in schools

• Speech against women
• College-campus radicalism
• Liberal interest-group speech
• “Attack parodies”

If a case involves a right of “association,” it fits the selection criteria so long as the group is
organized to offer core political speech. So, for example, where government refuses to allow a
student anarchist group to form2 or where a legislature refuses to seat a representative because of his
70
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anti-war views,3 the criterion is satisfied. Cases which fail are those where one is denied a right to join
the Jaycees4 or Rotary.5
With respect to the liberty’s parameter, I excluded three important categories of cases. The
first is any case where government objects only to the location of the speech, referred to in law
schools as “time, place and manner” restrictions.6 Secondly, none of the selected cases involve
protected environments.7 One thing needs mentioned about protected environments, however. If the
act of speech does not violate the general rules of the environment, merely being present in a prison
or high school will not exclude the case. So, for example, if a prisoner is allowed by prison
regulations to meet with visitors, any attempt by government to stifle the content of his speech during
a permissible and lawful visit would not be excluded.8
The final area of exclusion concerns defamation of private individuals. As I said in Chapter
2, the right to injure private reputations is not thought to be an activity belonging to the word
“freedom.” In addition, most private defamation cases involve speech that is more concerned with
gossip or private affairs than with social change, wars, flaunting authority or revealing scandal.
Hence, private defamation cases are removed.9 However, with respect to public-figure defamation,
the issue is more complicated. Where those cases appear in this analysis, I explain why.
Anti-American Speech
My first area of analysis is “anti-American” speech. It involves expression that is targeted
against The United States as a nation because of its explicit government policies – such as the
Vietnam war – and as well speech that is more generally against American political culture (such as
speech by socialist or anarchist groups). It includes cases arising out of anti-war protests in the 1960s
and 70s; “symbolic speech” cases involving the burning of draft cards and mutilation of American
flags; and cases involving anarchy and radicalism on college campuses, and socialist campaigns. In
each of the cases, conservatism is said to be cued against both the specific policy agenda being
advocated by the speaker or group as well as against the general idea of allowing courts to overrule
the policy choices made by legislative assemblies about these matters. Liberalism, on the other hand,
is said to be more tolerant of radical, anti-American expression and more inclined to protect people
from the will of their political community in the name of “liberty.”
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I divide this subject into two basic sections: anti-American expression that takes the form of
words, either spoken or written, and expression that uses “symbols” to communicate, such as marking
the flag with a peace sign or burning a draft card. I start with verbal criticism first.
A. Criticism with Words
I begin with Table 3.1, which looks at college campus radicalism and anti-war speech in the
1960s and 70s. The table lists only the names of the the justices who cast votes against their political
cue. Although the table refers to these votes as “defections,” it is not proper yet to consider them so.
It would be a fallacy to say that conservative justices always had to vote conservatively to have
political bias. At the end of the chapter, I let the regression analysis say what cannot yet be said.10 The
left side of the table is reserved for liberal justices, the right side for conservative. Who is a member
of these categories is a function of their scaled liberal-rating score.11 When a justice appears in these
columns, his or her scaled liberal score appears beside it so that readers can see how biased the
“defector” really is. Some "conservatives," for example, are only slightly conservative. The scaled
score reports this information so as not to mislead readers.
When looking at the voting patterns in the table, two observations should be made. First, the
Court’s voting appears to have shifted to the left – i.e., liberals are voting as a bloc but conservatives
are not. Secondly, as a logical consequence of this, conservatives as a group seem generally
supportive of anti-war expression. The simple fact is that in most cases in the table, the Court’s
conservative voting bloc is either fractured or casting all of its votes against its political cue.
In Hess v. Indiana, for example, half of the Burger Court’s conservative bloc voted to give
anti-war protesters the right to publically espouse that crowds should block traffic and obstruct
thoroughfares at times when police officers were unprepared for such tactics. Hess involved a student
protest at Indiana University. Police officers had arrived at the protest only to clear the streets so that
vehicles could continue moving. As protestors were ushered back to the curbs, one of them
advocated “taking the fucking streets” later, after police had left. He was arrested and found guilty
of disorderly conduct, but the Court reversed the conviction.
In the same year that Hess was decided (1973), the Burger Court decided Papish v.
University of Missouri Curators. In Papish, half of the Court’s conservative wing voted to give
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students at public universities the right to publish an underground newspaper containing radical
content, such as images of a police officer raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice.
The University tried, unsuccessfully, to expel the students who distributed the newspaper on campus.
The Court disallowed the expulsion.
And in Healy v. James, every member of the Court’s conservative voting bloc – Rehnquist
and Burger included – voted to give anarchist groups the right to meet on public campuses to
advocate the value of violence and disruption as a means to social change. The group, Students for
a Democratic Society (SDS), possessed a national reputation for violence and disruption in the late
60s. SDS was associated with taking over dean’s offices, entering classrooms and disrupting teaching,
and even burning buildings. After administrators at Central Connecticut State College had denied
students the right to form an SDS chapter on campus, incredibly, every conservative justice voted to
overturn their decision. In doing so, every conservative except one 12 agreed with the principle that
although universities (and governments) could police acts of disruption, they could not police the
desire to discuss or advocate the idea or philosophy of anarchy as a means of social change.13
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Indeed, Justice Powell, a strong political conservative with an ideological rating roughly equal to that
of Justice Kennedy and O’Connor, wrote the majority opinion. His words appear more concerned
with an important legal principle than with the politics of the counter culture:
We note, in so holding, that the wide latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms of
expression and association is not without its costs in terms of the risk to the maintenance of
civility and an ordered society. Indeed, this latitude often has resulted, on the campus and
elsewhere, in the infringement of the rights of others. Though we deplore the tendency of some
to abuse the very constitutional privileges they invoke, and although the infringement of rights
of others certainly should not be tolerated, we reaffirm this Court's dedication to the principles
of the Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society is founded.14

The only case in the table where conservatives voted as a bloc to suppress speech was Watts
v. United States, which appears to contain facts that were too much for Warren-Court conservatives
to stomach. The case involved an anti-war protester who said at a rally that, if drafted, the first person
he wanted to put in the sight of his rifle was Lyndon Johnson. He was charged with threatening to
injure the president, but his conviction was overturned by Warren Court liberals who, as a bloc,
outvoted the three conservatives on the Court.15
Table 3.2 continues our look at anti-American verbalizations. It contains two cases with three
distinct voting issues.16 The first case is the famous “Pentagon Papers” case, where the New York
Times obtained and published excerpts of a secret government study of the Vietnam War. The study
told of military operations and diplomatic initiatives that were supposed to be kept secret for national
security purposes. Although this case is not technically anti-war speech because the Times was merely
reporting on the war rather than disparaging it, it still involves an act that, if allowed, threatened to
hinder not only the current war, but the power of the President to wage war in general. Only one
conservative – Justice White – voted to uphold the speech.
The second case involves socialist campaigns. In Brown v. Socialist Workers, the Court’s
conservative wing voted overwhelmingly to allow the Socialist Worker Party to escape campaign
disclosure laws. Campaign finance laws generally require that candidates report to the government
the names of people who contribute money to their campaign, the amounts of the contributions and
how funds are spent. Obviously, these reports eventually enter the public domain where news media
and other groups can access them. In Brown, socialists argued that their efforts to raise money would
be hindered if the identity of their contributors became “exposed.” People might feel too embarrassed
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to contribute, they argued, or fear ostracization at work or in their community. The Court
overwhelmingly agreed. Its conservative bloc, in particular, unanimously voted to give socialists the
right to keep their contributors anonymous. Two out of five, however – still a minority – would have
required disclosure of how campaign funds were spent, because ostracization seemed much less a
concern for those who simply sold campaign products or services to socialists in a free marketplace.17
Overall, then, when the Court has confronted anti-American speech that ultimately takes the
form of a verbalization, its conservative voting bloc seems generally supportive of the First
Amendment.18 As I argue later in the chapter, the reason why this seems to happen is because the text
of the Constitution simply makes it too difficult for conservatives to vote in a manner that they
otherwise would like. I now consider what happens to voting behavior when the form of the speech
changes from words to “symbols.”
B. Criticism with Symbols
When people communicate, they usually do so through the medium of words. But
communication is by no means limited to a string of alphabetic characters. It is possible to use nonalphabetic symbols that “stand for words.” If I throw the middle finger, for example, people know
what I mean. If a soldier salutes, the recipient of this gesture likewise understands. What happens
when anti-American messages are conveyed this way? Does it effect voting behavior?
I begin my analysis with Table 3.3, which contains cases involving anti-American symbolism
other than flag mutilation (which is considered next). The cases in the table involve government’s
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attempt to convict a war protester for wearing a military uniform without authorization after he
dressed as a soldier in a “protest skit.” They involve a public school’s attempt to suspend high-school
and junior-high-school students for wearing black arm-bands in classrooms as a show of protest
against the Vietnam war. And they also involve the right to burn draft cards and to enter a courthouse
wearing a jacket that reads “Fuck the Draft.”
The case that is logical to discuss first is United States v. O’Brien. In O’Brien, a group of
protestors went to the steps of the South Boston Courthouse in March of 1966 and burned their draft
cards. A crowd of people watched the demonstration and began attacking the protesters. FBI agents
escorted one of the demonstrators into the courthouse for his own safety. He was eventually
convicted of a federal law that made it illegal to mutilate a draft card. Incredibly, four Warren-Court
liberals (and every conservative) voted to uphold his conviction. Only Justice Douglas dissented.
The only way to properly understand the liberal vote in O’Brien is to understand the Court’s
early doctrine regarding “speech versus conduct.” As First Amendment law was developing, the
Court had difficulty recognizing the fact that people could “verbalize” with more than just alphabetic
symbols (words). That is, if one raises a fist in the air to denote black power, sentential
communication occurs despite the fact that words are not the medium. The Warren Court, however,
considered this to be as much “conduct” as it was “speech.” And conduct, this logic held, could be
regulated more easily. Or as Chief Justice Earl Warren, a strong liberal, stated in his majority opinion
in O’Brien:
We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
"speech" whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.
However, even on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's conduct
is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the
destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity. This Court has
held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.19

The vote in O’Brien therefore seems to represent the effect that an early doctrinal regime had
upon voting patterns. If this is true, it is significant because the effect of these kinds of regimes
ultimately represents the greatest threat to the ideological model of judging. Doctrine is a problem
for instrumentalism, because, sometimes, it seems to cause justices to cast votes against policies or
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agendas that they may otherwise favor in order to be obedient to some higher concern. The simple
fact of the matter is that Warren Court liberals were generally supportive throughout their tenure of
both an expansive concept of individual liberty and anti-war expression in particular. And the fact that
they would allow these impulses to be checked or structured by a prudential doctrine is indeed
problematic for those who see the Court as a group of single-minded policy-driven voters.20
In any event, although the Court’s early speech-conduct distinction was effective in
“neutralizing” liberal votes, it isl eventually abandoned to the point where non-alphabetic verbalization
is vigorously protected. The erosion is evident in the voting of the three remaining cases in the table:
Cohen v. California, Tinker v. Des Moines School District, and Schacht v. United States. In Tinker,
Justice White voted with all but one liberal justice to protect a group of public school students who
were suspended for wearing black arm-bands in class as a show of protest against the Vietnam war.
Writing for the majority, Justice Fortas declared, “The wearing of armbands in the circumstances of
this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating
in it. It was closely akin to ‘pure speech.’"21 Only Justices Black and Harlan voted to disallow the
gesture – not because they thought it was “conduct,” but because it occurred in a protected
environment.22
In the other two cases, "speech" again defeats "conduct." In Cohen, a defendant wore a jacket
into a courthouse which read, “Fuck the Draft.” The Court overturned his conviction for “maliciously
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disturbing the peace.” Only one liberal justice in the case, Black, believed that the wearing of the the
jacket was conduct rather than speech. The remaining liberals (Brennan, Marshall and Douglas),
along with two slight conservatives (Harlan and White), thought that wearing the labeled apparel was
Constitutionally-protected expression.23 Finally, in Schacht, every conservative justice on the Court
(Burger, White and Harlan) voted with every liberal to overturn the conviction of a war protester who
performed a “theatrical skit” in front of an army induction center. The demonstrated dressed up as
a soldier and shot a squirt gun full of red liquid at another protester, who played the part of a
pregnant woman being gunned down by American soldiers.24
Table 3.4, however, contains the cases that will finally decimate the speech-conduct
distinction: flag mutilation. The table contains five cases involving citizens who were convicted of
state laws against flag mutilation or unlawful flag display for various acts committed against Old
Glory. In three cases an American flag was burned; in one it was sewn to the seat of a defendants
pants, and in a third it was brandished with a peace sign and hung upside-down. All of these acts were
done to protest some specific U.S. policy or state of affairs.
The voting patterns in these cases appear more ideologically driven than in other areas of core
political speech considered so far. However, even so, there is still meaningful “defection” by
conservative justices from their political cue. Indeed, without the votes of Justices Scalia and
Kennedy – both solidly conservative justices – the First Amendment would have lost its ability to
keep government from mandating a code of loyalty to its nation’s most basic symbol. It takes a while,
however, for the right of speech to prevail over this deep-seeded cultural pathology.
In the first case in the table, Street v. New York, the issue of whether flag burning is “speech”
is essentially ducked. Street involved an African American man who torched a flag on a street corner
following the death of civil rights leader James Meredith. He shouted to a crowd as the flag burned,
"We don't need no damn flag!" and said, "If they let that happen to Meredith we don't need an
American flag." Because three Warren-Court liberals voted to uphold the conviction (Warren, Fortas
and Black), the case was decided by one conservative (Harlan), a "moderate" (Stewart) and the three
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remaining liberals (Brennan, Marshall and Douglas) who voted to protect the protester.
The majority’s “reasoning” seems to show how difficult flag politics can be. The Street
opinion is not only intentionally technical – to the point of being its own legal fortress – but it is
glaringly problematic. The majority based its decision on the fact that the criminal charge in the case
made reference to the defendant’s oral criticism of the flag when charging only a single count of flag
mutilation.25 It was therefore theoretically possible for the conviction to have rested in part on the
spoken as well as the symbolic criticism. Because of this possibility, the majority voted to overturn
the conviction and conveniently avoided the question of whether flag burning, by itself, was free
speech.
Two things seem interesting about Street. First, it supports the game-theory view that justices
occasionally water-down doctrine in order to gain majority coalitions, and that what they decide may
not be what each maximally desires in the short run. The evidence for this can be found in Warren’s
dissent, which basically says that the Court ducked an issue that it could not win.26 One also wonders
why the majority would not have supported a remand or a retrial if it really believed its own logic.
Secondly, Street also reminds us that a percentage-liberal rating is not always a reliable
indicator of the relative political bias each justice possesses. It's a good estimation, of course, but it
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doesn’t stop those possessing a high rating from occasionally espousing attitudes about the flag that
look remarkably similar to the ones that we would label “conservative.” Justice Fortas, for example
– and later on, Justice Stevens – cast votes in flag cases based upon teary-eyed attitudes about the
sanctity of Old Glory that are fundamentally indistinguishable from the political attitudes offered by
conservative justices White, Rehnquist and O’Connor in those very same cases.27
In any event, symbolism as an act of communication had come a long way in Street. Where,
before, the speech-conduct distinction had made both liberals and conservatives unanimous in
O’Brien, it had now withered to the point where both liberals and the two slight conservatives on the
Court in 1969, Harlan and White, were splitting their votes.
The next case in the table is Smith v. Goguen. It involved a citizen who sewed a small
American Flag to the seat of his pants in 1970. He was not protesting at the time – just walking down
the street when a police officer saw him. His use of the flag, therefore, seems only to have been as
an article of counter-culture fashion. He was convicted by a Massachusetts jury of showing contempt
for the flag and sentenced to six months in jail. When the Supreme Court decided the case in 1974,
half of the Burger-Court conservative bloc voted with every liberal to overturn the conviction. The
Court again, however, did not declare flag mutilation to be “free speech” – it simply declared the
statute to be unconstitutionally vague.
Spence v. Washington was also decided in 1974. It involved a student who hung a flag upsidedown, with a peach sign affixed to it, outside of his college apartment. He was protesting the
Cambodia bombings and the deaths at Kent State. He was convicted of “improperly displaying the
flag.” Only one conservative – Powell – voted with every liberal (Brennan, Marshall and Douglas)
and two moderates (Stewart and Blackmun) to overturn the conviction. Once again, the Court found
a way to construct a foxhole for its reasoning. This time, flag mutilation was allowed because of the
“special” circumstances of the case: it didn’t occur in public where disorder might occur; it was
completely on the defendant’s private property; and it happened within the immediacy of discreet
national events, meaning it was not “an act of mindless nihilism.”
Fifteen years later, the Court would finally confront a public torching of the American flag
where it was not possible to hide the approval of the behavior behind legal excuses. In 1984, Gregory
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Johnson burned an American flag outside of the Republican National Convention in order to protest
the policies of the Reagan administration. He was convicted of flag “desecration.” In 1989, a divided
Court in Texas v. Johnson overturned his conviction by a 5-4 majority and finally declared flag
burning to be an act of free speech.
What is interesting about Johnson is how the flag issue prevailed. When it was decided, the
Court only had 3 liberal members, one of whom – Stevens – voted with three conservatives
(Rehnquist, White and O’Connor) to ban the speech. All four of the dissenting justices based their
decision primarily upon a teary-eyed view that the flag was simply too sacred of a symbol to mutilate.
That left only 2 remaining liberals, Brennan and Marshall, to vote in favor of the speech. In order for
the First Amendment to prevail, two unquestionably conservative justices – Kennedy and Scalia – and
one moderate justice with a very conservative reputation at the time of his appointment (Blackmun)
had to vote against the flag. The voting alignment is therefore ideologically fractured.
Interestingly, when one analyzes the content of the conflicting opinions by conservative
justices in both Johnson and Spence, one can see a clear difference between opinions that are based
primarily upon political ideology and those influenced by the intervention of something more
important. That is, one group of conservatives have a very stereotypical view about flag burning, but
another group has a much different view. The group of conservatives that tend to behave exactly as
the way instrumentalism predicts is always led by Justice Rehnquist. In Spence, Rehnquist appealed
to natural law as a way to avoid the speech clause. He wrote:
Although I agree with the Court that appellant's activity was a form of communication, I do
not agree that the First Amendment prohibits the State from restricting this activity in
furtherance of other important interests. ... [Because] "[T]he right of free speech is not
absolute at all times and under all circumstances.28

Fifteen years later, Rehnquist adds another piece of legal ammunition to his argument: flagburning is like “fighting words,” a category of speech unprotected by the First Amendment.29 He
writes “History is more important than logic” – a natural law aphorism – and “flag burning is the
equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar that, it seems fair to say, is most likely to be indulged in not
to express any particular idea, but to antagonize others.” Indeed, Rehnquist’s dissent reads like a
television commercial during a political campaign. His opinion quotes verses from Ralph Waldo
Emerson's "Concord Hymn" and stanzas from Francis Scott Key’s poem that later became the
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national anthem
When you compare this to the opinions of the other strong conservatives who voted in favor
of flag burning, you indeed see something remarkable. The opinion by justice Kennedy, joined by
Scalia, is a wonderful reminder not only that instrumentalism can and does fail, but that, relatedly, the
force of law can sometimes transcend ordinary politics. Kennedy, joined by Scalia, writes in Johnson:
I write not to qualify the words Justice Brennan chooses so well, for he says with power all
that is necessary to explain our ruling. I join his opinion without reservation, but with a keen
sense that this case, like others before us from time to time, exacts its personal toll. ... The
hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make them because
they are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the
result. ... Our colleagues in dissent advance powerful arguments why respondent may be
convicted for his expression, reminding us that among those who will be dismayed by our
holding will be some who have had the singular honor of carrying the flag in battle. ... With
all respect to those views, I do not believe the Constitution gives us the right to rule as the
dissenting Members of the Court urge, however painful this judgment is to announce. ... For
all the record shows, this respondent was not a philosopher and perhaps did not even possess
the ability to comprehend how repellent his statements must be to the Republic itself. But
whether or not he could appreciate the enormity of the offense he gave, the fact remains that
his acts were speech, in both the technical and the fundamental meaning of the Constitution.
So I agree with the Court that he must go free.30

In my view, the Johnson case represents the triumph of law over politics. It represents a clash
between ideological impulses desiring one thing, and a legal textual command another. The reason
why it is a triumph is because conservative justices had the power, if they wanted, to act upon a set
of narrow urges and force a code of loyalty to the national symbol. Instead, enough of them rose
above their disgust of flag mutilation and changed the case outcome. For this particularly controversy,
therefore, “principle” defeated ideology. And of course, this exact scenario repeated itself one year
later in United States v. Eichman.
Police, Liberal Groups, Satire and Criminals
Having just concluded my look at anti-American speech, I now examine voting behavior in
four other areas of core-political speech. They include anti-police speech, liberal-interest group
speech, the right to utilize satire as way to attack public figures, and speech by criminals who seek
to profit from communicating their violent stories to others. Each of the cases in this section involve
salient issues that should provoke ideological attitudes if instrumentalism was a good explanation of
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judicial behavior.
I begin the analysis with Table 3.5, which concerns anti-police speech. All of the cases in the
table deal with the right to curse or verbally disparage police officers in course of their official duty.
Conservatism is said to be cued against this speech while liberalism is more inclined to protect it. The
table, however, indicates that the Court's voting is once again shifted to the left. By and large,
conservatives are voting significantly in favor of the right to disparaging police officers. One case in
particular, Houston v. Hill, involves the right of a gay activist not only to verbally harass an officer
who is lawfully performing his duty in a gay area of Houston, but to admit, during the process, that
verbalization is intended to obstruct the officer. Almost every conservative member of the Court
voted to protect this speech.
The three other cases in the table are much more directly confrontational. They were decided
in 1972 and are often referred to as the “mother-fucker trilogy.” The first case, Gooding v. Wilson,
involves the right of an anti-war protester to say to a police officer who had moved him from blocking
access to an Army induction center: “White son of a bitch, I’ll kill you. You son of a bitch, I’ll choke
you to death. You son of a bitch, I’ll choke you to death. You son of a bitch, if you ever put your
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hands on me again, I’ll cut you all to pieces.” The only conservative who voted to protect this speech
was Justice White. The others thought that it constituted “fighting words.” In the two remaining cases
in the table, two conservatives, White and Powell, voted to allow a person say to police officers
“mother fucking fascist pig cops” and “God damn mother fuckers!”
The next topic is liberal interest-group speech. Table 3.6 contains five cases involving the right
of ACLU, the NAACP, labor unions and legal aid societies to use expressive activities as a way to
further their political agenda. Not every case involving a liberal group qualifies for selection; only
those involving core political speech are chosen. 31 Historically, the ACLU and NAACP have fulfilled
an important agenda-setting role for the Court. They find and bring cases that represent a "good
vehicle" for creating new legal doctrine. They would not be as effective in finding the right cases if
they were not allowed to solicit and recruit clients for “cause” litigation. It should come as no
surprise, therefore, that public entities in various southern states tried to suppress this activity with
laws that prohibit lawyers or their agents from soliciting business.
The most blatant attempt at trying to keep the NAACP from being effective in desegregating
schools in the south came in Virginia after the Court decided Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.
Two years later in 1956, Virginia passed a law that prevented groups from soliciting business for
lawyers and also prevented lawyers from being hired by groups that were not a party to the litigation.
This meant, in effect, that if southern blacks wanted to end discrimination, they would have to
individually locate and pay a lawyer willing to take the case, and that, in effect, they would have to
take on their white communities as individuals. Of course, the way that it worked in reality was that
the NAACP would go into communities and find the best cases for litigation and would locate and
pay the lawyer best suited for the job. Virginia’s law, in essence, cut the NAACP out of the picture
altogether. It is no surprise that similar laws were passed Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi,
South Carolina, and Tennessee.32
The Court first considered the legality of these statutes in NAACP v. Button, decided in 1963.
The case held that the NAACP had a First Amendment right to solicit cases, find lawyers and finance
cause litigation. The only Warren-Court conservative to agree with the decision, however, was Justice
White. Clark and Harlan thought that the regulation of the legal profession was a matter for states
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and not the federal government. By the time In Re Primus was decided in 1978, however, most of
the conservatives on the Burger Court – Powell, White and Burger – voted to give the ACLU the
same rights of solicitation that the NAACP had won in Button.
Conservatives also voted unanimously in 1982 to allow the NAACP and any other group to
interfere with the flow of commerce that businesses normally receive by encouraging economic
boycotts of stores and merchants. The problem with boycotts is that the common law provided a
remedy against those who intentionally or maliciously interfered with a person’s contractual or
business interests. Hence, if the NAACP wrongly enticed someone away from a store or to breach
a contract, there was a risk that the shopkeeper might sue for damages. In NAACP v. Clairborne
Hardware Co., every conservative member of the Court voted to severely limit the right to sue a
political interest group that organizes a boycott and, in doing so, overturned an award of damages
that merchants obtained against the NAACP for boycotts in 1966 through 1972.
The remaining cases in the table were only able to garnish one conservative vote each. One
involved the right of labor unions to encourage their members to pursue workers’ compensation
rights by recommending lawyers before settling a claim. The other, Legal Services Corporation v.
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Velazquez, dealt with the right of legal aid lawyers to be able to fully advocate on behalf of their
indigent clients. The government in Velazquez tried to make the receipt of federal funding contingent
upon the acceptance of welfare reform laws. That is, if you received federal funds, you could not
argue that the new laws were unconstitutional. This attempted “gag” of legal aid lawyers was struck
down, but only one conservative, Justice Kennedy, opposed it.
Table 3.7 concludes this section by looking at two additional cases where conservatives voted
unanimously to protect speech. The first, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, is the famous case where
Hustler published an ad that described right-wing religious leader Jerry Falwell’s first act of sex as
occurring with his mother in an outhouse when he was drunk. The case stands for the proposition that
“attack parodies” of public figures constitute free speech. The second case, Simon & Schuster v.
Crime Victims Board, is also somewhat famous. It involves a convicted mobster who wanted to
publish his experience of being a member in a New York crime family.33 New York had passed a law
that confiscated the profits of such deals in order to provide compensation to criminal's victims.
Interestingly, every conservative on the Court said this violated the criminal’s right to speak.
Discrimination, Hate Speech and Christians in School
My last segment analyzes several more areas where speech has become very controversial:
discrimination, hate speech and Christians wanting to express their beliefs in public schools. For this
area of core political speech, I examine the efforts by government to punish civil rights protesters who
marched to end racial segregation in the 1960s, speech that discriminates against women, speech that
espouses hatred against political minorities, and speech by Christians who want to meet and discuss
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their views in public schools. Once again, each of the selected cases involves a salient issue that one
would expect to provoke ideological attitudes.
The way that one might expect attitudes to be provoked, however, is much more complicated
than before. The cue assignments for many of these cases are irregular. Some of the cases, for
example, are the first in my analysis to contain a “reverse political cue.”34 This means that liberalism
is said to oppose the speech while conservatism favors it. This assignment of direction is given to the
cases promoting Christian speech. Still other cases have a coding rarity: a “unidirectional cue.” In
these cases, both liberalism and conservatism are said to be against the speech. The only cases in this
entire work that receives this coding assignment are the ones involving hate speech, and its
justification is explained below.
I begin my analysis with the civil rights cases. Table 3.8 contains 4 free speech cases with 5
issues that arose out of the civil rights marches and protests in the 1960s. Government generally tried
to suppress this expression by charging protesters with disturbing the peace, disorderly conduct and
failing to disburse from a public place when commanded by police officers. If only a zoning objection
is charged, however – e.g., arresting for trespass – the issue is excluded from consideration. 35 In
general, social conservatives were against the civil rights struggle in the 1960s, no matter if they were
Republicans or Democrats. 36 The coding in these cases is therefore “normal:” liberals for,
conservatives against. As the table shows, however, Warren Court conservatives were largely
supportive of civil-rights protests.
However, the vote in Brown v. Louisiana was more difficult. In that case, two conservative
justices (Harlan and Clark) and one solid liberal justice (Black) voted against the right of a small
group of African Americans to quietly and peacefully engage in a “sit in” inside a “white’s only”
public library in Louisiana. The dissenting justices thought that such protests, even though they were
passive, belonged outside in the streets rather than in the sanctuary of a library – or as Justice Black
said, “a place dedicated to quiet, to knowledge, and to beauty.”37
Table 3.9 finishes my look at civil rights speech. It contains two landmark decisions that
helped empower the modern press to make controversial statements about public officials and popular
people in American culture. Both cases involve the print press making false statements – or at least
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statement found to be false by juries – about segregationists in the south. The first case, New York
Times v. Sullivan, involved an advertisement that a civil rights group placed in the New York Times,
asking for money to support the struggle occurring in the south. Two paragraphs of the ad were
found to contain falsehoods. 38 Despite this, every conservative on the Warren Court voted in
Sullivan to create a major new loophole in the law of defamation: Falsehoods against public officials
are allowed so long as they are not made with malicious intent or with reckless disregard of the truth
(a very difficult standard). The situation was repeated three years later when the Court unanimously
allowed the Associated Press to report apparent falsehoods about a retired army general and popular
segregationist who had attended an integration riot in Mississippi. The case, Associated Press v.
Walker, extended the Sullivan rule to people having a general degree of notoriety, not just
government officials.
The next topic is hate speech. Tables 3.10 and 3.11 contain 5 cases with 7 hate speech issues.
The cases involve the right of Nazis to march in a Jewish community where some Holocaust survivors
and their relatives were living, and the right of the Ku Klux Klan and other racists to publicly
verbalize hatred against political minorities. The cue in these cases is quite tricky. I discuss
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conservatism first.
Although some may cynically suggest that American conservatism is cued in favor of racial
hatred, I have coded it as being cued against the speech. There simply is no empirical basis to say that
American conservatism generally favors hatred against Jews and African Americans. That is, there
are no campaign speeches, no party platforms, no lobbying alliances and no radio talk show hosts
saying that conservatism stands for this in the larger political culture. If anything, there is great deal
of evidence that the leaders of American conservatism (not to mention its rank and file) quickly
distance themselves from figures like David Duke. So it is simply ridiculous to suggest that modern
conservative dogma supports Klan activities today or in the 1990s (when the Court decided two cross
burning cases). The better view is that these cases represent the policing of social deviance in local
communities, and that conservatives tend to want to defer to the will of the state and local
communities to structure this order.
The truth is that if “law” really did not matter – if there was no First Amendment – this is the
way that conservatism would act toward all fringe, controversial speech. The fact of the matter is that
conservatives should react the same to extremist political speech no matter if comes from Nazis or
communists. It is an issue of social order. And conservatism simply does not like to grant special
entitlements to fringe or outcast groups that can defeat the structuring of order by majoritarian
institutions. Therefore, for these cases, conservatives are cued against the abstract idea of expanding
the right of the individual against his or her community and, also, are not in favor of the specific

Discrimination, Hate Speech and Christians in School

90

policy agenda of the group that is speaking. The cue, therefore, is unambiguous.
For liberalism, however, the coding is harder to see. Liberalism must be said to disfavor the
speech primarily because of the attitudinal model’s coding rules. This is because the most basic and
fundamental feature of instrumentalism as philosophy is that policy cue is more important than
abstract rhetoric. And because liberalism has as one of its core and most precious concerns – wealth
redistribution aside – the elimination of racial prejudice, the policy is said to be more important than
the normal rhetoric about the importance of liberty. If it were otherwise, judges would not be using
“principle” as weapon; they would be voting sincerely for abstract philosophy without regard to what
groups or policies it favors. The attitudinal model simply does not operate from the assumption that
a “neutral principle” can be more important than the politics that underlies it.39
Of course, one can see this sort of quandary in American liberalism fairly clearly. Some
scholars who are associated with the left, for example, have argued that the tort system should be
unleashed against hate speech. 40 Other leftist academics have argued that speech codes and political
correctness should be enforced on university campuses.41 Or, how about the European take on this:
hate speech is not considered a right in many “liberal” European countries.
Having explained how the cue assignments work, I now begin my look at Table 3.10. As you
can see, liberals and conservatives are both generally supportive of hate speech. Both agreed in
Brandenburg v. Ohio that the First Amendment protects KKK leaders who publicly advocate that
“the nigger should be returned to Africa; the Jew returned to Israel” and who threaten revenge against
government officials who support minorities. Also, both overwhelmingly agreed in National Socialist
Party v. Skokie42 that Nazis have the right to march in Jewish communities. However, only one
conservative (Powell) was willing to decide the Skokie case quick enough to actually allow the march
to occur on its desired date.43
In Table 3.11, liberals and conservatives are once again overwhelmingly supportive of hate
speech. They unanimously agree in R.A.V. v. St. Paul and Virginia v. Black that cross burning is free
speech, so long as it represents the idea of white supremacy and hatred of minorities in the abstract.
If it is carried out with intent to harm a particular citizen – e.g., to make a person think they will be
harmed if they do not leave a neighborhood – that can be outlawed as easily as assault criminalizes
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how one uses certain words. And they all agree in Dawson v. Delaware that one’s decision to espouse
racist beliefs is so protected by the Constitution that judges cannot even consider this kind of behavior
as a factor when deciding what punishment to give criminals for non-hate crimes.
Of all the cases in these two tables, R.A.V..is by far the most seminal and defining. It involves
Minnesota’s attempt to outlaw only a certain kind of hate-speech: those utterances that also
constitute “fighting words,” a category of speech not protected by the First Amendment.44 The
Minnesota law, for example, would outlaw uses of the n-word where people of different races are
about to fight. It would not, however, outlaw hate speech in general – e.g., a sign could be placed
outside of one’s home declaring hatred of jews or epitaphs used generally in public. Interestingly, a
unanimous Court declared this seemingly-narrow statute to violate free speech, and it did so with
rather interesting reasoning. By stating what kinds of fighting words are illegal, the Court reasoned,
Minnesota had proscribed a viewpoint, something that government cannot do.
What R.A.V. ultimately stands for, then, is two rather large and dominant principles in First
Amendment law. The first and most important is that the Court’s “content-restriction regime” has
become such a powerful doctrine in Constitutional law that it tends to align justices who have polaropposite views into a kind of solidarity about the importance of the principle of speech as a right in
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American society. And it does so without regard to the political cue involved in the case. In essence,
the doctrine sort of transcends “ordinary” political attitudes. This is what Ronald Dworkin refers to
when he talks about the “gravitational force” of important principles in law.45 At the conclusion of
this chapter, I capture this effect empirically and allow its weight to be more precisely conceptualized.
The second thing that RAV stands for may be a little less clear but needs mentioning. The case
represents a strong statement of how accepting the Court has become of symbolism as a legitimate
means of communication. Recall that conservative Justices Rehnquist, White and O’Connor
subscribed to the view that flag burning was an “inexpressive grunt” that constituted fighting words.
By the time RAV was decided – and later in Virginia v. Black – these issues were now dead.
Symbolism is now firmly entrenched in American legal culture.
My next-to-last topic is speech that discriminates against women. Table 3.12 contains only
two cases. One involves the the right of newspapers to print material that espouses or promotes
discrimination against women. The other involves the right of communities to protect women from
being portrayed as though they enjoy the act of rape, pain and sexual humiliation. The cue for each
case is different and is mentioned below.
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In the first case, American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, the city of Indianapolis tried to
outlaw the portrayal of women as enjoying rape and sexual humiliation. Although it was a
pornography statute, the ban applied to words as well as pictures. Portraying any woman, therefore,
in a novel or in movies as enjoying rape would constitute a violation of the law. One might think of
this ordinance conceptually as being the R.A.V of pornography (viewpoint porn). The cue in the case
is like hate speech: both liberalism and conservatism are opposed to the content of the expression
(unidirectional). Conservatism is opposed because it does not support the promotion of deviant sexual
material and because communities are better than Courts at regulate these matters. Liberalism is
opposed because pornography that subordinates women is said to be statistically linked with acts of
violence against women and, in general, promotes gender discrimination. 46 So strong was the Court’s
impulse to the contrary, that Hudnut was a summary affirmation of the Seventh Circuit’s decision
ruling the statute unconstitutional. Two conservative justices (White and Powell) voted with every
liberal to strike down the law.47
The second case in the table is Pittsburgh Press v. Human Relations Commission. It involves
the city of Pittsburgh’s attempt to keep one of its major newspapers from segregating help wanted
ads by gender. Liberalism is said to be cued against this speech – it no more favors promoting
discrimination against women than it does African Americans. Conservatism, on the other hand, I am
not so sure. It is, of course, not terribly supportive of the need to modernize gender roles – especially
in 1972, when the case is decided – but it is also supportive of letting political assemblies rather than
Courts govern. What is interesting about this case is that the Court’s actual voting seems as confusing
as its cue assignment. Burger and Douglas are aligned around the view that big brother cannot tell
a newspaper what to print, while Brennan, Marshall, Rehnquist and Powell think the community has
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the power to modernize the classifieds. Although the cue assignment seems arbitrary, I elected to
make the Rehnquist view, deferring to the assembly, as the preferred choice for conservatives.
My final topic is Christian speech in public schools. Table 3.13 contains 4 cases involving
Christian groups that want to use school facilities to meet, discuss and teach the Bible, show films
on “family values and child rearing,” and distribute a newspaper. Two cases involve universities. The
cue in this case is reversed: conservatism is said to favor the speech while liberalism is opposed. The
reason why these cases qualify as “core political speech” is because promoting Christian association
in public schools is as much about promoting and preserving a kind of cultural lifestyle as they are
a mere social gathering.
The voting in table makes one thing very clear: conservatives love applying the First
Amendment to Christian speech. This is the first table in this chapter where not one conservative
justice voted against his or her cue assignment. Liberals, on the other hand, do not seem greatly
supportive of this kind of expression. Unlike hate speech, where they voted consistently against their
cue assignment, their voting pattern seems unpredictable and uncertain.
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Data Analysis and Conclusion
I have shown throughout this chapter that justices who have conservative political bias tend
to cast a significant number of votes against their political cue when the First Amendment tells them
to. But does this mean that they are voting against their political ideology? One objection still
remains: conservatives need not always vote conservatively to express bias – some justices, for
example, are only slightly conservative. To deal with this objection, I conduct a logistic regression
analysis on the votes cast in the cases in this chapter. The dependent variable is the ideological
direction of the votes. The independent variable for is the justices’ career-liberal rating. I conduct a
separate regression that uses Segal-Cover scores as the independent variable. To facilitate a
meaningful interpretation of the results, I also conduct the same analysis for voting behavior in all civil
liberties – in essence, replicating the data of the attitudinal model.
There is one problem that I must deal with, however. The reverse-cue cases pose a problem
for the analysis. The problem is that I want to test the impact that a rigidly designated right has upon
conservative ideology. But in the cases involving Christian speech in schools, both law and ideology
point in the same direction for conservatives. Upholding speech – that is, the “law” – is
"conservative" in those cases. To remedy this problem, I remove the four Christian-speech cases out
of the data sample. In all of the cases that remain, therefore, conservatives are unambiguously cued
against upholding speech. The results of the regression are as follows:
Table 3.14: Regression; Core Political Speech and All Civil Liberties
Core Political Speech

N

Coefficient

P-level

Likelihood-ratio
R-squared

Career-Liberal Rating

372

0.0284

0.000

0.058

Segal-Cover Scores

372

0.8459

0.000

0.054

All Civil Liberties

N

Coefficient

P-level

Likelihood-ratio
R-squared

Career-Liberal Rating

26998

0.0455

0.000

0.137

Segal-Cover Scores

26998

1.0006

0.000

0.080
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Clearly, the results of the regression show that political ideology is much less of a factor at
explaining the votes of justices in the area of core political speech compared to all civil liberties cases.
But what is particularly noteworthy is how poorly the speech votes fit an ideological model. The
likelihood-ratio R-squared is only 0.058 when career-liberal percentages are used as the explanatory
variable, and it is only 0.054 when Segal-Cover scores are used. This means that neither the political
ideologies of justices nor their reputations for bias at the time of confirmation explains very well how
they voted in the selected area of cases. By contrast, the goodness of fit for these same measures is
considerably higher for voting in all civil liberties cases. The attitudinal model itself has a likelihoodratio R-squared of 0.13 using career percentages and 0.08 using Segal-Cover scores.48
In analyzing the logistic regression data in this and other chapters, it is important to focus on
goodness of fit rather than coefficients. The coefficients report information that is not considerably
helpful to our task. They tell us that an increment change in a given measure of liberal bias will cause
a corresponding increase in the probability of obtaining liberal votes. Obviously, if votes on the Court
become left-shifted because of the force of law, the coefficient will of course predict higher liberal
voting at higher units of bias. This is not really germane to the discussion. In fact it is misleading: the
issue is not whether increasing bias increases votes; the issue is how well a model of bias explains an
overall voting pattern. And clearly, ideological measures alone fail miserably to explain the votes cast
in the cases in this chapter.
More telling, perhaps, is Table 3.15, which lists the votes of the individual justices, appearing
in the order of most conservative to most liberal. Merely from eyeballing the numbers, one can see
that the votes of the entire Court appear to have shifted toward the left. At least the conservatives
appear to be less biased than they normally are. In fact, the votes of Justices White, Powell, Kennedy
and Scalia are strongly deposited in the “wrong” direction. Together, these conservatives cast 61
votes to protect speech and only 13 votes to suppress it . That is a combined percentage of 81.3%
liberal in a sample of cases where conservatives had an unambiguous political cue. Quite obviously,
these votes are inconsistent with an ideological model of judging.
The attitudinal model makes three controversial assumptions about Supreme Court judging:
(1) that Constitutional issues before the Court do not have “superior” answers; (2) that justices use
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legal rationalization as an instrument for their hidden policy agenda; and (3) that legal text is not
capable of influencing how a justice votes on the merits. These assumptions constitute the a priori
foundation of the model. If, indeed, these assumptions were always correct, one would expect
conservatives to have voted much more conservatively than they actually have in the selected cases.
At the very least one would expect voting patterns to bear some normal relationship to those found
in all civil liberties cases. Truthfully, one would expect conservative votes to be more conservative
in these cases because of the unambiguous political cue that exists in the selection. Instead, the votes
are shifted to the left, and the empirical measures of ideology fail miserably to explain them.
What is said here is that the a priori foundation of the attitudinal model – like all of
skepticism's mischief – is problematic. The fact of the matter is that, sometimes, justices do regard
Constitutional text as being sufficiently clear and do not approach legal reasoning instrumentally.
When this happens, justices tend to shun strictly ideological voting patterns. Future works should
identify other areas of Supreme Court decision making that are poorly explained by instrumentalism.
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Notes:
1. “Verbalization” means communicating linguistic messages. You can do this with alphabetic and numeric
symbols – i.e., with language – or you can do it with non-alphabetic symbols, such as: showing the peace sign,
putting a fist in the air to denote black power, throwing the middle finger, etc. Hence, “symbolic speech” is
included.
2. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
3. Bond v. Florida, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
4. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
5. Bd. of Directors v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
6. Examples include setting up a permit or license requirement or adopting beautification laws. This criterion
resulted in the removal of all public or private fora cases. It also, unfortunately, resulted in the removal of antiabortion cases where government tried to zone protesters from getting too close to abortion clinics and their
patrons.
7. A “protected environment” is one where the speaker has already relinquished (or lost) significant liberty by
virtue of the environment itself. These include claims to speak by persons in the military or in prison, or by
schoolchildren or public employees. It also, however, includes the right to speak by judges. Although the
category of “judges” is a close call, there is only one case that was thrown out. It is Republican Party v. White,
536 U.S. 765 (2002), where conservatives unanimously voted to uphold the right of judicial candidates to speak
freely in judicial campaigns, but where liberals unanimously voted to restrict speech on the premise that judges
are not like ordinary politicians. What is interesting about this case is that the ideological rhetoric is completely
reversed. Conservatives are promoting the law-is-policy view and liberals are touting the ivory-tower stuff.
Anyway, this case was removed.
8. A good example is Simon and Schuster v. Crime Victims Bd., which declared New York’s Son-of-Sam law
unconstitutional. In this case, a prisoner sold his story of crime to a publisher. New York tried to confiscate
the profits of the book so they could distribute it to the prisoner’s crime victims. This was held to violate free
speech. The case is included because the act of speech – visiting with a publisher and signing contracts – was
not a violation of the rules of the environment.
9. Examples of defamation cases that were excluded include: Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976)
(magazine erroneously reported that Russell Firestone divorced his wife on the grounds of adultery); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (newspaper wrongly reported that a football coach fixed a
game); Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (one company falsely reported that
another filed for bankruptcy); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (newspaper column implied
that a high school wrestling coach lied under oath at a hearing concerning a wrestling altercation); and Masson
v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991) (magazine altered the quotations of a popular
psychiatrist).
10. For more information, see Chapter 2, 62-65.
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11. Justices having voting patterns that display any scaled directional bias whatsoever – a rating at or above
0.1 or -0.1 – are lumped into the categories. See Chapter 2, 62-65.
12. Rehnquist concurred only in the result. He did not agree with the logic of the decision.
13. A contemporary analogue of this principle would be if a Muslim group wanted to meet on campus to
discuss why terrorism was an appropriate vehicle to end Western domination of Middle East affairs. Perhaps
they would meet to discuss and advocate that 9/11 was a good idea. Presumably, under Healy, universities are
not allowed to disrupt such meetings or their “teachings.”
14. Healy, 408 U.S. 169, 194 (1972).
15. The coding rules require me to classify Justice Harlan’s vote as a vote against speech, even though he only
dissented for procedural reasons. He thought that the Court dealt with the case in too cursory a fashion and
should have held a hearing on the issues it decided. The concern appears sincere inasmuch as Justice Fortas,
a strong liberal, agreed with him. Nonetheless, my coding rules require that where a justice “issue deflects” in
favor of their political bias, the vote must be recorded as favoring their ideology. See Appendix, 164 (coding
rules).
16. To see the rules for when a case is coded as having two voting issues, please refer to the Appendix,
“Coding Rules.”
17. I should note that the reason why Brown is not considered in Chapter 4 as a “campaign-finance” case is
because it is not concerned with the legality of contribution or expenditure limits; it is only concerned with
reporting and disclosure requirements. Brown therefore doesn’t address the issue of whether money is speech;
it addresses the issue of whether a record-keeping law operates in such as way as to keep an anti-American
group effectively muzzled.
18. There are other cases, of course, that contain ultra-leftist subject matter, but they failed the selection
criteria. These cases involve the communist witch hunt during the McCarthy era. The cases from 1963 onward–
my cut-off point – involve two subject areas: loyalty oaths for public employees and the right of bar
organizations to ask new admitees if they intend to take action to overthrow the government by force. Although
both involve ultra-leftist subject matter, they clearly fail the selection criteria.
First, the bar cases fail because the government’s regulation does not punish or prevent communists
from associating or promoting their views. That is, in none of the bar cases was mere association with an ultraleftist organization enough to disqualify membership to the bar. You could say, “Hell yes I am Communist”
and still be admitted. You could also advocate the idea of violent overthrow so long as you did not actually try
it yourself. All that those cases stand for, therefore, is the right of the bar to inquire if a person intended to act
upon what was regarded at the time as a kind of terroristic philosophy. Mere affiliation was never a ground
for exclusion, and the cases therefore are not a direct attempt by government to stifle core political speech. See
In Re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 35 (1971) (Harlan’s dissent).
The public employee cases involve government’s right to hire employees that are not communist. These
cases failed the selection criteria because they involve a “protected environment.” Because principals generally
have a certain degree of control over their agents, cases that try to broker or define the scope of this dominion
were thrown out. The selected cases all involve direct suppression of core speech by those not in a fiduciary
or paternal relation.
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Of course, I readily admit that the loyalty oath cases are highly ideological and display a voting pattern
that, like Bush v. Gore, tends to exemplify the triumph of ideology over prudential decision making. But what
must necessarily be conceded in return is that this kind of voting does not define all of the political struggles
on the Court. In fact, this chapter seems to demonstrate that when core political speech occurs outside of a
protected environment, it is “law” instead of politics that tends to prevail.
19. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)
20. And as I show throughout this and other chapters of my work, O’Brien is not, as proponents of
instrumentalism might suggest, an anomaly. Almost every legal subject that I analyze has its own “O’Brien.”
Indeed, Texas v. Johnson, the flag burning case, is a much better example of the “O’Brien effect,” only in the
opposite political direction. Johnson ultimately stands as a symbol of how powerful the Court’s “content
restriction” regime has become. It is, as I argue in this chapter, a force that is capable of structuring justices
away from their bias in favor of a stern legal command.
21. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
22. Although it is technically true that Tinker involves speech in a protected environment (a high school), I
included it because school officials tried to ban “arm-band protesting” when no other school regulation
disallowing garments of this sort apparently existed. The whole purpose was to stifle the act of speech, not
police an institutional rule regarding the propriety of dress. To see the difference, compare Tinker with Bethal
School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (student had no First Amendment right to give an election
speech at school that was laden with sexual innuendo, because this disrupts the educational environment). I
concede, however, that others may think that the selection criteria requires Tinker to be removed. Had I done
so, it would not have changed my analysis. Only two weak conservatives, Harlan and White, were on the Court,
and they split their vote.
23. White’s vote is difficult to code. Although he actually dissented in the case, he chose to reject the dissent’s
view that wearing a jacket showing the words “Fuck the Draft” was “conduct” rather than “speech.” He
thought, therefore, that Cohen’s choice of clothing was constitutionally protected. The only reason he dissented
was because he thought that California would overturn the conviction itself if given a second chance.
Apparently, by the time that Cohen’s case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, California had re-interpreted its
own law in another case, which, if applied to Cohen, would have overturned his conviction. Hence, White only
wanted was a remand.
24. The cultural divisiveness of the war issue seems evident in this and other cases from the era. Although the
Court overturned the conviction in Schacht, it was hesitant to declare an automatic right to deface or ridicule
the military uniform. It largely confined the issue to an analysis of the statute in the case, which itself allowed
non-soldiers to use military uniforms for purposes of “theatrical productions.” The Court simply declared the
protester’s skit to be a “theatrical production” and left it at that. Burger and White, of course, had a different
view: they wanted juries to decide that issue. But, strangely, they chose not to dissent on that ground. They
concured completely in the decision to reverse the conviction without any retrial or threat of jeopardy
whatsoever. They did not dissent "in part." Therefore, it is as if they wrote to tell us only what their view was
in theory. I obviously coded their votes as being "liberal."
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25. The defendant was charged by Information, which accused the defendant of committing "the crime of
Malicious Mischief in that [he] did wilfully and unlawfully defile, cast contempt upon and burn an American
Flag, in violation of 1425-16-D of the Penal Law, under the following circumstances: . . . [he] did wilfully and
unlawfully set fire to an American Flag and shout, `If they did that to Meredith, We don't need an American
Flag.'" Street, 394 U.S. 576, 579 (1969).
26. Warren writes: "I believe that the States and the Federal Government do have the power to protect the flag
from acts of desecration and disgrace. But because the Court has not met the issue, it would serve no purpose
to delineate my reasons for this view. However, it is difficult for me to imagine that, had the Court faced this
issue, it would have concluded otherwise. Since I am satisfied that the constitutionality of appellant's conduct
should be resolved in this case and am convinced that this conduct can be criminally punished, I dissent."
Street, 394 U.S. 576, 605 (1969).
27. For the record, though, Warren and Black – unlike Fortas – never really tell us if their opposition to flag
burning is because of a teary-eyed adoration for Old Glory. Warren’s dissent in Street explicitly says that he
will not reveal why he believes flag mutilation can be outlawed. And Black simply says it is a matter of
conduct, not speech. See Street, 394 U.S. 576, 610 (1969).
28. Johnson, 418 U.S. 405, 416-417 (1989) (Rehnquist took the quotation from Chaplinsky).
29. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
30. Johnson, 418 U.S. 405, 420-421 (1989)
31. For example, Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U. S. 788 (1985), is excluded because it involves the NAACP’s
desire to be included in a charity drive for federal employees. The drive had excluded political-advocacy
groups. Obviously, the case does not involve an attempt to stifle an act of communication. Also, two cases
involving unions are not in the data set because they involve lawyer fee protection rather than union “speech.”
In both cases, the local bar tried to stop unions from recommending lower-priced lawyers to their members and
from placing one lawyer on salary to handle all of the injury claims. The goal of the suits was obviously to
protect the bar’s fee base generated from worker’s compensation business. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois
Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217 (1967) and United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576
(1971).
32. Ark. Stat. Ann., 1947 (Cum. Supp. 1961), 41-703 to 41-713; Fla. Stat. Ann., 1944 (Cum. Supp. 1962),
877.01 to 877.02; Ga. Code Ann., 1953 (Cum. Supp. 1961), 26-4701, 26-4703; Miss. Code Ann., 1956, 204901 to 2049-08; S.C. Code, 1952 (Cum. Supp. 1960), 56-147 to 56-147.6; Tenn. Code Ann., 1956 (Cum. Supp.
1962), 39-3405 to 39-3410.
33. His story was later made into the popular movie, “Goodfellas,” starring Robert Di Nero, Joe Pesci and Ray
Liotta.
34. I explained this concept in Chapter 2. A case with “reverse cue” is one where the policy-cue overrides
abstract rhetoric when deciding if a vote is liberal or conservative . See Chapter 2, 62-65.
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35. If the government alleges that a demonstration is too close to a courthouse or is a trespass, I have had to
exclude these votes because the charges police the location of speech, not its message. This resulted in the
removal of one case and two issues. The case is Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), which involved a
crowd of 200 students who gathered at a county jail to protest the jailing of other demonstrators. The crowd
began to block the jail entrance and driveway – areas normally used only by sheriff’s deputies – and refused
to surrender their ground. They were charged with malicious and mischievous trespass. Their convictions were
overturned, but no conservative defected. The Adderley case is generally listed in law school educational
materials under “Time, Place and Manner” restrictions, not under “content restrictions.” See e.g., Calvin R.
Massey, “Constitutional Law” (New York, Aspen Law & Business, 1997).
I also removed the vote on the third charge in Cox v. Louisiana (picketing too close to a courthouse)
for the same reason. There was no conservative defection here as well. However, I did not remove the second
charge in Cox (blocking public passages) because social protest tends to obstruct the flow of sidewalk and
thoroughfare traffic to some extent. The idea is that charges such as disturbing the peace or interfering with
passages are not really attempts to zone social protest; they are efforts to keep gatherings from being large or
effective. Only real zoning issues were tossed.
36. Of course, many claimed that their objection was only to the federal government being involved in the
structuring of another invasive legal order. See Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 2nd , 1964, 110, pt. 11:
14319 (Senate floor speech of Senator Barry Goldwater); See also, Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry
Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus, (New York: Hill & Wang, 2001), 18, 21, 363-64;
and Charles W. Whalen Jr. and Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, (Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press, 1985), 212-13.
37. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 167 (1966) (Black, dissenting). I included Brown in my analysis
because the government did not charge a zoning objection; it charged the protesters with failing to disburse
from a public place when asked by a police officer. It therefore is not a true zoning case.
38. The falsehoods are found in this passage:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang `My Country, 'Tis of Thee' on the State Capitol
steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and truckloads of police armed with shotguns
and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When the entire student body
protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in an
attempt to starve them into submission ... [and] Again and again the Southern violators have
answered Dr. King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his
home almost killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested
him seven times - for `speeding,' `loitering' and similar `offenses.' And now they have charged
him with `perjury' - a felony under which they could imprison him for ten years.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 258 (1964).
39. See Segal and Spaeth, The Attiudinal Model Revisited, 432-433 (“principles” are subject to motives).
40. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, Kimberle Williams Crenshaw,
Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech & the First Amendment, (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1993).
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41. For a general look at how universities try to censor speech that offends minorities and other groups, see
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), “About speechcodes.org,” FIRE,
http://www.speechcodes.org/about.php (accessed June 1, 2004).
42. A coding issue exists in the Skokie case. I have broken the justices vote into two issues: whether Nazis have
a right to march in Jewish communities, and whether the Court should act to grant emergency relief to permit
the march. The vote on the first issue is not analyzed separately by the Court – it is simply accepted a priori
by all but one of the justices. It is clear that even the dissenting justices agree that the First Amendment allows
Nazis to bring symbols of the Holocaust right into the streets of Jewish neighborhoods. See Skokie, 432 U.S.
43, 46 (1977) (dissent characterizing the injunction as “erroneous” and “interfere[ing] with the constitutional
rights of those enjoined.”). However, the position of Justice White is unclear. He doesn’t join either the majority
or the dissent, but indicates that he would deny the stay. Hence, I have had no choice but to code Justice White
as voting against both the first and second issues in the case.
43. The Nazis had been trying to overturn a local trial judge who had issued an injunction denying their right
to march. They filed an appeal, but no court in the Illinois Court system would stay the injunction until the
appeal could be heard. So they asked the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene and force Illinois to allow the march,
even though the case was still pending in the Illinois court system. The Supreme Court agreed to act
immediately.
44. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
45. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth & Company, 1977), 113; and Law's Empire,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 239.
46. For what its worth, that’s the way the Canadians see it. See Regina v. Butler, 1 S.C.R. 452, 89 D.L.R. 4th
449 (1992).
47. The three remaining conservative justices (Rehnquist, O’Connor and Burger) would have set the case for
oral argument. Because Hudnut is a summary reversal, I cannot count these votes as a vote against the speech.
I simply don’t know how the three would have voted on the merits. I have therefore treated them as abstaining.
A summary affirmation, it must be remembered, is a legal precedent. It is the exact opposite of a denial of cert,
which refuses to consider the matter. Had the Court simply denied cert in Hudnut, it would have allowed the
Seventh Circuit’s decision protecting rape-porn to stand only as a law for states under the Circuit’s territory.
The fact that the Court summarily affirmed and therefore created law for the entire country is indeed
noteworthy.
48. It is more than interesting to note that these scores are themselves rather poor. For an explanation of why
the attitudinal model has such a poor fit to its data, see Chapter 6.

Chapter 4:
Diffused-Referent Speech:
The Doctrine of Language Games

INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 3, I showed that voting patterns by Supreme Court justices during the last forty
years or so in the area of core political speech did not fit very well into an empirical model of judging
that tried to impose a political stereotype using a binary variable. The ideological model failed
because, for this area of decision making, biased judges tended to uphold speech that one would think
they would have opposed based on their percent-liberal rating. The simple fact of the matter is that,
as a group, conservatives tended to split their votes when the First Amendment told them to protect
conduct that their political ideology opposed. Moreover, what was suggested to have caused this
ideological defection was the fact that the liberty claim being asserted was strongly designated by a
textual statement of law. The basic idea of Chapter 3, then, was to show that where “law” is rigid,
justices tend to shun “value voting” in favor of a higher concern for the integrity of words in the
Constitution.
In this chapter, I explore what happens to voting patterns when law becomes slightly less rigid
than in the cases found in the last chapter. In particular, I examine what happens to voting behavior
when the referent of a legal word becomes “diffused” – that is, where the term’s form and function
separate from one another. In each of the cases in this chapter, the referent of a legal word has either
its archetypical form or function, but not both. In this situation, it is important to remember that
language is still sufficiently communicative – diffused referents cause a language game, not complete
uncertainty. Therefore, “law” is semi-rigid in these cases, and I code them in my data set as having
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a rigidity level that is intermediate to "prototypes" and "referent extensions" (discussed in Chapter
4). What I expect, therefore, is for voting patterns on the Court to show at least some difficulty fitting
into an ideological model that forces a political stereotype with a binary variable.
This chapter begins my analysis by examining voting behavior in the area of commercial
speech. The second half of the chapter analyzes mostly campaign finance cases, but also a few cases
involving the Sixth Amendment right to jury trials in criminal cases. A brief linguistic analysis
precedes each segment.
Form over Function: Advertising as “Speech.”
What matters more in language: form of function? It might be intuitive to think that function
is more important than form because, for example, this is the way it works in biology and engineering.
But for language in general, it probably depends on what kind of word it is. Consider the following
questions:
(1) Is the pope is a “bachelor?”
(2) Is a dolphin a “fish?”
(3) Is advertising “speech?”
If one says that number (2) has a clear answer – that dolphins are not fish; they are mammals
– it is important to note what is actually being said about the epistemology that underlies this claim.
What is being said is that, although a dolphin looks like a fish – it has fins, lives in the ocean, etc.–
what is more important is that it functions exactly as a mammal: it has warm blood, nurses its young,
breathes air, etc. So according to the rules of classification for this kind of term, how an animal
functions in nature has more to do with its classification instead of what form it takes.
But now consider example number (1). With the term “bachelor,” the situation appears to be
opposite. Although the function or purpose of the term “bachelor” is to denote eligibility for the
purpose of dating – something which seems to exclude the Pope – what is said to belong to the label
“bachelor” are simply those males who are unmarried, regardless of their de facto eligibility status.
The same might be said of calling former President Bill Clinton “a married man.” Although during
the Monica Lewinsky scandal people may have thought that these words had lost their meaning, one
still had no choice but to concede that Bill Clinton was “a married man” regardless of his true
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eligibility status. Hence, the form of this concept, and not its function, is considered most important
for classification purposes.
It is not rare to find language games of this sort in the law. They are, frankly, abundant. I now
look at one area of Constitutional law where a right’s form seems to be more important than its
function: commercial “speech" (known by non-lawyers as, “advertising”).
A. The Central Hudson Regime
Before the 1970s, commercial advertising was not recognized as a right guaranteed by the
First Amendment’s free speech clause. When governments regulated advertising, it was thought to
be an act of economic regulation, not censorship.1 It was not until the 1970s when the Court began
suggesting that advertising might be a form of “free speech.” Although many cases in the 70s began
to strike down legislation that infringed on the right to advertise, the formal culmination of the view
that advertising is a form of protected speech came in 1980 decision of Central Hudson v. Public
Service Commission.2
The major difference in the right of advertisers to speak compared to the right to speak
generally is that the law allows government to control the content of the speech in some situations.
Hence, the “content-restriction” regime that is so sternly entrenched the area of core political speech
is not present here. However, that does not mean that this area of law is without a meaningful
decision structure. To the contrary, what commands votes in advertising cases is a doctrinal force that
I call the Central Hudson regime.
Under Central Hudson, advertising is given significant First Amendment protection, with one
exception. If it misleads or deceives consumers – or if it fails to disclose product information essential
to informed choices – government can easily intervene to correct the content of the message. Hence,
the Central Hudson regime stands for the proposition that where government is not acting to enhance
the market information that buyers obtain from sellers, it will encounter significant difficulty if it tries
to dictate the content of commercial speech. Or as Justice Stevens once said for the Court:
However, when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, non-misleading
commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process,
there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally
demands.3

My analysis of how the Central Hudson regime fares as decision structure when it conflicts
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with justice ideology begins in Table 4.1. The cases in this table have a salient political cue. They
involve people or businesses who want to advertise abortion services in southern states, send
unsolicited condom mailings to rural neighborhoods, promote alcohol and beer consumption with
price and strength wars, and encourage gambling and playing the lottery. In each case, of course,
representative institutions of government passed laws trying to regulate these commercial messages
in some form or another. In some cases, government tried to ban the advertising completely, while
in other cases the restrictions were partial (e.g., prohibiting only radio ads or mentioning price).
The political cue in these cases is unambiguous. Both the specific policy issue – encouraging
social vice – and the abstract idea of letting political assemblies govern rather than Courts is
consistently “conservative.” Both criteria point in the same direction. One should expect, therefore,
conservatives to support bans or controls on abortion advertising, condom mailings, alcohol price and
strength wars, and so forth. Of course, it is true that not all conservatives are of the puritanical sort,
but this is always a problem when using a binary variable to assign an ideological stereotype to
judicial votes. The fact that the puritanical impulse is a part of conservative heritage, and the fact that
our backup criteria – letting assemblies and not Courts govern – agrees with the directional
assignment means the coding is the best it can be. It is also obedient, of course, to the attitudinal
model’s own rules for assigning direction.
Of course, some may say that supporting commercial speech is merely another way to support
the capitalistic enterprise, and that treating this activity as a political liberty is actually an intellectual
fraud designed to benefit those who exploit labor with capital. My answer to this is twofold. Using
a Marxist criteria to code judicial votes does not work because both liberalism and conservatism in
American political culture are not opposed to the free market system. Secondly, coding votes this way
makes Rehnquist appear attitudinally against the capitalistic enterprise when in reality he advocates
the conservative idea of judicial restraint, and it makes Brennan appear to be a great capitalist dog
when in truth he just loves every possible incarnation of free expression he can find. The point, then,
is that the directional coding is the most meaningful it can be.
As Table 4.1 shows, however, stereotypes do not describe very well how justices vote in this
area of the law. The Central Hudson regime is indeed a meaningful decision structure. It seems to
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shift the spectrum of judicial attitudes to the left, just as the content-restriction regime does for core
political speech. Conservatives are lining up with liberals to vote for outcomes that you would not
think conservatives should favor if their career percent-liberal rating meaningfully reflected the extent
of their ideological bias.4
When the Central Hudson regime was first being constructed, Justice Rehnquist was the
leading voice against it, and his views epitomize stereotypical judicial conservatism. He did not want
a new area of “rights” being pronounced by courts over legislatures. He had seen enough of that in
the Warren era. Hidden within his viewpoints, however, is a claim about language. He suggests that
merely because something can be said to belong to the activity “talking” does not automatically make
it belong the political right of “speech.” He writes in a 1976 case:
The logical consequences of the Court's decision in this case, a decision which elevates
commercial intercourse between a seller hawking his wares and a buyer seeking to strike a
bargain to the same plane as has been previously reserved for the free marketplace of ideas,
are far reaching indeed. Under the Court's opinion the way will be open not only for
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dissemination of price information but for active promotion of prescription drugs, liquor,
cigarettes, and other products the use of which it has previously been thought desirable to
discourage. Now, however, such promotion is protected by the First Amendment so long as
it is not misleading or does not promote an illegal product or enterprise. In coming to this
conclusion, the Court ... extends the protection of that Amendment to purely commercial
endeavors which its most vigorous champions on this Court had thought to be beyond its
pale.5

Rehnquist’s view, of course, tuned out to be prophetic. As Central Hudson became
constructed case by case, it indeed swept away precisely the kind of legislation that he felt courts
should not be governing with the free speech clause. Bigelow v. Virginia is a good example of what
Rehnquist did not like about the newly emerging advertising rights. The Court in Bigelow struck
down Virginia’s attempt to keep what was then an illegal service – abortion – from being advertised
inside its borders by legal providers located in neighboring states. In dissent, Rehnquist suggested that
a legal right is known by its function, not its form:
As a threshold matter the advertisement appears to me, as it did to the courts below, to be a
classic commercial proposition directed toward the exchange of services rather than the
exchange of ideas.6

But what is more interesting is that, eventually, he gives in. Despite his opposition to the idea
that advertising was “free speech,” Rehnquist decides to endorse Central Hudson in 1983. In fact,
in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products, he goes so far as to agree with every other conservative justice
on the Court that the right to “free speech” includes the the right send condom mailings randomly to
neighborhood households. Again, he and every other conservative justice agree in Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co. that “free speech” gives brewers the right to advertise the strength of their beer. And
again in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, he and every conservative justice agree that the First
Amendment protects beer merchants who want to advertise the price of liquor, against the will of
their elected representatives.
Of course, two cases in the table present exceptions to this kind of voting pattern. They
involve Puerto Ricans and radio ads, two situations where Central Hudson failed as a meaningful
decision structure to bring together justices with opposing values. In the first case, Posadas de Puerto
Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., an ideologically polarized Court allowed Puerto Rico to ban gambling
advertising that was directed at local citizens rather than tourists. And in United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co., conservatives successfully allowed the federal government to ban out-of-state
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lottery advertisements within the borders of states that did not have lotteries.
One last case that is not in the table is none other than Central Hudson itself. It is the only
advertising case in my analysis with a reverse cue. Central Hudson involved the federal government’s
attempt to deal with the Arab oil embargo and the energy crisis in the 1970s by banning public utilities
from promoting the use of electricity. The cue for liberals in the case is policy-specific: their rhetoric
tends to favor the regulation of oligopolies for purposes of energy conservation (an environmental
regulation).
The vote in Central Hudson, however, is not stereotypical. Marshall, Brennan and Stevens
voted against the energy conservation ban and in favor of industry encouragement of higher electricity
use in an era with a national energy crisis. Not only did liberal justices do this, but, in the process,
they created the seminal case which came to define the doctrinal regime for this area of decision
making. Rehnquist is the only conservative who voted in favor of the liberal social policy, and he does
so because, in 1980, he was still clinging to his strident and apparently non-instrumentalist concern
that “free speech” is an idea that had no place in the field of economic regulations. He writes:
I disagree with the Court's conclusion that the speech of a state-created monopoly, which is
the subject of a comprehensive regulatory scheme, is entitled to protection under the First
Amendment. I also think that the Court errs here in failing to recognize that the state law is
most accurately viewed as an economic regulation and that the speech involved (if it falls
within the scope of the First Amendment at all) occupies a significantly more subordinate
position in the hierarchy of First Amendment values than the Court gives it today. 7

The next two tables complete my look at commercial speech. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 deal with the
advertising rights of certain professions and involve behavior historically thought to be socially taboo.
They involve pharmacists who want to advertise the price of prescription drugs; lawyers and
accountants who want to advertise the price and quality of their services; and injury lawyers who
attempt to find potentially lucrative cases by directly mailing solicitations to accident victims and
other clients. Traditionally, this kind of behavior offends the non-advertising members of the
profession, who, as a whole, benefit from the concealment of information about price and quality of
service. Historically, professions as a group benefit from a lack of price competition and from the
inability of consumers to differentiate terms of service.
As a corollary, consumers are the ones who seem to benefit from seeing this sort of
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professional collusion disrupted. Of course, it is also true that individual market suppliers – those for
whom advertising works – also benefit. As for the cue assignment, it seems much safer to say that
liberalism tends to support consumer protection policy rather than protect markets where statelicensing requirements already create a formidable barrier to entry and exit. And because this
judgment is also harmonious with the backup criteria – that liberals want an expansive set of judicial
liberties while conservatives do not – the cue assignment is said to be unambiguous. Once again, the
assignment is obedient to the attitudinal model’s basic rules.
When one looks at the voting results, however, a different reality appears. The ideological
model is once again having problems describing Court behavior. Conservatives voted in bulk to strike
down rules that disallowed pharmacists to advertise the price of prescription drugs in State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. They also voted strongly in favor of allowing
accountants more freedom to advertise in Ibanez v. Florida Dept of Business and Professional
Regulation and Edenfield v. Fane.
Lawyer advertising, however, is a little more difficult. For this issue, the “defection” is weaker
than in other Central Hudson cases. The first case that gave attorneys the right to advertise prices
was Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. The only conservative who supported the idea was Justice White.
Rehnquist, on the other hand, strongly opposed Bates because of his pre-1983 view about advertising.
His dissent implies that the term “speech,” like the term “mammal,” is defined by how its membership
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functions in a given environment:
I continue to believe that the First Amendment speech provision, long regarded by this Court
as a sanctuary for expressions of public importance or intellectual interest, is demeaned by
invocation to protect advertisements of goods and services. I would hold quite simply that the
appellants' advertisement, however truthful or reasonable it may be, is not the sort of
expression that the Amendment was adopted to protect.8

By the time the Central Hudson regime became solidified in the 1980s, more conservatives,
though not always many, began to warm up to the idea of attorney advertising. In one case, In re
RMJ, every conservative – including Rehnquist – voted to loosen up rules against direct mailing of
announcement cards and publishing areas of practice. But only Kennedy and White voted to allow
lawyers to send solicitation letters directly to potential clients.9 And, interestingly, Kennedy was the
only conservative vote to allow a lawyer to advertise as a “specialist” 10 and to strike down Florida’s
ban of direct solicitation of accident victims within 30 days following an injury.11
Indeed, Central Hudson as a regime is much weaker at structuring decisions about lawyer
advertising than it is other advertising claims. Justice O’Connor’s view probably sums up the
conservative position well:
This case provides yet another example of the difficulties raised by rote application of the
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commercial speech doctrine in the context of state regulation of professional standards for
attorneys. Nothing in our prior cases in this area mandates that we strike down the state
regulation at issue here, which is designed to ensure a reliable and ethical profession. Failure
to accord States considerable latitude in this area embroils this Court in the micromanagement
of the State's inherent authority to police the ethical standards of the profession within its
borders.12

Despite the rougher road that attorney advertising had, Central Hudson nonetheless has
proven itself to be an effective decision structure. As I show in the next section, it has tended to
structure justices away from political biases much the same way that the content-restriction regime
did for core political speech, although not quite as strongly.
B. Data Analysis
Table 4.4 reports the voting data for individual justices. They are listed from most
conservative to most liberal. Just as the data appeared in the last chapter, it seems as though voting
on the Court is left-shifted. Quite simply, conservatives are not as conservative as they usually are,
and liberals are more liberal than usual. Although the number of votes for individual justices is lower
than I would like, there are, at least, 133 data entries in the regression. The results are listed below:
Table 4.35: Regression: Advertising and All Civil Liberties
Commercial Speech

N

Coefficient

P-level

Likelihood-ratio
R-squared

Career-Liberal Rating

133

0.0477

0.000

0.110

Segal-Cover Scores

133

0.6351

0.060

0.023

All Civil Liberties

N

Coefficient

P-level

Likelihood-ratio
R-squared

Career-Liberal Rating

26998

0.0455

0.000

0.137

Segal-Cover Scores

26998

1.0006

0.000

0.080

As you can see, goodness of fit is once again below what the attitudinal model enjoys for all
civil liberties claims, which itself is not all that spectacular.13 Regressing the votes against careerliberal percentages produces a likelihood-ratio R-squared that is 0.11. If Segal-Cover scores are used
as the independent variable, it falls to 0.023. Both of these measures are below the level of
explanation that obtain from voting in all civil liberties cases. Based upon these numbers, I concluded
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that the ideological model is a relatively poor explanation of voting behavior in advertising cases.
Function over Form: Money as “Speech.”
Having just seen that the Central Hudson regime is a significant decision-making structure,
and that it is inexorably annexed to a language construct that favors the form of a right over its
function, I now consider what happens when the opposite construct is urged. Consider the following
statements:
(1) A living-room beanbag is a “chair”
(2) The terrorist attack on 9/11 was an act of “war”
(3) A dolphin is a “mammal”
(4) campaign contributions are “speech”
In each of the above statements, the form of the archetype is not present, but its function is.
An archetypical chair has a flattened surface with four “legs” and a “seat-back.” And what this device
is constructed for is sitting. A barstool or a large living-room beanbag does not look like the
archetype, but fulfills its exact function in every important respect. Mentally, therefore, one has no
trouble stuffing these things under the category of “chair.”
Similarly, consider what “war” normally looks like. It involves armies, territories, flags, and
is directed by governments. Yet, its ultimate purpose is mass destruction that causes death or
surrender of the enemy, who is also an army, territory, flag and government. Of course, wars are
fought over a variety of issues – to conquer or control people, to settle disputes about ownership of
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land, for treasures, etc. But a new type of “war” is emerging that fufills the same function of the
archetype, but has a different form. In the new "warfare," nation states who cannot themselves win
in a "classic war" decide to fund, recruit or otherwise support a clandestine organization that commits
mass destruction and death upon an enemy for a particular purpose. Yet the terror organization itself
lacks the structure of a nation state. In this sense, the function of “war” is present, but its expected
form is not.
One should not confuse this with figurative speech. Statements such as, “this test is a bitch”
or “we lost the war on poverty,” are figurative expressions. They are, in short, a kind of poetry. But
when it is said that what happened on and after 9/11 is a “war,” it is meant as a matter of fact. The
same is true when one says that a barstool is a “chair” – this is not a colorful statement; the referent
is intended as a literal member of the category.
Language assertions of this kind are quite common in the law. In this section I analyze a very
controversial one: campaign contributions. Giving money to politicians has the function of “speech,”
but not its archetypical form. This is because donating to support campaigns and win policy victories
is, like voting, a quintessential kind of political advocacy, but it is not itself a verbalization. In order
to see this, one needs to differentiate between giving money as a gesture versus giving it as an
activity. Clearly, giving money as a gesture is the same as other symbolic gestures of support (e.g,
wearing a yellow-ribbon for the troops). Imagine for a moment a large public spectacle where an
advocacy group presents a symbolic check – sort of like the ones that lottery winners receive on
television – to a politician. There is no doubt that the ceremonious gesture of giving money is
“speech,” because it says “I support you.” But giving money as a gesture is not what campaign
finance reform outlaws. It outlaws the funneling network that allows unlimited amounts of money to
flow to presidential candidates through soft donations or other means. And using this financial
network to amass political war chests amounts to an exchange of dollars, not an exchange of
“words.” Hence, the activity does not have the form of "speech," but does have its function.
The political cue for this area of law is coded as "reversed." It is considered “conservative”
to uphold the right to donate and “liberal” to allow government to restrict it. Although it may seem
at first that one’s position on campaign contributions depends on who is contributing – e.g.,
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conservatives cry foul when trial lawyers and unions amass war chests – the truth is that, overall,
conservatism tends to favor the influence of money in campaigns. The reason for this is twofold. First,
Republicans tend to have an advantage in raising money over Democrats, trial lawyers and unions
notwithstanding. Second, conservatism’s love of property rights is such that it is generally hostile to
political movements that desire to take power away from the wealthy as a class. Rich, powerful
corporations and individuals – no matter which party they support – are at the very least able to buy
access to politicians when they make large donations. And making this elite group equal to common
citizens is a type of “class politics” that conservatism generally disfavors. 14 Of course, it is also true
that conservatives generally want assemblies to decide popular issues rather than courts. But the way
that the coding rules work for the attitudinal model, policy-cue trumps abstract rhetoric. Just as it is
regarded as politically “conservative” to uphold Christian speech in schools, anti-abortion protests
or reverse-discrimination claims, so, too, is it “conservative” to support policies that promote the
influence of wealth in campaigns.
Finally, I organize this discussion into two groups of cases. The first is what I call the “general
rules” of campaign finance. Those cases are found in Table 4.5. The second, found in Table 4.6, is
a collection of specific campaign regulations that were challenged by conservative advocacy groups
and corporations. The latter group of issues seems to be more politically salient and likely to provoke
judicial attitudes. Although the voting patterns do tend to be different for each set, the results are not
necessarily what one expects.
I begin my analysis with Table 4.5, the “general rules” of campaign finance. When you look
at the voting patterns in the table, it appears as though a political stereotype explains judicial behavior
reasonably well for this area of law. Conservatives do, it seems, generally favor using the judicial
power to strike legislation that tries to take away the influence of wealth in elections. Liberals, on the
other hand, generally seem to support the opposite idea. There are very few “defectors” in the table.
There are two exceptions, however. The most significant is the vote that upheld the basic
contribution limit of $1,000 per individual and $5000 for every PAC in Buckley v. Valeo. What is
interesting about this vote is that Rehnquist, Powell and White joined with every liberal on the Court
to limit the power of wealth beyond this contributory structure. Likewise, Rehnquist and O’Connor
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voted with every liberal to allow states to lessen the power of wealth in campaigns by adopting even
lower contribution limits than those of the federal government in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC.
But for the remaining issues, the conservative vote solidifies. As a group, conservatives
strongly supported using the First Amendment to allow wealth to be channeled into campaigns
through various loopholes. They tended to support, for example, excluding both non-coordinated15
and coordinated expenditures16 from FELA and opposed the most recent effort to shut down softmoney loopholes in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. They also tended to oppose
aggregate limits on campaign spending17 as well as laws that prohibited wealthy candidates from using
their own unlimited monetary resources.18
The rhetoric in these cases is quite interesting. The point that conservatives seem to stress
most is that the activity of giving money to political campaigns ought to be cognitively regarded in
the same way as the Court views core political speech. The reason for this is that the activity has the
function of core speech, and, where the function of a right is so strongly present, it is superior to the
right’s form for classification purposes. Or as Scalia says in McConnell:
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This is a sad day for the freedom of speech. Who could have imagined that the same Court
which, within the past four years, has sternly disapproved of restrictions upon such
inconsequential forms of expression as virtual child pornography, tobacco advertising,
dissemination of illegally intercepted communications, and sexually explicit cable
programming, would smile with favor upon a law that cuts to the heart of what the First
Amendment is meant to protect: the right to criticize the government. For that is what the most
offensive provisions of this legislation are all about. We are governed by Congress, and this
legislation prohibits the criticism of Members of Congress by those entities most capable of
giving such criticism loud voice: national political parties and corporations, both of the
commercial and the not-for-profit sort.[case citations omitted]19

Justice Breyer is the leading proponent of the opposite view. He argues that giving money is
not “speech,” but an activity undertaken to facilitate speech. He therefore considers it an act of
association, since giving money is sort of like joining the team. But importantly, he argues that
campaign-finance laws do not prohibit this right of association; they only limit how much one can
donate during the affiliating process. He writes in Nixon:
On the one hand, a decision to contribute money to a campaign is a matter of First
Amendment concern – not because money is speech (it is not); but because it enables speech.
Through contributions the contributor associates himself with the candidate's cause, helps the
candidate communicate a political message with which the contributor agrees, and helps the
candidate win by attracting the votes of similarly minded voters ... [However,] the statute ...
does not deny the contributor the opportunity to associate with the candidate through a
contribution, though it limits a contribution's size.20

Breyer’s logic is a bit problematic. The right of association is a right that the Court has
implied in the right of speech. Government cannot, for example, prohibit an anarchist group from
meeting to discuss and debate the virtues of having an overthrown political order.21 Nor can it stop
anti-American Muslims from meeting to talk about the benefits that terrorism as a strategy is securing
for Arabia and the spread of Islam. Infringing on meetings, therefore, is another way to infringe on
what is being discussed.
But if donating was considered part of the right to associate, and the size of donations could
be rationed, it seems that any associational resource can now be rationed. For example, could
government say to a large labor union that it can only meet to plan one picket per year? Could it say
to the NAACP in the 1960s that its members could only meet to plan one march a year? It seems to
me that a better view for Breyer would be to say that interfering with donations is not the same as
interfering with meetings, because one interferes with “speech” while the other does not. And that
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is because transferring unlimited dollars to someone involves the exchange of currency rather than
ideas. Although it may function as “speech,” it is not itself speech, just as one who stands in loco
parentis is not himself the parent. This language argument says form is more important than function.
Although the struggle to limit the influence of wealth in campaigns seems decidedly
ideological, something rather strange happens when corporations and advocacy groups are injected
into the fray. As Table 4.6 illustrates, conservative votes are not so homogenous in these cases. Quite
strangely, Justice Rehnquist and other conservatives consistently vote to deny corporations and
conservative advocacy groups the right to “speak” through donations.
For example, when Massachusetts banned corporations from spending money to influence the
outcome of certain kinds public ballot issues, Rehnquist and White joined with arch-liberals Brennan
and Marshall to support the idea.22 When the National Right to Work Committee, a conservative
advocacy group that is organized as a corporation, tried to amass a political warchest by calling over
200,000 people for donations, every conservative member of the Court voted with liberals to oppose
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the fund raising. Their reasoning was that corporations without capital stock can only solicit from its
membership.23 When Michigan outlawed corporations from contributing to campaigns with revenue
from their general funds – requiring, instead, a “segregated fund” – Rehnquist and White joined with
all the liberals on the Court to uphold the law.24 And – unbelievably – when a pro-life group
challenged the exact same law in Massachusetts, arguing that it should be exempt from the
segregated-fund law since its primary fund was generated for the sole purpose of spreading its
political views, the same thing happened: Rehnquist and White teamed up on the liberal side to stifle
the group’s use of its own money in campaigns. Even this was too much for Brennan and Marshall;
they voted in favor of the pro life group. Finally, there is yet another anti-abortion group that recently
tried to attack the separate-fund law, and, once again, conservatives justices Rehnquist, Kennedy and
O’Connor voted with all the liberals to successfully outlaw the group from using its own money to
contribute to elections.
Indeed, the tenacity with which Rehnquist has led conservatives against corporate speech is
stunning. He writes in Bellotti:
The question presented today, whether business corporations have a constitutionally protected
liberty to engage in political activities, has never been squarely addressed by any previous
decision of this Court. However, the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
the Congress of the United States, and the legislatures of 30 other States of this Republic have
considered the matter, and have concluded that restrictions upon the political activity of
business corporations are both politically desirable and constitutionally permissible. The
judgment of such a broad consensus of governmental bodies expressed over a period of many
decades is entitled to considerable deference from this Court.25

It is not clear to me how a political model of judging makes sense of these votes. If one is
to view political conservatism as being cued to support the influence of wealth in campaigns both
because it tends to favor Republicans and because of an ideology against “class politics,” – an
argument that seemed plausible in Table 4.5 – what is to be made of the voting pattern in Table 4.6?
What is Rehnquist and Kennedy doing voting against an anti-abortion advocacy group that collected
its money for the sole purpose of promoting its views in an election, but can’t spend it because the
money is not an account separate from its general account? Moreover, why do Rehnquist and White
do this when even Brennan and Marshall do not?
One of the reasons that might cause this unpredictability is that all of these cases have a
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reverse political cue. Perhaps it is simply troubling to vote for policy when it goes against a more
general abstract concern about the place of rights in government. Perhaps Rehnquist feels two large,
equal urges: oppose class politics, but also let assemblies rule. Maybe instrumentalism is wrong to
assume that policy cue trumps abstract rhetoric. Indeed, reverse-cue cases seem quite troubling for
those who want to measure the Court with a political stereotype. To solve this problem, I now take
a brief look at a sample of cases involving the same language puzzle, but with an unambiguous cue.
Function over Form: “Jury Trials”
Campaign finance cases involve a word game that is played with an ambiguous political cue.
In this section, I briefly analyze votes for an issue that involve the same kind of language game, but
has an unambiguous cue. The issue concerns a criminal defendant’s right to a “jury trial,” guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, which states: “... the accused shall enjoy the right to
a ... trial, by an impartial jury ... .”
In American history, juries and judges have always had distinct roles in criminal cases. Juries
decide guilt or innocence; the judge decides punishment. In some states, of course, juries are given
the right to decide whether to impose capital punishment, but this is a rare exception to the general
division of labor that usually exists. According to the way that the system has historically functioned,
the facts that determine guilt or innocence are more fateful than the facts that determine punishment.
They are more fateful because defendants cannot be punished unless they are found guilty, and, if so,
their punishment cannot exceed the maximum allowed for the crime the jury determined had
occurred. Juries, therefore, determine the jeopardy for which defendants are eligible. That is their
historical role.
In the last 15 years or so, legislatures have found ways to diminish this function by passing
sentencing-enhancement laws. An enhancement is a law that allows the judge to impose a sentence
greater than the crime for which the jury found guilt, provided that the judge finds at a sentencing
hearing that certain aggravating circumstances exist. Obviously, This presents an interesting
disruption in the division of labor historically given to judges and juries. If the judge can punish
defendants beyond what juries find them guilty of, the whole idea of using juries to determine the
eligibility of jeopardy has now changed. Indeed, in many respects the judge’s findings now become
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more fateful.
The language issue is this: Does the term “jury trials” refer only to the form of a decision
process or its function? So long as there is a group of citizens that sit at your trial and decide
something, have you been given a “jury trial?” Or does the term refer to the idea that the decision
must establish the parameters of punishment? It would seem kind of meaningless to have a right to
a jury trial, only to have the verdict be advisory, perfunctory or secondary to the decision made by
the trial judge. It would make the jury symbolic and turn a substantive power into nothing but a ritual.
Table 4.7 presents what I will call the Apprendi regime. In each of the cases in the table, a
judge was given the power to decide facts that caused a defendant to be sentenced to a punishment
greater than that allowed by the crime the jury said was committed. The cue in each case is
unambiguous: conservatism generally disfavors granting convicted felons new rights. Liberalism, on
the other hand, is more inclined to overturn statutes and verdicts in the name of liberty. This coding
is consistent with the attitudinal model’s coding.
When you look at the voting in the table, however, it is clear that the ideological model is
having trouble once again. Justice Scalia appears to be leading a revolt among conservatives against
their usual policy inclination. He voted to overturn the sentences given to several defendants: a
deported alien who returned to the United States after committing three aggravated felonies,26 a
criminal who seriously injured someone while committing a car jacking,27 and a defendant who
committed a felony that resulted in death.28 The key case, however, is Apprendi v. New Jersey, where
Scalia’s view officially becomes the law of the land. His opinion in Apprendi is strikingly similar to
the view he expressed about language in campaign-finance cases. He suggests that the function that
a right serves is more important than the form it normally assumes. He writes:
What ultimately demolishes the case for the dissenters is that they are unable to say what the
right to trial by jury does guarantee if, as they assert, it does not guarantee ... the right to have
a jury determine those facts that determine the maximum sentence the law allows. They
provide no coherent alternative. ... Justice Breyer proceeds on the erroneous and all-toocommon assumption that the Constitution means what we think it ought to mean. It does not;
it means what it says. And the guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to . . . trial, by an impartial jury" has no intelligible content unless it means that
all the facts which must exist in order to subject the defendant to a legally prescribed
punishment must be found by the jury. 29

To this day Justice Breyer continues to resist the Apprendi regime, along with Rehnquist and

Function over Form: “Jury Trials”

123

O’Connor. One of their chief complaints is the carnage that the decision has had on the federal system
in the form of Habeas Corpus filings. This concern becomes a source of irritation in Ring v. Arizona,
where the Court invalidates all death-sentencing statutes that allow a judge, not a jury, to find facts
that qualify one for death. In Ring, O’Connor appears to have had enough. She writes:
Not only was the decision in Apprendi unjustified in my view, but it has also had a severely
destabilizing effect on our criminal justice system. ... As of May 31, 2002, less than two years
after Apprendi was announced, the United States Courts of Appeals had decided
approximately 1,802 criminal appeals in which defendants challenged their sentences, and in
some cases even their convictions, under Apprendi. ... The number of second or successive
habeas corpus petitions filed in the federal courts also increased by 77% in 2001, a
phenomenon the Administrative Office of the United States Courts attributes to prisoners
bringing Apprendi claims. Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, 2001 Judicial Business
17. This Court has been similarly overwhelmed by the aftershocks of Apprendi. A survey of
the petitions for certiorari we received in the past year indicates that 18% raised Apprendirelated claims. It is simply beyond dispute that Apprendi threw countless criminal sentences
into doubt and thereby caused an enormous increase in the workload of an already
overburdened judiciary. 30

But neither Scalia, Thomas or Kennedy – a majority of the Court’s conservatives – would
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budge from the Apprendi principle being applied in Ring. Their concern for the integrity of a legal
right outweighed their political biases. Indeed, if one were to pretend Brennan or Marshall were
speaking the words Scalia writes to justify his vote in Ring, it would sound like classic “liberal”
rhetoric. Scalia writes:
[M]y observing over the past 12 years the accelerating propensity of both state and federal
legislatures to adopt "sentencing factors" determined by judges that increase punishment
beyond what is authorized by the jury's verdict, and my witnessing the belief of a near
majority of my colleagues that this novel practice is perfectly OK ... cause me to believe that
our people's traditional belief in the right of trial by jury is in perilous decline. That decline
is bound to be confirmed, and indeed accelerated, by the repeated spectacle of a man's going
to his death because a judge found that an aggravating factor existed. We cannot preserve our
veneration for the protection of the jury in criminal cases if we render ourselves callous to the
need for that protection by regularly imposing the death penalty without it.31

Although Apprendi qualifies as a structuring “regime” because, like Central Hudson, it causes
significant defection from political ideology, it is not without its weakness. It is a young regime and
has caused significant disruption in overturning many state and federal sentencing practices. Because
of this, it may be no surprise that an exception was created to Apprendi in Harris v. United States,
a case that was decided the same day as Ring. The exception allows judges to decide one kind of fact
– brandishing a firearm – that can increase the maximum sentence of a crime. The voting in the case
appears to result from there being just too many ongoing brandishing convictions to unleash another
Apprendi tsunami. Something had to happen, however, because the brandishing exception rests on
no principle other than “we refuse to apply Apprendi,” and Scalia, this time, remains noticeably silent
as he votes in the opposite direction. I wonder whether not vote-trading took place? It looks as
though Scalia brought Kennedy on board for the big case – Ring – in exchange for caving on the
brandishing issue.
Summary and Conclusion
This chapter examined three areas of constitutional decision making where the right being
asserted is only semi-rigidly designated in law. Two of the areas possessed an unambiguous political
cue: "commercial speech" and the right to jury trials in criminal cases. The third area, campaign
finance, involved a reverse political cue. The analysis revealed that the ideological model was a
relatively poor explanation of voting in the unambiguously-cued sample of cases. Quite simply,
conservative justices tended to support social policy that was against their political ideology. In
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particular, when regressing commercial speech votes against career liberal ratings, the likelihood-ratio
R-squared was calculated to be 0.11. This is lower than the goodness of fit that the attitudinal model
enjoys for all civil liberties cases, which is 0.137.
However, in the reverse-cue cases, results are harder to interpret. When the Court votes on
the "general rules" of campaign finance, its seems to be ideologically fractured. But when the issue
changes to more specific rules challenged by corporations and conservative advocacy groups who
want to donate to campaigns, voting again becomes hard to stereotype into liberal and conservative
patterns. Quite simply, conservative justices cast a significant portion of their votes against
corporations and advocacy groups who try to use "money as speech." This suggests that reverse-cue
cases pose some additional difficulty for ideological modelers. In particular, it suggests that, at times,
a justice's abstract rhetoric about the place of rights in government may be more important to him or
her than the ideological direction of policy being considered. Future study of reverse-cue cases is
needed before any firm conclusion can be reached.
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Chapter 5:
The Politics of Poetry:
What Happens When Law Is Absent?

INTRODUCTION
In the last chapter, I examined voting behavior in three areas of constitutional law where the
legal right asserted in the case depended upon a diffused language construct. In this chapter, I
proceed one step further: examining voting for rights that “extend” the meaning of their legal term
into a kind of poetry. The rights are said to be “extensions” because they lack both the form and
function of the references normally expected from the right’s legal term. There are two major
examples of these kinds of rights in this chapter: the idea that nudity is “speech” – the law of
obscenity and pornography – and the idea that Constitution protects “substantive due process.”
This chapter will also look very briefly at the voting results of another area of law that is said
to be least rigid: searches and seizures. As I indicated in Chapter 2, the Fourth Amendment is
structured linguistically as an imprecise liberty because it is "gradient" and because its qualifier, the
word “unreasonable,” is both vague and ambiguous at the same time.1 Although I discuss the results
of the search-and-seizure analysis in this chapter, the cases for the topic appear in the Appendix.
My hypothesis suggests that measures of political ideology should be much more reliable at
predicting judicial behavior in this chapter compared to its performance in the last two. This is
because, when "law" is absent, I expect politics to rule. I begin the consideration of this claim with
the law of obscenity and pornography.
The Politics of Erotica
The cases in this section of the chapter involve the First Amendment right of companies or
128
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merchants to distribute what at the time is generally regarded as “hard core” erotic images to
consumers. The function of this material – that is, the product’s use in the marketplace – is primarily
self-enjoyment or actualization. It is, therefore, perhaps no different in one sense than the marketing
of products like tobacco or even fine confectionary chocolates. Consumption of all of these things
stimulates the pleasure center of the brain and causes a release of certain brain chemicals, most
notably endorphins and enkephlines. One can, therefore, think of the exchange of this imagery sort
of as a purchase of stimuli.
For purposes of linguistics, one should see that it is especially poetic to say of something that
stimulates your brain, “Oh that violin is speaking to me,”or “This chocolate speaks to my soul.”
Properly translated, these expressions mean: “I like this.” And of course, the reason why using the
word “speech” in these contexts is regarded as poetry is because these sorts of exchanges principally
involve stimuli rather than sentential ideas, and because they are not verbal in form. One must indeed
adopt a poetic vernacular if one is to say that exchanging erotica is a species of “talking.”
Of course, it is possible to imagine a situation where depictions of nudity are not a sale of
stimuli. One can very easily imagine illustrations in a book that teaches sexual education or anatomy.
My basic point, then, is not that pictures or illustrations cannot be used "as words" to gain knowledge
or to facilitate sentential statements, but rather that these kinds of uses of nudity are not the ones that
this chapter contemplates. And just to be clear, I am not saying that it is wrong for judges to give a
figurative construction to legal words when deciding certain kinds of issues. I have tried to stay away
from the normative claim of what should be the law. All that I am interested in is whether language
precision effects voting on the Court. So the point here is purely descriptive: whether one likes it or
not, calling erotica “speech” is simply a flowery use of the word.
A. The Cases
The history of how the right to certain kinds of erotica came to be viewed as “free speech”
begins in 1957 when the Supreme Court decided Roth v. United States.2 Writing for the majority,
Justice Brennan, of all people, declared that the Constitution did not protect “obscenity.” But he also
said that not all sexual imagery was obscene, meaning that some forms – what would later be called
“pornography” – are protected by the First Amendment. At the time Roth was decided, however,
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Brennan’s opinion seemed to exclude all forms of erotica from protection. This is because he defined
obscenity as imagery “having a tendency to incite lustful thoughts,”3 which, as I have argued above,
is really the basic function of erotica as a market commodity. So how did pornography ultimately
survive?
The answer is that, hiding behind Roth’s Victorian desire to repress the marketing of sexual
arousal was an interesting loophole: something was “obscene” only if the average person within the
community felt it was, and in cases after Roth, only if the work lacked sufficient artistic value.4
Inasmuch as criminal juries were deciding these issues, uniformity was hardly the rule. What was
permissible imagery in New York City was most surely not what it was in, say, rural Alabama. Hence,
pornography was able to survive and eventually grow into a significant industry because, so long as
the imagery could be shown to have certain "artistic value" – maybe it was "classy" or packaged into
a larger thematic magazine – the Court's decisions actually protected it as a constitutional right.
The cue in these cases is unambiguous. The controversy over erotica is primarily about
cultural permissiveness in America and therefore involves a puritanical and religious impulse that
expresses itself as a political force. American conservatism tends to be the instrument of this force
with rhetoric about “family values,” the “moral majority” and so forth. Liberalism, on the other hand,
though not endorsing erotica, tends to be more tolerant of a permissive culture and advocates an
expanded conception of individual liberty. But obscenity cases are not only about defining cultural
permissiveness; they are also about the systematic use of criminal prosecutions as a means to police
a social vice and impose a dominant sexual ethic. Hence, even if liberals agree with “family values,”
they still may be resistant to using jails and police to deal with this sort of “problem.”
A good example of both the apologetic and unapologetic versions of liberalism is reflected
in the views of justices Black and Douglas. Black’s main concern was that using the police state to
punish people for wanting to look at certain kinds of images was improper because the definition of
“obscenity” was too vague to inform people of what was acceptable and unacceptable behavior. He
writes in a 1966 obscenity case:
Criminal punishment by government, although universally recognized as a necessity in limited
areas of conduct, is an exercise of one of government's most awesome and dangerous powers.
Consequently, wise and good governments make all possible efforts to hedge this dangerous
power by restricting it within easily identifiable boundaries.5
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He goes on to say that obscenity is the kind of subject that lacks the boundaries required for use of
the police state. Now, compare that view to Douglas, who, in the same case, express a more
unabashedly “liberal” view:
Some of the tracts for which these publishers go to prison concern normal sex, some
homosexuality, some the masochistic yearning that is probably present in everyone and
dominant in some. Masochism is a desire to be punished or subdued. In the broad frame of
reference the desire may be expressed in the longing to be whipped and lashed, bound and
gagged, and cruelly treated. Why is it unlawful to cater to the needs of this group? They are,
to be sure, somewhat offbeat, nonconformist, and odd. But we are not in the realm of criminal
conduct, only ideas and tastes. ... Another group also represented here translates mundane
articles into sexual symbols. ... But why is freedom of the press and expression denied them?
Are they to be barred from communicating in symbolisms important to them?6

Table 5.1 begins my analysis of voting patterns in obscenity cases from 1963-1971. The table
indicates that at least three liberals on the Warren Court – Brennan, Fortas and Warren – did not like
the idea of using the First Amendment to protect people from erotica prosecutions. Justice Brennan,
in particular, seemed to have a Victorian impulse hiding inside his otherwise unabashedly liberal belief
system. One can see this in Mishkin v. New York, where his majority opinion contains the kind of
puritan attitudes that one would expect from conservative justices. He writes:
Appellant was not prosecuted for anything he said or believed, but for what he did, for his
dominant role in several enterprises engaged in producing and selling allegedly obscene books.
Fifty books are involved in this case. They portray sexuality in ... such deviations as sadomasochism, fetishism, and homosexuality. Many have covers with drawings of scantily clad
women being whipped, beaten, tortured, or abused. ... [The] appellant insisted that the books
be "full of sex scenes and lesbian scenes . . . . [T]he sex had to be very strong, it had to be
rough, it had to be clearly spelled out. . . . [T]he sex scenes had to be unusual sex scenes
between men and women, and women and women, and men and men.7

Had Justice Rehnquist written these views, it would seem like stereotypical conservatism. And
what is more interesting about Brennan’s characterization of the imagery in Mishkin is how it differs
from Justice Stewart’s judgment about the very same material. Stewart, a political centrist, writes:
The appellant was sentenced to three years in prison for publishing numerous books. However
tawdry those books may be, they are not hard-core pornography, and their publication is,
therefore, protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.8

Apparently, the decision to protect pornography but not obscenity had an unintended
consequence for some members of the Warren Court. Some of the justices became disgusted with
the fact that they now had to view erotica in order to “judge” it. Justice Warren actually proposed
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changing the Court’s standard of review from de novo to abuse-of-discretion, 9 presumably so the
Court could make the review more perfunctory. But it is Justice Clark, a conservative of the Harlan
variety, who gives us the best indication of this sentiment in a dissenting opinion in a 1966 case. He
writes:
It is with regret that I write this dissenting opinion. However, the public should know of the
continuous flow of pornographic material reaching this Court and the increasing problem
States have in controlling it. Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, the book involved here, is
typical. I have "stomached" past cases for almost 10 years without much outcry. Though I am
not known to be a purist - or a shrinking violet - this book is too much even for me. It is
important that the Court has refused to declare it obscene and thus affords it further
circulation. In order to give my remarks the proper setting I have been obliged to portray the
book's contents, which causes me embarrassment. However, quotations from typical episodes
would so debase our Reports that I will not follow that course. 10

Because of the attitudes of Brennan, Warren and Fortas, the ideological model of judging
does not work well for Warren Court liberals from 1963-1971. Although in two cases they vote
"liberal" as a bloc, the facts are rather tepid. One in particular involves a film about a woman who
runs away with an archaeologist and falls in love – it was nationally distributed and had only one “sex
scene” at its conclusion. 11 In another case, they declare various books and magazines from three
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different states as being “not obscene” without describing the content of the materials or explaining
the application of law to fact.12 The implication is that these cases were “easy.”
There is one case, however, which had the possibility of becoming a regime case for the
Court: Stanley v. Georgia. It involved a Georgia resident who was caught with three “dirty films”
underneath his bed in the privacy of his own home. The films were for his private use. Although he
was convicted of possessing obscenity, the Court overturned the conviction and held, rather boldly,
that the First Amendment gives people the right to possess obscene imagery, so long as it is for their
private use. No justice dissented from the case, but three – Brennan, Stewart and White – concurred
in the result without joining the majority opinion. Stanley’s promise as a regime case eventually failed,
as subsequent cases rendered it as meaningless as possible.13
But even though an ideological model of judging had its problems getting started in the1960s,
that would all change with two important developments. First, Justice Brennan would undergo a
miraculous conversion, and, second, the Court would see the eventual replacement of liberal prudes
with conservative ones by the time 1972 arrives. It is, therefore, after 1972 when the model of a
political stereotype begins to work quite well.
Table 5.2 contains obscenity cases decided from the point of Brennan’s conversion to the mid
1970s. Although Brennan’s “outing” officially occurs in Miller v. California, the case where he
actually announces that he is born again is Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, decided the same day.
Paris is a case about two adult theaters that were prohibited from showing erotic films. Brennan
dissented from the Court’s approval of the ban, stating:
I am convinced that the approach initiated 16 years ago in Roth v. United States and
culminating in the Court's decision today, cannot bring stability to this area of the law without
jeopardizing fundamental First Amendment values, and I have concluded that the time has
come to make a significant departure from that approach.[citation omitted]14

From this point forward, Brennan’s voting alignment was consistently liberal in obscenity cases for
the rest of his career. Justice Douglas welcomed Brennan’s conversion in Paris, when he wrote:
My Brother Brennan is to be commended for seeking a new path through the thicket which the
Court entered when it undertook to sustain the constitutionality of obscenity laws and to place
limits on their application. I have expressed on numerous occasions my disagreement with the
basic decision that held that "obscenity" was not protected by the First Amendment.15

From this point forward, voting in obscenity cases became ideologically polarized. The
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conservative bloc consisted of justices Rehnquist, Burger, Powell and White – and later, O’Connor
and Scalia – against the liberal bloc of Brennan, Marshall and Stevens (Douglas retired in 1975). The
only case in Table 5.2 that failed to polarize the Court was Jenkins v. Georgia, which is quite tepid.
The case involved Georgia’s attempt to convict a theater owner for showing the film “Carnal
Knowledge,” which Rehnquist’s majority opinion declares to be non-obscene because it showed “no
exhibition whatever of the actors' genitals” and “nudity alone is not enough to make material legally
obscene.”
The opinion of the conservative wing of the Court is best embodied by Justice Burger in
Miller, who presents an argument similar to Brennan’s earlier view in Roth, but with a difference
emphasis. Burger’s point is essentially that erotica does not include itself well with other referents of
the word “speech.” He writes:
The dissenting Justices sound the alarm of repression. But, in our view, to equate the free and
robust exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene
material demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the
historic struggle for freedom. 16

Table 5.3 takes the obscenity cases into the present time. Even with a change of membership,
there is no change in the ideological polarization of the voting patterns. Because conservatives have
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more votes, convictions are routinely upheld for imagery of “petting, coitus, oral sex, masturbation,
homosexual activities,”17 depictions of nude males and females engaged in “masturbation, fellatio,
cunnilingus, and sexual intercourse,”18 and sadomasochistic materials. 19 Ward is particularly
interesting because it allowed Illinois to prosecute sadomasochistic imagery with a statute that
criminalized “a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion … [going] substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters."
There is, of course, one outlier. For some reason, in Pope v. Illinois, every conservative
member of the Court voted to weaken the effect of obscenity prosecutions. Under Pope, in order to
find that a particular sampling of erotic material lacks serious artistic value, the decision must be
based in the abstract20 instead of looking at how the community actually feels about it. This is because
unpopular material may nonetheless have literary or artistic value. It seems to me that one of the most
glaring benefactors of this doctrinal change is homosexual erotica. What the conservative members
of the Court are saying to juries is rather interesting: just because they or their communities
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personally dislike the material does not mean it lacks artistic value in the abstract. Presumably, under
the logic of Pope, rural Alabama could not declare a homosexual version of Playboy to be obscene.
It could be argued that Pope, therefore, is yet another example of how the Court occasionally
produces a decision that is at odds with the political value structure that is presumed to dominate it.
The term that I used in Chapter 3 to describe this phenomenon was the "O'Brien effect." It refers to
how a juristic concern for doctrine can occasionally overcome even strongly ingrained political
impulses.
B. Lust and Verbal Obscenity
Having just seen that voting in obscenity is ideologically polarized, I now examine something
that is very interesting. What happens if the “obscenity” is not conveyed by imagery, but occurs
through words? Is it even possible to have words that qualify as a kind of impermissible erotica under
the law? When I first encountered this suggestion, I thought it was not possible at all. It seemed to
me to be an oxymoron of some sort. But in fact, the Court has held that if a book lacking pictures
describes sexual activity to the point of being “obscene,” it is treated no differently than “regular”
obscenity.21 But this unquestionably problematic. The two are simply not the same. The difference
is that the stimuli for “verbal erotica” are words and that the pathway to arousal occurs through the
act of imagination. The words cause one to “picture” something. So it is completely strange to me
that the Court would take the position that certain words could be censored because they caused the
mind to indulge certain thoughts which caused impermissible arousal.
In any event, Table 5.4 examines the voting pattern in the three cases where the Court judged
verbal obscenity. All of the cases are coded as those in Chapter 4: speech with correct form, but
incorrect function. Surprisingly, there is no “gravitational force” that wrestles conservative justices
away from their ideology in favor of protecting controversial verbalization. In Kaplan v. California,
an ideologically polarized Court voted to ban a book because it is "clinically explicit and offensive
to the point of being nauseous,” and “almost every conceivable variety of sexual contact, homosexual
and heterosexual, is described.” Even all of the Warren-Court conservatives voted to uphold a
Massachusetts ban of a book written by John Cleland in about 1750, Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure, commonly known as Fanny Hill.
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To understand what explains these votes, one needs to compare them to the issues that appear
in Table 5.5. Specifically, one must consider Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, which is listed in
both Tables 5.4 and 5.5 because it contains two separate issues. Sable concerns the FCC’s attempt
to ban “sexually-oriented, pre-recorded telephone messages.” The Court in Sable allowed the FCC
to ban messages that were “obscene,” but not messages that were merely “indecent.” The vote on
obscenity is perfectly polarized, but the vote on indecency is perfectly harmonious. In essence, every
conservative member of the Court said in Sable that the First Amendment protected “phone sex” so
long as it did not become “obscene.”
Something similar happens in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. The issue in Brockett is not
verbal obscenity; it is whether states can ban pictorial erotica that is only “lustful” in stead of obscene.
Interestingly, every conservative member of the Court said, in essence, that the Constitution protects
the dissemination of lustful erotica. All of the conservatives agree, therefore, that it is “free speech”
to distribute some erotica, but not others. When one considers Brocket and Sable together, therefore,
one sees that obscenity has become a regime unto itself. Although there is great ideological
disagreement about whether communities can use their police state against all erotica, there is
incredible apolitical agreement that erotica which flunks the obscenity test – pornography, mere lust,
indecency – is something that communities cannot outlaw. And what is interesting about this “pact”
is that it appears unrelated to language rigidity – it does not matter if the erotic effect is achieved

The Politics of Erotica (Data Analysis)

138

through the medium of words.22
C. Data Analysis
Having just examined the case opinions and voting tendencies of justices in obscenity cases,
I now examine the numerical voting data. Table 5.6 presents the votes of the justices for all areas of
obscenity. This includes “verbal obscenity” but does not include words or erotica that is only lustful
or indecent. As one can see, the votes are quite polarized in the direction suggested by members’
percent-liberal index. Conservatives are voting quite conservatively in this sample of cases, and
liberals are voting quite liberally (as they seem to consistently do). If there is a justice who does not
fit well into his or her stereotype, it is Justice Blackmun, who for some reason seems especially
committed to protecting obscenity. Regressing these numbers against career-liberal ratings and SegalCover scores gives us the following results:
Table 5.55: Regression: Obscenity and All Civil Liberties
Obscenity

N

Coefficient

P-level

Likelihood-ratio
R-squared

Career-Liberal Rating

171

0.0687

0.000

0.265

Segal-Cover Scores

171

1.7467

0.000

0.213

All Civil Liberties

N

Coefficient

P-level

Likelihood-ratio
R-squared

Career-Liberal Rating

26998

0.0455

0.000

0.137

Segal-Cover Scores

26998

1.0006

0.000

0.080

As one can see, the ideological model seems to be functioning quite well. It has a likelihoodratio R-squared of 0.265 when it uses career percentages as its independent variable and 0.213 for
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Segal-Cover scores. Both of these numbers are much stronger than the goodness of fit the attitudinal
model as a whole enjoys.23 Based upon these findings, one can conclude that political ideology is
indeed a good explanation of what causes justices to vote they way they do in obscenity cases.
Having established this voting pattern for one area of law where the primary command is especially
indeterminate, I move now to another.
Search and Seizure
In Chapter 2, I described the difficulty that exists with trying to “nail down” the meaning of
gradient rights. I showed that this was especially difficult if the qualifier of the right was both vague
and ambiguous at the same time, as is the case with the word “unreasonable.” In this work I analyze
search-and-seizure cases involving two important issues: warrants and reasonable suspicion. The first
issue is concerned with whether a warrant is needed before a police officer can act. The second is
concerned with when and under what circumstances a police officer can detain, search or seize
without having probable cause or a warrant. The cases appear in the Appendix and have the same
table format that my chapter discussions utilize. One can flip through the Appendix very easily and
see the voting results. The cue in the cases are always unambiguous: conservatives are against the
granting of rights to criminals, especially when it hinders police detection and prosecution of crime,
while liberals want an expansive conception of liberty and checks upon the police state.
Table 5.7 presents the results of search-and-seizure voting in the area of warrants and
reasonable suspicion. As one can see, the voting is indeed obedient to a political stereotype. The
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Court seems as polarized in this subject area as it was in obscenity cases. Quite simply, conservative
justices appear more conservative, and liberal justices more liberal. The results of the regression
appear below:
Table 5.75: Regression: Search and Seizure and All Civil Liberties
Search & Seizure

N

Coefficient

P-level

Likelihood-ratio
R-squared

Career-Liberal Rating

413

0.0647

0.000

0.237

Segal-Cover Scores

413

1.7236

0.000

0.218

All Civil Liberties

N

Coefficient

P-level

Likelihood-ratio
R-squared

Career-Liberal Rating

26998

0.0455

0.000

0.137

Segal-Cover Scores

26998

1.0006

0.000

0.080

Clearly, the ideological model functions well in the search-and-seizure cases in my analysis.
It has a likelihood-ratio R-squared of .237 when it uses career percentages as its independent variable
and .218 when using Segal-Cover scores. Both of these numbers are significantly higher than the
goodness of fit for voting in all civil liberties cases. Based upon these findings, one can conclude that
political ideology is indeed a good explanation of what has caused justices to vote they way they do
in search and seizure cases. Having established this voting pattern for second area of constitutional
decision making where law's primary command is least rigid, I now move on to my third and final
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analysis of voting behavior in cases where law is absent: “substantive due process.”
The Poetry of Natural Law
In this final section, I examine another area of constitutional law where the Court is asked to
extend the referent of a legal word so that its utterance becomes a kind of poetry. Just like obscenity,
the figurative construction that dominates this area of law lacks both the form and the function of the
word’s best literal meaning. The area of law is “substantive due process.” The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee that no person can be deprived of “life,
liberty or property without due process of law.” What this sentence literally says, of course, is that
certain processes must be given before government takes certain liberties. But the Court has not
limited its “interpretation” of this clause to what it literally says. It has transformed the word
“procedure” into “substance,” making the phrase declare that liberty cannot be taken without “fair
substantive laws.” Properly translated, the phrase now means: “the Court must protect the sacred
liberties.” As one scholar correctly noted, the phrase “substantive due process” is a bit of an
oxymoron, rather like speaking of “green pastel redness.”24
Scholars who study legal epistemology label the use of substantive due process as “natural
law” or "natural rights." They say this for two reasons. First, it allows the Court to declare that rights
exist in the Constitution that are not literally mentioned in its text. And second, it presupposes that
the Court possesses some kind of autonomous power or special institutional vantage point that
enables it to declare what freedoms are so precious to organized liberty that no public assembly can
take them away with a mere statute. The Court has used this power to declare that the following
activities are protected by the Constitution: marriage, contraception, abortion, fair punitive damage
awards, and most recently, homosexual sodomy.
My analysis examines voting patterns for three of these activities: abortion, punitive damages
and gay rights. But the abortion and homosexual rights cases are not be discussed here; they are
found in the Appendix. The reason for this is that the sodomy cases are not numerous enough, and
I have examined only “leading” abortion cases. Hence, I am hesitant to make an empirical assessment
of an area of law having an incomplete sample. Instead, I focus in this section on the Court’s use of
“substantive due process” to give wealthy corporations relief from “jackpot justice.”
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One of the advantages that punitive-damage relief provides us is its political cue. It should be
noted that in every case in this chapter, conservatives have been unambiguously cued against the right
being asserted, and that “law” has been very poor in designating the right’s existence. For this
selection, this dichotomy is disrupted. Punitive damage cases are coded as having a reverse cue.
Conservatism is said to favor the policy of tort reform, while liberalism is said to be sympathetic to
trial lawyers and wealth redistribution. Under the attitudinal model’s coding rules, policy cue trumps
abstract rhetoric in the assignment of direction. So the question is: what happens to conservative
voting behavior when what they are said to desire – tort reform – is not sanctioned by Constitutional
words? Does they stick to their normal rhetoric?
This area of law is interesting because it shows us the quandary that reverse-cue cases can
cause. Just as hate speech posed a quandary for liberals, granting substantive due process rights to
wealthy corporations makes conservatives look hypocritical. Their rhetoric is consistently against
natural law. Perhaps this sentiment is best captured by Justice Burger, who once wrote in dissent:
[T]he Constitution does not constitute us as “Platonic Guardians” nor does it vest in this
Court the authority to strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable
social policy, “wisdom,” or “common sense.”25

Justice White’s 1986 opinion denying homosexuals the right to commit sodomy in the privacy of their
own home also echoes these sentiments:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution.26

The attitudinal model is very clear in how it treats statements such as these: they are a pretext.
That is, they are nothing more than a rationalization produced by what conservative justices really
want: the denial of liberal social policy. Or as Harold Spaeth says,
Those who wish to argue that the Court merely follows established legal principles in decided
cases (yes, such views exist, as we have documented in Chapters 2 and 7) certainly have their
work cut out for them ... [This view] fails to appreciate the fundamental influence of
motivated reasoning in human decision making. As classic social psychological findings
demonstrate, the ability to convince oneself of the propriety of what one prefers to believe
psychologically approximates the human reflex.27

I now consider the issue of motivated reasoning when examining how conservatives vote in
punitive damage cases. Table 5.8 lists the cases in chronological order. As one can plainly see, the
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ideological model is a general failure at explaining the voting behavior. There is massive and
persistent defection from stalwart conservatives. The table begins with Bankers v. Crenshaw, where
conservatives voted to uphold a verdict of $1.6 million in punitive damages when only $20,000
existed in compensatory damages. They did so allegedly because of a procedural norm: the attorney
failed to raise the due process challenge soon enough. In Pacific Mutual Life v. Haslip, every
conservative except O’Connor voted to uphold an $840,000 punitive award that had $200,000 in
compensatory damages. In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources, once again, every
conservative except O’Connor voted to uphold a $10 million punitive award where compensatory
damages were only $19,000.
Beginning in 1996, however, the conservative voting bloc begins to fracture somewhat. In
BMW v. Gore, the three most conservative members of the Court – Rehnquist, Thomas and Scalia
– voted to uphold a jury award of $4 million in punitive damages (reduced to $2 million by the state
appeals court) where only $4,000 existed in compensatory damages. Kennedy and O’Connor voted
with three pragmatic liberals (Stevens, Souter and Breyer) to overturn this verdict. Finally, by 2003,
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only two conservatives – Scalia and Thomas – voted to uphold a $145 million punitive damage award
with $2.6 million in compensatory damages in State Farm v. Campbell.
What is interesting about these cases is how the political classification of justice attitudes
resembles what one saw in Texas v. Johnson, the flag burning case in Chapter 3. The content of the
conservative opinions seem to fall into two groups: those that are “stereotypical” and those that seem
concerned with something larger than ordinary politics. Justice O’Connor’s views, for example, seem
most like "ordinary" opinions the one might hear conservatives espouse outside of the courtroom in
the larger political culture. She is alarmed by “skyrocketing” jury awards and “wealth redistribution.”
She writes:
Juries are permitted to target unpopular defendants, penalize unorthodox or controversial
views, and redistribute wealth. Multi-million dollar losses are inflicted on a whim. ... Recent
years ... have witnessed an explosion in the frequency and size of punitive damages awards.
A recent study by the RAND Corporation found that punitive damages were assessed against
one of every ten defendants who were found liable for compensatory damages in California.
Id. at viii. The amounts can be staggering. Within nine months of our decision in BrowningFerris, there were no fewer than six punitive damages awards of more than $20 million.
Medians as well as averages are skyrocketing, meaning that even routine awards are growing
in size [citations omitted.]28

Scalia’s view, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with doctrine. He does not approve
of the Court granting rights that have no textual basis in the Constitution. He is consistently against
natural law no matter if it favors liberal or conservative social policy. He writes:
I do not regard the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as a secret repository of
substantive guarantees against "unfairness" - neither the unfairness of an excessive civil
compensatory award, nor the unfairness of an "unreasonable" punitive award. ... The
Constitution provides no warrant for federalizing yet another aspect of our Nation's legal
culture (no matter how much in need of correction it may be) ... .29

Indeed, if these cases illustrate one important lesson, it is that the term “ideology” becomes
troublesome to use in reverse-cue cases. Just as voting to uphold hate speech was said not to be
“liberal” in Chapter 3 because policy cue trumped abstract rhetoric – causing a bit of an
uncomfortable feeling – so too is one left with a bit of an uncomfortable feeling when trying to say
which view, O’Connor’s or Scalia’s, represents the “conservative” vote. Reverse-cue cases, quite
simply, make it very difficult to impose a political stereotype using a binary variable.
But if it is troubling to make these choices, one thing is clear: instrumentalism’s claim that
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principle is ruled by politics is, by definition, problematic as well. The simple fact of the matter is that
legal text and the doctrine it produces do matter to justices independently of their policy desires. In
the next chapter, I suggest that instrumentalism as a critique of the Court simply fails too much to
reliably explain how justices behave. I specifically show that it only has a sound empirical basis for
some areas of voting in civil liberties cases, but not others. In making this observation, I also clear
up the confusion that exists between the two kinds of "conservatism” that exist in O’Connor’s and
Scalia’s opinions. One opinion sees "law" as an instrument for policy choice (O’Connor’s); the other
regards it as a constituence for a set of choices. That is, one seeks to maximize policy choice in the
short term, while the other shuns an immediate gain in favor of obtaining both a long-term group of
policy benefits and a legitimate decision structure all at the same time. In short, Scalia wants "law"
to be real, and he knows that conservatives benefit in the long run from conservative legal doctrine.
Hence, he shuns voting for punitive damage relief even though he desires it because doing so protects
the integrity of "law" as well as long-term conservative social policy.
Summary and Conclusion
This chapter examined three areas of constitutional decision making where the right being
asserted is least clearly designated in law. Two of the areas had unambiguous cue: obscenity and
search and seizure. In both areas, voting on the Court tended to be polarized, and the ideological
model appeared to explain judicial behavior well. In obscenity cases, the measure of the model's
goodness of fit, the likelihood ratio R-squared, was 0.265 when regressing votes against career liberal
percentages. For search and seizure cases, it was 0.237. The goodness of fit enjoyed by the attitudinal
model as a whole is 0.137.
Importantly, a third area of law was analyzed that had a reverse cue: punitive damage relief
under the "substantive" due process clause. For this area of voting, political stereotypes did not
explain Court decision making very well. Quite simply, many conservative justices voted to deny relief
to insurance companies and corporations using the same reasons that they use to deny "substantive"
due process claims that promote liberal social policy. Instrumentalism and "motivated reasoning,"
therefore, seemed not to define the behavior of many conservatives. In short, as a general rule,
conservatives seem consistently opposed to voting for rights that are least-clearly designated by law,
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no matter if the social policy is liberal or conservative. Because the number of reverse-cue cases is
small, however, this observation should be read with caution. Additional analysis of voting behavior
is needed in reverse-cue cases that are governed by legally indeterminate language before one can
make a better conclusion.
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Notes:
1. See Chapter 2, 50-54.
2. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
3. Brennan preferred to use an artful phrase “appealing to the prurient interests” to refer to the stimulation
of lust. This phrase would reappear for decades in subsequent obscenity cases and is now hallmark verbiage
in any case dealing with the outlaw of certain kinds of erotica.
4. Early on, the value prong was quite liberal: the work had to be “utterly without redeeming social value.”
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). So even though certain imagery might incite arousal, it could
be regarded as “classy” or “done the right way.” Plus, the door was open to argue that the whole idea of adults
enjoying sexuality through a commodity is not itself without some social value. I mean, not all juries or
communities were puritanical. So in 1970s, the Burger Court made the standard more conservative: imagery
that “lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value” could be criminalized . Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973) (emphasis supplied).
5. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 477 (1966).
6. Ibid.,.490
7. Mishkin, 383 U.S. 502, 505 (1966)
8. Mishkin, 383 U.S. 502, 518 (1966)
9. He used different words – “sufficient evidence” – but the application worked the same way. It would have
given trial judges the power to decide if something was obscene. Appellate justices could then defer to that
ruling in cases where one could reasonably disagree. Presumably, this would allow Warren to get out of the
business of being a porn critic.
10. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 433 (1966).
11. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
12. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
13. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (possession of photos in a private
suitcase at an airport not protected under Stanley); and United States v. Twelve 200-Foot Reels, 413 U.S. 123
(1973) (no protection even if the photos in your suitcase are for your private use).
14. Paris, 413 U.S. 49, 73-74 (1973).
15. Ibid., 70
16. Miller, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973)
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17. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
18. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977)
19. Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977).
20. The Court uses the words “objective, reasonable-person standard” to describe this.
21. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
22. Just so there is no confusion, the cases in Table 4.5 are coded in my data set just as the pictorial obscenity
is coded. They are the least rigid uses of the word “speech,” no matter that they are “non-obscene.”
23. For an explanation why the attitudinal model has a poor fit to its own data, see Chapter 6.
24. John Ely, Democracy and Distrust, (Harvard University Press, 1981), 18.
25. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 (1982)
26. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986).
27. Segal and Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model Revisited, 432- 433.
28. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 43 and 62 (1991) (quotation is two excerpts of O’Connor’s opinion; the top two
sentences are from page 43, the rest from page 62).
29. BMW, 517 U.S. 559, 598-599 (1996).

Chapter 6:
Conclusion: Who Won the Battle Between
Law and Ideology?

INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 2 of this book, I presented my hypothesis that legal language effects the way that
justices on the Supreme Court cast their votes. The way that this effect was said to occur was very
simple: the more precise or clear that a claim was in law, the more likely the justices were to vindicate
it, no matter if doing so went against their political ideology. But when referring to “law” in this
sense, I made it clear that I meant “primary commands,” which are Constitutional and statutory law,
not court precedents. Frankly, it would be silly to theorize that a justice is more inclined to follow
precedent merely because its announcement in a Court opinion was articulate. Precedent is simply
a different kind of judicial concern.
Also in Chapter 2, I created a criteria that allowed me to assess when and under what
conditions the language in a primary command could be said to be clear, partly clear and completely
imprecise. I referred to this idea of fluctuating clarity as “language rigidity.” Importantly, the criteria
that I ultimately created had a firm basis in both language philosophy and cognitive linguistics and
was able to be translated into an ordinal-level variable for use in an empirical model of judging . That
is, using the criteria, I can now rank primary commands with the number 1, 2, or 3 to denote when
their content litigants claim them to have is very clear, moderately clear and least clear.
In Chapters 3 through 5, I analyzed the voting behavior of Supreme Court justices as well as
the content of their case opinions in the selected areas of core political speech, advertising, campaign
finance, jury trials, obscenity, substantive due process and search-and-seizure. This analysis showed
149
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that the ideological model failed to explain the votes that justices cast in the area of core political
speech and advertising. However, I also showed that political ideology seemed very much to be the
king of the Court in the areas of obscenity and search and seizure. In this chapter I explore whether
or not language rigidity can explain this discrepancy.
But first, I have some unfinished business with the ideological model. Recall that in Chapters
3 through 5, I made several references to the attitudinal model’s goodness of fit. In particular, I
compared how well the model fit its voting data for all civil liberties cases to the fit that it “enjoyed”
in discrete voting areas, such as core political speech. During this discussion, I simply accepted for
the time being that the attitudinal model’s "overall" fit (in all civil liberties cases) could serve as a
baseline for researchers to say whether or not given sub-areas of voting were excessively politicized
or not. Now, however, it is time to look more closely at that assumption. Is the attitudinal model’s
goodness of fit a proper baseline for delineating when the court “value votes” and when it does not?
Stated another way: are the attitudinal model’s own empirical findings overstated in the literature?
The Attitudinal Model Revisited
In Chapter 1, I discussed the empirical research that Segal and Spaeth used to create their
attitudinal model. In particular, I showed that the most central feature of the model is the scholars'
claim claim that career-liberal ratings accurately represent the political ideology of the justices. This
is so, Segal and Spaeth say, because the ratings have a strong correlation with independentlydeveloped measures of the justices' reputation for bias at the time of their Senate confirmation (called
"Segal-Cover scores"). If the independent measures were not so imperfect, the scholars claim, the
correlation would be even stronger. Hence, the career-liberal ratings of justices are now
"independently operationalized" and reliably tell the truth about the extent of political bias among
members of the Court.
The first point that needs to be made about this claim is that Segal and Spaeth chose to
aggregate their data into percentages before they analyzed it. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the
Supreme Court Data Base contains voting data that is in the form 29,443 computer entries of binary
markings (e.g., "1" for liberal, "0" for conservative). One of the problems with aggregating this data
into percentages for each justice is that the quantity of votes cast by individual members of the Court

The Attitudinal Model Revisited

151

varies remarkably. Justice Brennan’s percentage, for example, is based upon 2,416 votes cast, while
Justice Fortas’ is based upon153 votes. The second problem is that aggregation reduces the number
of potential data points from 29,443 to only 23, the number of justices covered in their study.1 Hence,
the foundation of the attitudinal model appears to be composed of an ecological fallacy and a smallcase regression that produces an unstable estimation of the R-squared.
I have elected to re-estimate the goodness-of-fit of Segal and Spaeth’s model by correcting
for these errors. To fix the problem, I have regressed both the Segal-Cover scores and career-liberal
ratings (separately) against the twenty-some thousand votes that are in the data set.2 Because the
dependent variable – the votes – is in a binary format, I have used a logistic regression estimated with
maximum likelihood. For goodness-of-fit, I have relied upon the likelihood-ratio R-squared, which
is both a reliable statistic and superior choice for logit modeling.3 Because this statistic is said by
some to underestimate goodness of fit somewhat when compared to OLS estimations of continuouslevel data,4 I have also created a hypothetical Court and have conducted a number of similar analyses
upon its data to provide a better feel for what the measure reports. The findings of my first regression
are reported below.
Table: 6.1: Regression: The Attitudinal Model
Civil Liberties
Cases

N

Coefficient

P-level

Likelihood-ratio
R-squared

Segal-Cover Scores

26998

1.0006

0.000

0.080

As one can see, the attitudinal model's own data does not fit the Segal-Cover scores very well.
The likelihood-ratio R-squared for this regression is only 0.08 – a terrible number. The coefficient,
obviously, is still the same; a one-unit change in the independent variable makes the probability of
obtaining liberal votes increase by about half of the proportion of the increment. But as I have said
before, the coefficient is not what is most germane here. If all that Segal and Spaeth were arguing –
as I will be later in this chapter – that a given phenomenon is a variable that effects voting, the
coefficient would be fine. But they are arguing much more than that: they say that ideology should
be regarded as the primary and central explanation of how justices decide cases. Quite frankly, their
model’s goodness of fit is not close to empirically supporting such a view.

The Attitudinal Model Revisited

152

What is more interesting, though, is what happens when one conducts the same analysis using
the career-liberal rating as the independent variable. For this regression, goodness of fit only increases
to 0.137. One may want to ask: how can it be that if justices cast liberal votes in the exact proportion
to their career rate, that their career rate would not better fit their votes? That is, how can a tautology
fail? The answer to this question lies at heart of yet another problem with the attitudinal model: it
plays a language game with its audience.
To understand how this game works, one must first understand how Segal and Spaeth
measure bias on the Court. Essentially, they count it by marking votes with a “1" for liberal and “0"
if it is conservative. But when the statistical model determines that justices like Blackmun, Stewart,
White, Clark, Harlan, Souter, and Breyer fail to align themselves greatly with either the “0s” or “1,”
it calculates this as a “bad fit.” Stated another way, what researchers say they observe as the Court’s
political bias – the stimuli of “1s” and “0s” – simply does not influence the choices of these median
justices all that well. To deal with this problem, Segal and Spaeth simply declare that these justices
are “moderate” or “weak conservative/liberal” – meaning they are still voting their ideology, and are
still, therefore, politically biased.
There are two glaring problems with this. First, “moderation” is not generally understood as
an American political ideology – it is rather understood as the absence of affiliation with directional
political beliefs. Moderation is to liberalism and conservatism what independents are to Democrats
and Republicans.5 Having political ideology requires that one affiliate with certain beliefs that are
shared by a political community6 about who or what should prevail in life, and why.7 It might be more
accurate to call people who resist affiliation of this sort as tempered rather than biased.
Furthermore, merely because a belief system remains idiosyncratic does not automatically
make it a political ideology, unless, of course, the name of the game is word change. One might use
the word “ideology” in a more general way to mean “philosophy,” so that any person who does
anything can say he followed his beliefs. But if the term ideology means “just what I believe,” then
Segal and Spaeth would no longer have a political model of judging, but a model of self
determination. All that they would be saying is that justices do what they think is right, which is
hardly an explanation of anything.8 Also, one would not seem to need Segal-Cover scores to bring
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such a creation to life.
Another problem with Segal and Spaeth’s claim that tempered justices are equally biased as
the non-tempered is that the researchers’ variable coding prevents such an observation. That is, if
moderation really stood as its own political subject matter, the only way researchers could measure
its presence on the Court is to count it in the same manner as they do liberal and conservative votes.
If, in fact, researchers used a trichotomous variable that provided three coding options instead of two,
one could in theory account for votes as being liberal, conservative or moderate.9 But this innovation
would no doubt disappoint ideological modelers as well, because it would probably show that liberal
or conservative justices “defect” quite regularly in favor of centrist votes, and that the Court as a
whole is driven by pragmatic rather than dogmatic considerations. There is a good reason for such
speculation: that is exactly why Segal and Spaeth’s model doesn’t fit its data very well.
The reason why the attitudinal model’s goodness of fit is poor even when one uses careerliberal ratings is because nearly 40% of the Court’s voting activity over the last forty or so years
comes from tempered, pragmatic justices. By “pragmatic” I mean justices having very little or no
scaled bias (a liberal rating from 42% to 65%). Table 6.2 lists the number of votes entered for each
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justice in the Supreme Court Data Base according to the most recent edition of the Supreme Court
Compendium, excluding Roosevelt and Truman appointees. Almost 40% of the votes are from
justices with liberal ratings from 65 to 42 (from about Stevens to White). Adding another 10 points
in both directions – that is, adding O’Connor, Powell, Kennedy and Black – accounts for another
17%. That leaves the voting load of the Court's most committed ideologues at about 43%.
To demonstrate how this effects goodness of fit, I created two hypothetical courts with
different membership and voting patterns. Court-A has a normally distributed value structure10 – for
every Rehnquist there is a Brennan; for every Powell a Stevens; and for every White a Souter. There
is also a sole Stewart (the centrist). Court-B, on the other hand, has a skewed value structure. It does
not have a centrist and is over represented in votes by justices with extreme ratings. If Court-A
engages in “ideal voting” – every member voting liberal at the rate expected by his or her rating – the
goodness of fit is 0.237. If the same court polarizes,11 the fit jumps to 0.88. For the skewed Court,
however, ideal voting scores 0.423. A matrix of these values appears below in Table 6.3:
Table 6.3: Goodness of Fit; Hypothetical Courts
Type of Voting

Likelihood-Ratio
R-Squared

Court-A (Balanced)

Ideal

0.24

Court-A (Balanced)

Polarized

0.88

Court-B (Skewed)

Ideal

0.42

The reason, therefore, that Segal and Spaeth’s own data is not explained well in a logistic
regression that uses career percentages as the explanatory variable is because 40% of the twentysome thousand votes are cast by centrist-oriented justices.(57% if one expands the net to include the
O’Connor types). What does this show? It shows that the best characterization of the kind of civilliberties voting that has taken place on the Court on a day-to-day basis over the last forty or so years
is more pragmatic in orientation than scholars often report. It in no way shows us a Court that is
defined by political clans or dominated by political pathology. Although those forces are indeed
present, the simple fact is that the bulk of the Court’s votes do not fit very well into a political model
of judging. What I am saying is that scholars of the Court seem to elevate the importance of the more
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ideologically-driven justices in a way that distorts the fact that the Court is competitively anchored
by centrist, pragmatic forces.
In fact, the truth about political ideology is that it is a fluctuating influence upon the Court.
For some controversies – like Bush v. Gore – the Court does indeed polarize in a way that fits a
political stereotype. But in other cases – such as Lawrence v. Texas, the decision protecting
homosexual sodomy – the critique of a political Court seems to come apart. Importantly, what my
work does is empirically identify distinct and meaningful areas of decision making that are more
ideologically driven than normal as well as areas that are less politicized. I replicate these findings
below so that readers can now place them into better context.
Table 6.4: Ideological Fluctuation
N

Likelihood-Ratio
R-Squared

Core Political Speech

372

0.058

Advertising

133

0.110

Obscenity

171

0.265

Search and Seizure

413

0.237

26998

0.137

All Civil Liberties

Having just concluded that political ideology is better understood as a fluctuating rather than
governing force upon the Court, I now consider a much more important issue: What might cause this
fluctuation? Why are measures of ideology so unsuccessful with core speech but so much better with
search and seizure? To answer these questions, I now examine the data supporting my central
hypothesis.
Who are the Textualists?
The reason why ocean tides become high and low has to do with the gravitational field of the
moon. Ronald Dworkin is a popular legal philosopher who once suggested that law itself contained
a “gravitational force” that changed justices behavior.12 In this segment of my final chapter, I consider
whether or not rigidity of legal commands empirically effects the choices that justices make and
therefore explains the reason why the Court experiences high and low ideological tides.
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I conduct this analysis with a logistic regression. Every case discussed in Chapters 3 through
5 is included, as are the cases in the Appendix.13 The independent variable is “command rigidity,”
which is ordinal in rank. It is coded as a “1” where a primary command is most rigid, “2” where it is
intermediate and “3” where it is least rigid. The dependent variable is a binary variable called “liberty
granted.” It records, simply, whether or not justices vote to support the liberty claim that a litigant
argues is founded in a primary command. It is the same as the ideological direction variable, except
that, in reverse-cue cases, the two become opposite. That is, for free-speech cases, the variable is a
“1” for each vote in favor of speech, no matter if the vote is for obscenity, advertising, campaign
finance, burning flags, hate speech or Christians in school. For substantive due process, a “1” is
entered for each vote in favor of abortion claims as well as relief from punitive damage awards. In
other words, the variable does not distinguish whether the liberty claim is said to be “conservative”
or “liberal.”
Table 6.5 lists the results of the regression.14 They are, quite frankly, surprising. I admit that
I did not completely foresee these findings. What the regression shows is that virtually every
conservative justice is effected by the language clarity of positive law when judging liberty claims for
the issues in this study, but that no liberal justice is. The p-values for liberals are all statistically
insignificant. The only two who are in the ballpark are Warren and Black, who have p-levels,
respectively, of 0.142 and 0.151. The only “non-conservative” having statistically-significant results
is Justice Blackmun, who is technically a centrist but had a reputation as a political conservative at
the time of his confirmation.15
When interpreting these findings, it is important to remember a few things. First, because the
measure of rigidity assigns a “1” to the most textually-precise claim and a “3” to the least, a one unit
increase in this variable represents a step toward indeterminacy. Hence, that is why the coefficients
are negative. The more that liberty claims are based upon flowery or indeterminate language
constructs, the greater the likelihood that conservatives but not liberals will deny the claim.
Conversely, as liberty claims become more supported by legal text, conservatives but not liberals
become more likely to support them. Liberals do not become more supportive because they are
already so committed to “the cause” that this tendency exists regardless of what the law says. Stated
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another way, they support obscenity as vigorously as they do core speech. Literalism or language
determinacy, therefore, seems not to structure their voting.
I must be careful, however, in making these statements about liberal justices. Because the Bill
of Rights is usually supportive of liberal social policy, it is simply difficult for liberals to have very
many reverse-cue cases in their data set. The only cases in this study where liberals were cued against
claims to liberty were those involving campaign finance, Christian and hate speech, and punitivedamage relief. Hence, because liberalism is cued to favor the great majority of liberty claims the Court
receives, it is no wonder that those possessing liberal values vote to vindicate their desires both when
law is absent – that is, when it is vague or uncertain – as well as when it is more clear. The real issue
is how liberals might behave when “law” tells them to vote against their vision of the good society,
and I simply do not have enough votes in this study to make a solid judgment about that.
For conservatives, however, they are told repeatedly by sentences in the Bill of Rights to vote
for things that they ordinarily would not support absent law’s command. It is no wonder, then, that
they tend to seek refuge in a jurisprudence of language precision. In essence, they use language as
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a structure to decide which of a group of largely unfavorable policy outcomes to allow and which to
deny. In fact, it is quite rational when faced with such relatively unpleasant choices to adopt a criteria
for dispensing legal entitlement that allows one to manage policy benefits globally. What this says
is that language precision allows those who are predisposed against the idea of expanding the
individual’s right over his or her community to grant only those claims which they clearly have to.
But is this still “instrumentalism” as I defined it in Chapter 1? It clearly is not, unless one
wants to play more word games. It is not instrumentalism because the language construct that is
adopted as "law’s" justification is not a sham. Bias does not occur through "law," it occurs around
it. Stated another way, when conservative justices say that they do not like gay rights because it is
not in the constitution, their view gains credibility when they say the same thing for policy they do
like (e.g., punitive damage relief). Hence, justification is not mere rhetoric that is governed by hidden
desires for specific policy outcomes; it is a genuine and real decision structure.
Language precision allows conservatives to maintain the integrity of justification while
managing liberty claims in a way that produces more policy gain than loss. Because of this, it is better
to think of "law’s" role as a franchise of sorts rather than a weapon. One can think of language
precision as being a kind of juristic store that conservatives operate. The business of precision
requires them to take losses every now and then – flag fires, punitive damages, condom mailings, war
demonstrators, sentencing enhancements – but, at the end of the day, they turn a profit (no gay rights,
no abortion, no obscenity, more police power, etc.). And what is even better is that their business is
completely legitimate.
It is probably best to refer to this phenomenon as the constitutive aspect of "law." It
emphasizes the political aspect of law’s definition, not its application. The significance of this view
can be understood better if I compare it to something that it seems to resemble, but does not: the
game-theory approaches described in Chapter 1. Recall that some political scientists who promote
the view that judging is instrumental also argue that it is constrained by the roles of other elites in
government. The idea is that the preferences of other governmental leaders force justices to seek
long-term rather than immediate policy benefits. The difference between this view and how
conservative justices actually behave in my study is that the decision to “retreat” into the shelter of
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language precision is not caused by the interdependent choices of other political elites. There is no
evidence, for example, that the other branches of government cause conservatives to embrace
language precision. Nor is there evidence that, on the whole, they embrace it because they have to.
Who or what forced conservatives to do this? Why are they not more supportive of judges
punishing serious criminals beyond statutory maximums? Why are they not more supportive of the
public's outcry against flag mutilation? Why don’t they allow government to ban mass, unsolicited
condom mailings? Why have they not been more supportive of relief from skyrocketing punitive
damage awards? How come they allow citizens to mouth off to police officers? How come they allow
Larry Flynt to defame Jerry Falwell? Why do they protect anarchists at universities?
The answer to all of these questions is very simple: "law" requires it. And even though the
view that conservatives have of "law" is founded upon the stingiest of language constructs possible,
it nonetheless allows them to legitimately adhere to "law" while at the same time securing more policy
victories than losses. In this way, "law" plays an independent role in structuring their policy choices.
All of my efforts aside, C. Herman Pritchett still has the best description of it:
[P]olitical scientists who have done so much to put the “political” in “political jurisprudence”
need to emphasize that it is still “jurisprudence.” It is judging in a political context, but it is
still judging; and judging is something different from legislating or administering. Judges make
choices, but they are not the “free” choices of Congressmen. ... There is room for much
interpretation in the texts of constitutions, statutes and ordinances, but the judicial function
is still interpretation and not independent policy making. It is just as false to argue that judges
freely exercise their discretion as to contend they have no policy functions at all. Any accurate
analysis of judicial behavior must have as a major purpose a full clarification of the unique
limiting conditions under which judicial policy making proceeds.16

Below is the list of justices who my study finds are statistically influenced by command rigidity
when voting for liberty claims. As one can see, the effect that rigidity has on each of the 9 justices is
substantial. Of all the textualists, Scalia, Powell and Kennedy are the most ardent. Scalia’s results are
the best of the three. A one unit increase in how precisely a primary command designates a right
makes it 83% likely that Scalia will vote to uphold the liberty claim. His likelihood ratio R-squared
is 0.206 – better than the attitudinal model enjoys when "explaining" all civil liberties voting. The
complete results are as follows:
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Table 6.6: The Rigidity Effect
Justice

Odds

Percent

Percent
Change in
Odds

Likelihood
ratio Rsquared

Rehnquist

2.855

0.74

185%

0.111

Thomas

3.281

0.77

228%

0.111

Scalia

5.096

0.84

410%

0.206

Burger

1.824

0.65

82%

0.044

O'Connor

2.077

0.67

108%

0.055

Kennedy

5.120

0.84

412%

0.186

Powell

4.408

0.82

341%

0.186

White

2.381

0.7

138%

0.096

Blackmun

2.427

0.71

143%

0.086

What are the implications of these findings? The first and foremost seems to be that “law”
matters. It does not matter in the way that it was said to in the 1800s – as a system of self contained
rules and pre-existing solutions. But it matters in the way that things do to social scientists: as variable
in an equation. My work shows that law is a variable in a judging equation. It is not, as legal
skepticism says, a fantasy of the judicial mind or a toy of the judicial will. Rather, it is as structuralism
says – a pre-existing cognitive framework that exercises an independent force upon the formulation
of policy desire in the mind of the justice.
I readily conced, however, that there are not many areas of Constitutional decision making
where the right being asserted is designated especially clearly in law. But there are some, as I have
shown. And it seems to me that if my findings work for Constitutional decision making – a very tough
test for "law" – they should export well into statutory interpretation cases, where textual rights tend
to have better articulation. It is certainly worth future research to see if my findings can prove
themselves in other contexts.
Secondly, what I have shown should spread new light in how the politics of law is
conceptualized in undergraduate courses. Too often I fear that political science describes Court
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decisions as though "law" cannot act as a meaningful decision structure or as though all the choices
justices make are “political” in the same way. As Pritchett said, we need to differentiate between the
strata of things we label “political,” paying particular attention to the fact that justices who follow an
ethic of “plain meaning” are treating law as a constituence rather than as an instrument.
My work might help us better understand, for example, how political scientists should
describe the crisis that the Court faced during the Roosevelt years when it was using the commerce
clause to strike down various kinds of progressive legislation. Like it or not, the commerce clause
seems to be a comparatively rigid sentence. One could compare it rather nicely to the speech clause
in terms of what it literally means, versus what is poetically says (today). And if one accepts the
premise that literalism was a force acting upon judicial minds independently of policy cue, one has
no choice but to see Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan not only as an effort to change an ideologically
stubborn Court, but the literal meaning of a rather important legal sentence as well.
In addition, one may now be in a position to better understand how legal text can allow the
Court to change society – rather than prevent it from being changed – when its nomenclature is so
vague that it commands nothing but political values to govern. The Court’s search-and-seizure
decisions, for example, show how indeterminate legal text can facilitate conservative activism. In fact,
I see great parallels in the conservative philosophy of interpretation that tried to keep the federal
government confined to a “plain” reading of the commerce clause and the one that effectively
redefined the scope of police powers under the Fourth Amendment. The parallel is this: in each
instance a literal reading of words allowed it. The lesson here is the same: law matters, indeed.
Of course, I must also be careful not to forget the situations where law has failed. I am well
aware of the obvious examples in both Constitutional law and elsewhere where the force of politics
has caused legal sentences to lose all of their literal content. The Constitution’s war power clause and
its commerce clause are two examples. Both do not seem to have much integrity as accurate
sentences anymore. What is commonly said in classrooms about the cause of these failures has
something to do with America’s change from an agrarian, simple society to the very complicated one
we have today. If this is indeed true, it says that there is yet another empirical variable that needs
fitted into our judging equation. If we could capture empirically the pathway that explains how mass
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societal change effects judicial voting behavior, we might be able to explain when and why natural
law occasionally asserts itself upon the Court. If we had this variable, we could empirically model
judging as being a function of three basic things – ideology, language and mass social change. This
would be a substantial improvement over what exists today.
Lastly, if there is one other contribution that my work makes to the politics of law, I hope it
is a change in the impulse that some academics have about language. I hear too often the claim that
language cannot have “plain meanings” and that words can never “point” to anything. This
commitment to indeterminacy at all costs is not only irrational – which is perhaps its goal – but it is
often naively inconsiderate of the views of cognitive linguistics,17 an empirical science, and analytic
philosophy. Language, I have shown, is not only philosophically capable of being referential, its
precision is an empirical predictor of judicial behavior.
Summary and Conclusion
The role that ideology plays in Supreme Court judging has been over emphasized in political
science literature. Rather than being a grand theory that explains everything, it is only a fluctuating
force upon the court; sometimes high, sometimes low. For example, measures of justice ideology do
not explain very well the voting that occurs in core political speech and advertising cases. For these
two subject areas, regressing career liberal ratings against justice votes produces a likelihood-ratio
R-squared of 0.058 for core speech18 and 0.11 for commercial speech. This is significantly lower than
the goodness of fit for voting in all civil liberties cases, which is 0.137. However, my analysis of
search-and-seizure and obscenity cases reveals the opposite: ideology is a much stronger explanation
of judicial behavior. For these subject areas, career liberal ratings have a likelihood-ratio R-squared
of 0.265 for obscenity and 0.237 for search-and-seizure.
One of the reasons why the role of political ideology is misunderstood is because scholars
exaggerate how well the attitudinal model explains its own voting data. The cause of this mistake is
a decision by attitudinal modelers to aggregate their data into percentages prior to performing
regression analysis. This results in findings that are based upon micronumerous cases and an
ecological fallacy, which causes exaggerated conclusions. For example, regressing Segal-Cover scores
against career-liberal ratings produces an R-squared statistic that overstates how well the scores
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explain justices’ votes. In reality, if the votes remain non-aggregated and a logistic regression analysis
is used, the likelihood ratio R-squared for this regression is only 0.08. The coefficient, of course,
remains the same. Thus, although Segal-Cover scores remain a statistical predictor of how justices
vote, they do not come close to being an overall explanation of voting activity. More importantly,
neither do career percentages, which, as mentioned, have a goodness of fit of only 0.137 for all civil
liberties cases. This shows that political ideology is hardly the unitary, robust explanation of judicial
behavior that scholars suggest.
The basic reason why career percentages do not fit the attitudinal model's data very well is
because almost 40% of the votes in the United States Supreme Court Data Base are from centristoriented justices (having liberal scores from 42% to 65%). The most extreme justices (having liberal
scores below 30% and above 75%) account for 43% of the votes. The intermediately biased make
up the remaining 17%. Because nearly 40% of the twenty-some thousand votes in the data base are
not meaningfully responsive to directional stimuli, movements in career ratings simply do not explain
the voting data especially well. What this says is that scholars who are championing the idea of an
ideologically-driven Court are simply allowing the votes of those with the most obstinate political
biases to overshadow the nearly equal presence of pragmatic, centrist-oriented members of the Court.
Another basic problem with the attitudinal model is that its scholars have adopted an
unrealistic approach to the concept of justification in law. The assumptions that modelers make about
legal epistemology and how it effects judging are quite problematic and do not seem to have any solid
empirical support. The better view – and the one that seems to unify all the approaches – is that legal
justification provides a meaningful decision structure for justices. What this structure fundamentally
consists of is a pre-existing cognitive framework that independently helps justices formulate their
views about cases. Importantly, the structure does not determine case outcomes; it only helps to
narrow the list of permissible choices and provide "weight" to various alternatives.
One of the central features of this decision structure is legal text. The specific language found
in constitutional provisions and statutes clearly effects how justices decide cases. For example, the
more precisely that a claim to liberty is designated by the text of a legal command, the more likely that
conservative justices are to vote in favor of it. Conversely, if the claim rests upon vague and
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indeterminate language, conservatives are likely to vote against it. The specific justices whose votes
are statistically determined by language clarity are: Rehnquist, Thomas, Scalia, Burger, O'Connor,
Kennedy, Powell, White and Blackmun. Of these textualists, Scalia, Kennedy and Powell are the most
ardent. Scalia is the most textually-centered of them all. A one unit change in how clearly a liberty
is designated by law makes it 83% likely that Scalia will vote to vindicate the claim.
It cannot be said, however, that liberal justices use textual rigidity as a decision structure. The
only two who are close to having statistically significant results are justices Warren and Black.
Perhaps if the sample of cases was expanded to cover more of their careers, rigidity might predict
their votes as well. But for now this must be considered speculation. One of the reasons why liberals
as a group do not use language precision as a decision structure is simply because of the disputable
premise that "law" ends when it becomes figurative. Liberalism tends to believe in a "living
constitution" and in other rights-creating rhetoric. It would be foolish for such a value system to
deploy word precision as a decision structure.
But this does not transform "law's" meaning into some kind of political sham. To the contrary,
what it shows is that, where law is most clear in what it commands, both liberals and conservatives
tend to adhere to its meaning. It is only that liberals continue voting for liberty when claims become
less clear. Hence, what liberals and conservatives disagree about is the legally ambiguous. Stated
another way, they disagree about how to vote when law's wishes are absent. This is more the fault
(or design?) of law's drafters than a failure in “law” itself.
There are plenty of cases in this study, for example, where law "told" conservative justices
to vote for social policy that they disfavor. Instead of following their ideology, conservatives tended
to vindicate "law." These include cases involving: flag burning, anti-American protest and speech that
obstructs police officers; hate-speech involving Nazis, racists and cross burning; left-wing speech
involving anarchists meetings and radical publications on college campuses, and national socialist
campaigns; and liberal interest-group speech cases that strengthened the power of the ACLU and the
NAACP. They also include cases that protect the right to attack popular religious leaders with
parodies that depict them in incestuous relationships and to portray women in novels and movies as
enjoying the act of rape. They also include cases striking down sentencing enhancement laws that are
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"tough-on-crime;" cases protecting the right to advertise abortion services, the strength of beer and
the price of liquor; and cases that protect the right of citizens to mail each other condom ads. In all
of the above cases, conservative justices either unanimously defected from their ideology or
experienced significant fracture within their voting bloc.
Importantly, command rigidity seems to be a significant cause of the conservative defection.
It is no coincidence, for example, that in each of the case areas listed in the preceding paragraph, the
legal issue involves both an unambiguous political cue for conservatives and a liberty claim that is
more textually determinate than the other areas of voting examined in this study. It also is probably
no coincidence that in cases where a claim to liberty was least rigid, conservatives tended to deny
rights to sodomy and abortion services as strictly as they did to insurance companies and corporations
who wanted protection from "jackpot" punitive damage awards. That is, the voting seems more
related to a language construct than to the case’s policy cue. In short, law matters.
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Notes:
1. Actually, the number of potential data points is 26,998. This is because attitudinal modelers chose to exclude
justices appointed by Roosevelt and Truman. Therefore, the votes of Rutledge, Frankfurter,Whittaker, Jackson,
Burton, Minton and Reed are not considered. One of the reasons for their exclusion is the fear that their SegalCover scores are not as reliable as the ones used for current justices. Following this convention, I, too, assess
the goodness of fit of the Court’s voting without inclusion of these justices.
2. The data set for this procedure is organized like the one pictured in my empirical design in Chapter 2. Each
justice’s vote appears as its own row in the data set. The measures of ideology appear in the columns. There
are, therefore, 26,998 data entries. The values for this data were obtained from the latest version of the
Supreme Court Compendium, Third Edition, 2002.
3. Scott Menard, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis, (Sage Publications, 2002), 20-27.
4. See Alfred DeMaris, Logit Modeling, Practical Applications, (Sage, 1992) , 53-54.
5. Using Phillip Converse’s framework, one is moderate if he or she has chosen to resist certain “constraints”
(or cues) that political elites generate to link “idea elements” together to form political pathology. See Phillip
Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent
(New York: The Free Press, 1964), 206-61.
6. See, e.g., John Plamenatz, Ideology, (New York: Praeger, 1970), 15 (ideology is a “set of closely related
beliefs ... of a group or community”); and Roy C. Macridis, Contemporary Political Ideologies, 3rd Edition
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986), 2.
7. What is fundamental about ideology is that “a given political ideology rationalizes the status quo, whereas
other, competing ideologies and movements challenge it.” Macridis, 3.
8. Indeed, it is interesting to see some political scientists believe the the criteria of falsifiability for the
attitudinal model’s claims is finding examples where justices admit that they had to vote for an outcome that
they did not personally favor. It is as if the only claim that could refute it is one of duress or no free will. See,
e.g., Lori Hausegger and Lawrence Baum, “Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme Court
Motivations in Statutory Interpretation,” American Journal of Political Science 43 (1999): 162.
9. In fact, this seems consistent with Spriggs, Maltzman and Wahlbeck’s observation that any potential case
represents not merely one of two choices, but one of many graduated choices. See Figure 3 in Chapter 1.
10. The values for the Court simply run from .10 to .80, with an equal number of votes from each of the 8
justices.
11. Polarized voting is defined as members aligning their votes in the direction of their closest pole for every
vote cast (every case is Bush v. Gore). However, the justice with no affiliation for either pole splits his or her
vote.
12. See, Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth & Company, 1977) at p. 113; and Law's
Empire, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986) at p. 239.
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13. For the record, that would be: core political speech, advertising, campaign finance, obscenity and
pornography, and speech involving vulgarity; search-and-seizure cases involving the warrant requirement and
those involving “reasonable suspicion;” and substantive due process cases involving punitive damage awards,
gay rights and “leading” abortion cases.
14. No results appear for Justice Goldberg. He only had 7 votes, all of them “1s” and none with a rigidity
coding of “2 ” or “3.” He therefore had to be tossed.
15. Blackmun’s career voting pattern is atypical. When he was being confirmed, he was thought to be a strong
conservative – equal to Justice Burger. Indeed, when he started casting votes on the Court, he began as a
conservative. But as time went by, he became less and less conservative each year. By the time he ended his
career, in fact, his voting had become strongly liberal. He had actually moved to the left in incremental steps
each year of his term, so that where he ended his career was the opposite of where it began. His career liberal
rating, therefore, shows no great affiliation with either political ideology.
16. “The Development of Judicial Research,” in Joel B. Grossman and Joseph Tanenhaus, eds., Frontiers of
Judicial Research (New York: Wiley, 1969), 42.
17. See, e,g., Marc C. Baker, The Atoms of Language: The Mind’s Hidden Rules of Grammar (New York:
Basic Books, 2001), 204-205; Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997),
299-362; and Steven Pinker, Words and Rules (New Tork: Perennial, 2000), 269-278.
18.It should be remembered that this statistic excludes Christian speech cases. See Chapter 3, 94.

Appendix

This appendix contains the rules I developed for coding cases. It also contains search-andseizure and other cases I rely upon for my analysis. Coding rules are presented first.
A. Coding Rules.
A distinction must be made between the criteria for assigning ideological direction to a vote
and what actually is "a vote." I discussed the former in the final segment of Chapter 2, titled, "The
Concept of Political Cue." I discuss the latter now. A justice "votes," quite simply, by being part of
an alignment in a case (majority, minority or plurality). If the justice only partially joins an alignment,
e.g., concurring or dissenting in part, the part that he or she disagrees with becomes its own "vote."
The number of votes per case are called "issues." Each "issue" is a data entry in my data set. Some
examples follow.
Example 1: One case, one issue. The Court hears argument on Case X. The question
is whether burning an American flag is "free speech." 5 justices believe the speech
clause protects this activity, 4 believe it does not. There is one "issue" in the case; and
the "vote" is simply the decision to join with the yes or no side.
Example 2: One case, two issues. The Court hears argument on Case Y. The question
is whether the the speech clause protects protestors who were arrested for blocking
traffic and disorderly conduct. 5 justices rule that the speech clause protects the
protesters. 2 justices dissent completely, and 2 dissent "in part." The opinion of the
partial dissenters is that the conviction for disorderly conduct is unconstitutional, but
not the conviction for blocking traffic. There are therefore two "issues," and the vote
is:
Issue-1: disorderly conduct: 7 justices in favor of speech; 2 against.
Issue-2: blocking traffic: 5 justices in favor of speech; 4 against.
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There are two situations that infrequently arise, but create problems. I call these problems
"deflection," "packaging" and "parsing." Deflection is where a justice refuses to analyze the legal
issue in the case because of some ulterior, usually procedural concern (e.g., the party lacks standing,
the doctrine of abstention should apply, etc.). Deflection is considered rhetoric: what the justice does
in the case is his "vote," not what he or she says. Packaging is where a case has in theory many
potential issues, but the Court votes up or down on all of the items as a "package." This counts as
one vote. Parsing is the opposite: justices cast differing votes on differing parts of the statute. This
is treated the same as Example 2 above. Some examples follow:
Example-3: Issue Deflection: The Court hears argument on Case Z. The question is
whether the defendant's conviction for obstructing a police officer violates the speech
clause. The Court overturns the conviction 6-3. 6 justices believe free speech was
violated, 2 justices do not, and 1 believes the Court should not have decided. The
justice who supports abstention does so because, very recently, the state changed its
obstruction law. It is not clear now whether the conviction is legal under the new law.
Because the Court has a policy of letting states decide fresh issues, this justice
dissents on procedural grounds. For coding purposes, the deflection is irrelevant.
There is one voting issue, and it 6 in favor, 3 against.
Example-4: Packaging. The Court hears argument on Case A. The question is
whether an anti-abortion statute is constitutional. The statute requires parental
notification, spousal notification, informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period. The
Court has never before considered any of these issues. It holds, 5-4, that the statute
is unconstitutional. 5 justices agree that none of the provisions are acceptable; 4
justices believe they are all acceptable. There is one issue in the case.
Example-5: Parsing. The Court hears argument on Case B. The question is whether
an anti-abortion statute is constitutional. The statute requires parental notification,
spousal notification, informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period. The Court's
opinion is fractured. 1 justices believes that the entire statute is unconstitutional; 3
justices believe that everything but parental notification and informed consent is
unconstitutional; 2 justices believe that only spousal notification is unconstitional, and
3 justice believe the entire statute is acceptable. There are 4 issues:
Issue-1: parental notification: 8 justices for; 1 against.
Issue-2: spousal notification: 3 justices for; 6 against.
Issue-3: informed consent: 8 justices for; 1 against.
Issue-4: 24-hour waiting period: 5 justices for; 4 against.
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Example-6: Parsing. (Example-5 with one change). The question is whether an antiabortion statute is constitutional. The statute requires parental notification, spousal
notification, informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period. The Court's opinion is
split, but not fractured. 4 justices believe that everything but parental notification and
informed consent is unconstitutional; 2 justices believe that only spousal notification
is unconstitutional, and 3 justice believe the entire statute is acceptable. There are 3
issues:
Issue-1: parental notification and informed consent: 9 justices for; 0 against.*
Issue-2: spousal notification: 3 justices for; 6 against.
Issue-3: 24-hour waiting period: 5 justices for; 4 against.
* Note that one issue has disappeared because it is now grouped into one "package." This
happens because the Court did not split its voting alignment between parental notification
and informed consent; it only split between spousal notification and the waiting period.
Extra voting issues are only created by splits in alignment, not by any other criteria .

Examples of packaging or parsing are rare. When it occurs, I indicate it in the tables of cases
appearing in Chapters 3 through 5 and in the tables found (below) in this Appendix. If a justice
concurs only in the result of a case, it is coded like deflection: what a justice does in the case is what
counts as a "vote," not his or her affiliation with arguments. If a coding problem arises, I indicate it
in endnotes when discussing the case in the body of my work. There are 3 such notes, all of them in
Chapter 3 (notes 15, 23 and 41).
B. Cases
The pages that follow contain cases that were not specifically discussed in the body of my
work, but are relied upon in my study. They consist of selected search-and-seizure cases, landmark
abortion cases, speech cases involving vulgarity and cases involving the right to sodomy under the
substantive due process clause. The tables indicate in the upper right corner the area of law they
address. In every respect, the tables are similar in format to those that appear in the chapters. It is
quite easy to flip through them and see the voting alignment.
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